

INDIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

INDIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Dhiraj R. Chamling



Associated Publishing House
New Delhi-110005

Associated Publishing House
New Market, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-110005

लोखपुर विश्वविद्यालय प्रकाशकः

लोखपुर

प्रकाशकः

Dhiraj R. Chamling 1939

© Dhiraj R. Chamling 1978

All Rights Reserved

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

PRINTED IN INDIA

PUBLISHED AND PRINTED BY R.K. PAUL FOR
ASSOCIATED PUBLISHING HOUSE, NEW DELHI.

FOREWORD

S H O R T L Y after the close of World War II India dropped the trappings of colonial status and became a sovereign nation in her own right. About the same time, another political structure had just come into being—the United Nations. Each of these entities—India and the United Nations—was a “developing” phenomenon. What would the future hold for each? Would India with its teeming millions, its immense cultural wealth, and its modern technological lag, be able to take its rightful place in the community of nations? Would the fledgling United Nations be able to surmount the strains of national rivalries, economic dislocations, and threats to peace, and develop into a stable and effective world government?

The fate of the United Nations would depend upon the way in which it was regarded and used by the individual nations. In the late 1940s and early 1950s there were serious questions all over the globe regarding the viability of this new experiment in international government. The magnitude of world problems, and the deadly necessity of avoiding another global war, were considerations which made it mandatory that the United Nations be accorded every opportunity to succeed.

The fate of India would depend largely upon two factors. One would be the quality of her own leadership in tackling the problems of development at home and of relations with neighbouring and distant nations. The other factor would be the attitude of other nations, including the United Nations, in reaction to India's policies and problems.

The present book by Mr Rai Chamling is a depth study of India's problems as affected by the existence and policies of the United Nations. The fact that both India and the United Nations were experiencing their formative years together perhaps induced a bond of understanding and cooperation

beneficial to each, strained as some of the relations might appear to be at certain junctures. Mr Rai Chamling's research goes far towards providing insights for a better appreciation and perspective of Indian foreign relations in the years 1947-1952.

University of Missouri
Columbia, USA

Robert Karsch
Professor of Political Science

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Grateful acknowledgment is due to:

The University of North Bengal for allowing to carry on research with a subsidiary in the form of a research scholarship.

The Vice-Chancellor, Prof. A.C. Roy, for his sympathetic interest in the work.

The teaching staff of the Department of Political Science, North Bengal University, for their advice and suggestions.

The Librarian and members of the staff of:

The Central Library, North Bengal University.

The National Library, Calcutta.

The Library, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi.

The work has been possible for their cooperation.

Sincere thanks are also due to other friends and well-wishers in Calcutta and Delhi for their help.

Dhiraj R. Chamling

PREFACE

THE dissertation, "India and the United Nations: 1947-52", is to probe into the facts which influenced the policy-making in foreign affairs during the formative period of independent India. Inheriting the legacy of a colonial rule India was groping her way in international politics. Her national interest was determined by Britain so far as delineation of her boundary and the organization of defence were concerned. India's economy was a near appendage of the larger imperial interest of Britain. The administration was fashioned in British image and the bureaucracy functioned in a spirit of either resistance to the new outlook or a band of cynical superiors only tolerating a group of amateur political leaders. The country was divided and relation with the newly created State of Pakistan was far from friendly. Internal administration was faced with major political decision in connexion with the hundreds of princely States also which had neither the power of becoming independent States nor the leaders of new India were in a mood to allow them to take such decision.

In considering the Indian approach in her policy-making, especially during her infancy, the facts of existing world organization become more formative. The Principles and Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and also the details were not only readily acceptable to the builders of modern India but it was found that an identity of outlook already existed. Chapter 1 of the dissertation thus deals with this *Identity of Outlook* between India and the United Nations Organization. Chapter 2, *Peace and National Reconstruction*, gives a descriptive account of India's economic problem and her major interest in national reconstruction. Her insistence on a peaceful international condition could be appreciated. Chapter 3, *U.N. and Economic Aid*, deals with the question of India's insistence on U.N. assistance for economic development. Chapter 4, *A Cold War Departure*, expounds India's political motivation in

international tension and deals with the problems she had to face in formulating an independent policy on the one hand, and supporting the U.N. on the other. In Chapter 5, *U.N. in Action and India's Role*, some major international disputes have been discussed with a view to showing India's active reliance on the U.N. peace-keeping machineries. In discussing international disputes India like any other sovereign State had to be careful to safeguard her national interest even when she was working hand in hand with an international organization. Her policy-making was in keeping with the fundamental concept of national interest and this has been explained in Chapter 6, *International Disputes and India's National Interests*. Lastly, Chapter 7, *Human Rights*, deals with an apparently non-political U.N. sphere of action, i.e., the human rights. In shaping the world into a better place to live in for all, irrespective of race, religion, etc., the Convention on Human Rights could play a decisively major role. India had all along been a champion of human rights and her foreign policy formulation was very much influenced by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the concluding Chapter 8, the impact of the United Nations on the qualitative absorption of the U.N. ideals by India has been discussed. This dissertation is not meant to be a descriptive account of India's policy towards the U.N. but an analytical review of India's foreign policy-making vis-a-vis the existence of the United Nations.

University of North Bengal
April 13, 1978

Dhiraj R. Chamling

To
my mother
who is no more

CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-------------|
| Foreword | <i>v</i> |
| Acknowledgments | <i>vii</i> |
| Preface | <i>viii</i> |
| Contents | <i>xi</i> |
| 1. IDENTITY OF OUTLOOK | 1 |
| Mutual Affirmation—The Charter and the Constitution—Directive Principles of State Policy—Economic Collaboration—Foreign Policy—Absorption of Force—Trusteeship System—Anti-Colonialism—Non-Self-Governing Territories—South-West Africa—Indonesia—Kashmir—Korea. | |
| 2. PEACE AND NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION | 28 |
| Five Year Plan and Foreign Commitments—Technical Assistance—Agriculture—Plan and Policy. | |
| 3. U.N. AND ECONOMIC AID | 53 |
| Problems of Independence—Policy and Investment—U.S. Aid | |
| 4. A COLD WAR DEPARTURE | 93 |
| Commonwealth Relationship—Involvement and Immunity. | |
| 5. U.N. IN ACTION AND INDIA'S ROLE (CASE STUDY) | 120 |
| Indonesia—Palestine—Berlin—Korea—Uniting for Peace Resolution—Chinese Intervention—Cease-Fire—The P.O.W. Issue—Diplomatic Activities—Emergent China and Tibet. | |
| 6. INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES AND INDIA'S NATIONAL INTEREST | 155 |
| Indo-China—Malaya. | |
| 7. HUMAN RIGHTS | 174 |
| Practice At Home—Indians Overseas. | |
| 8. CONCLUSION | 199 |
| Select Bibliography | 222 |
| Index | 231 |

1

IDENTITY OF OUTLOOK

INDIA, emerging as an independent sovereign State, solemnly undertook a common approach along with the United Nations Organisation in the solution of several issues that the world faced at the aftermath of World War II. This, in a way, followed from the inexorable logic of the fact of the extent to which India, as an original member of the world body, placed her faith and reliance upon the sanctity of the Principles and Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, though shaken at times by the decisions of the principal organs of the world organisation upon questions wherein the national self-interests of India were directly involved. In September, 1946, when the Indians, for the first time, had an active participation in the affairs of the country, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minister, declared that India's attitude towards the United Nations Organisation would be that of "... whole-hearted cooperation and unreserved adherence, both in spirit and letter, to the Charter governing it".¹ The overall popular opinion in India had remained optimistic that in spite of its many weaknesses and failings, the United Nations stood for something that was good and should be supported at all cost. At no time had criticism of the working of the United Nations reached the level of fundamental opposition to it. It had been this confidence in the inherent strength of the United Nations that added to the initiative of India in referring to it even questions in which not only her own vital interests but also the basic tenets of her foreign policy were at stake, such as the cases of the struggle for Indonesian independence, the Kashmir question, and the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa. In some other situations, being fully aware of the adverse consequences of the fact that even the precincts of Lake Success had not proved invulnerable to the game of power-politics India looked for U.N. action. Again, whenever

India went to accept the provisions of the U.N. with no reservations whatsoever, she actually acted as a signatory to the instruments taking the same not only for a unique phenomenon in the annals of International Law but also for an unequivocal declaration in the cause of humanity itself, i.e., the enlargement of human freedom. India had patiently been striving for it ever since the late twenties of this century as adequately corroborated by the number of resolutions adopted by the Indian National Congress in the pre-independence era. The truth lies in that the foreign policy India pursued at the attainment of her sovereign character had been an outgrowth of the past way of thinking of the people of the country and the past declarations of their own leaders while India was on the threshold of developing her focus upon the structure of the international organisation and was anticipating, though in a vague manner, in some instances, for the shape of things to come. Thus, once more, the body of doctrines and political philosophy that the framers of the San Francisco Charter expressly codified in 1945 were not a novel experience especially on the part of the Indian people as the bulk of those philosophical doctrines based upon the canons of justice and morality had already been, in one way or the other, zealously advocated and sought to be revived and extended by India through the medium of her various internal and external activities. Moreover, the attitude of the present Indian Government towards the United Nations was, to a great extent, influenced by what the Indian people thought about the League of Nations.

Mutual Affirmation

Hence, what the United Nations Charter performed was to endorse fully, and further perpetuate the chosen ideals and traditional virtues that India, on her own, cherished and championed not merely in the better part of her colonial existence alone but throughout the course of her enriched past. The universality of Indian thought was at long last recognised and Oriental Philosophy was accorded a fresh interpretation at the hands of the framers of the Charter. The genesis of the ideal of Universal Brotherhood and Morality which constituted the cornerstone of the U.N. edifice was reared and professed in

India beginning with pre-historic times as one of the outstanding aspirations of national life summarised in the maxim of "Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam". India's acceptance of the Charter was to indirectly reaffirm a major phase of her own long-term policies and democratic values and to rededicate her historical forces for the international cause that had gone beyond the frontiers centuries ago. In the process, she incorporated the guideline of the United Nations and made it a way of her life with the introduction of the concept of Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy as being the crowning points of her Republican Constitution of 1950. The Preamble to the United Nations Charter lays down that "the Peoples of the United Nations" were determined "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small" and "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained". They have further resolved, in order to realise these ends, "to practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours", and "to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security", and "to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest", and "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples". Again, Article 1 (1) of the U.N. Charter embodies, as the Purposes of the United Nations, "to maintain international peace and security, and to that end : to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace". The other purpose of the United Nations Article 1 (2) is "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen

universal peace". A closer analysis of the above exposition supplies with the fact that coming next only to Christian Ethics and European Liberalism, the revelations occurred to the West through the writings of scholars like Max Muller, Swami Vivekananda and Rabindra Nath Tagore, made it possible for Indian discourses innocently to have a place in the U.N. scheme of things especially in the field of UNESCO. At the same time, the wide popularity and hold that the Pacifism of Mahatma Gandhi could acquire on the Occidental mind went a long way in providing even a subconscious inclination towards the enhancement of the good things of life, especially the tenets of Ahimsa and Satyagraha that won universal approbation. Thus, the international affiliation of Buddhism as well as the mission of Ashoka, in essence, could not eventually be ignored. The inherent affinity of the principle of "Panch Sheel" as subsequently developed by India too, was readily traceable to the above basic features of the United Nations.

The Charter and the Constitution

The 1950 Constitution of India adequately reflects its attunement with the fundamental U.N. values as enshrined in the Preamble to the Charter when it, in its own Preamble, declares that, "The People of India" had solemnly resolved "to secure to all its citizens: Justice, social, economic and political; Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; Equality of status and opportunity; and to promote among them all Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation".² Therefore, the U.N. Charter and the Indian Constitution have a common source—the common man wherever he might be and both of them cherished the same basic objectives, i.e., again, the achievement and realisation of justice, liberty, equality, fraternity and structural unity. Furthermore, the framers of the Constitution sincerely sought to bring about a national translation of the Human Rights provisions of the U.N. Charter whenever they made a declaration of the Fundamental Rights in Part III of the Constitution, the *raison d'être* being, in one way, the significance attached to the individual in the philosophy of the State, corresponding to the recognition made under the law of the United Nations.

The State, under Articles 14 to 35, guarantees to its citizens, the Right to Equality, Right to Freedom, Right against Exploitation, Right to Freedom of Religion, Cultural and Educational Rights, Right to Property and Right to Constitutional Remedies with their multiple implications which only come within the larger context of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, passed by the General Assembly on December 10, 1948. India, with her ancient tenets of wisdom and tolerance, has seldom been discouraged by the fact that these Rights are honoured more in violation than in observance. The Declaration, inter alia, under Articles 18 and 19, unequivocally confirms the preservation and furtherance of certain ultimate human values that the Constitution has accepted as primary and without which a sustained and normal human life is not feasible. This applies so much so that this Section of the Fundamental Rights is not to be suspended even in a State of Emergency, as the Draft Convention on Human Rights proposes to bring about. "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.... Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers".³ This proved to be a foregone conclusion since the two documents traced the origins of the development of the respective Rights to the philosophy of the French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) which, in its turn, had influenced the course of the Bill of Rights of the United States of America. In fact, the Nehru Era represents the best preservation of Human Rights in India though the same had to be shelved sometimes according to the demands of political expediency. It may be recalled that while sponsoring the resolution on objectives of the Constitution in the Constituent Assembly, Nehru paid a tribute to all the three major revolutions of modern history—French, American and Russian: "Because this is a Constituent Assembly, think also of the various Constituent

Assemblies that have gone before, of what took place at the making of the great American nation, when the fathers of that nation met and fashioned out a constitution which has stood the test of these many years—more than a century and a half—and of the great nation which has been built up on the basis of that constitution”.⁴

Directive Principles of State Policy

Again, the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution, though not justiciable, are yet considered fundamental in the governance of the country and under Articles 36 to 51 go to evaluate the spirit of the Charter, while representing the theme of the Constitution itself. The general duty of the State as defined in Article 38 stipulates that “The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life”.⁵ Not satisfied with laying down this basic principle, the framers have worked it out by specifically prescribing certain principles of policy to be followed by the State under Article 39; “The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing: (a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood; (b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good; (c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment; (d) that there is equal pay for equal work for both men and women; (e) that the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age or strength; (f) that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment”.⁶ That the economic policy of India contemplating a socialistic pattern of society was envisaged in the Directives is an established fact. It could be equally seen having its close co-ordination and affinity with the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Under Chapter IX (International

Economic and Social Cooperation), Article 55, it is laid down that: "With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: (a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development; (b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and (c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion". The above statement which broadly represents the economic attitude of the United Nations stands conspicuous by its inherent sympathy and understanding for the Indian cause besides that of the others, and on the background of which India was going to construct her own policies.

Economic Collaboration

Both the United Nations and India were determined to fight for the freedom, not only of the nations, of not even a section of the people, but for the freedom of the common man everywhere for only there lay the remedy for a lasting peace. In this way of general welfare, the two would attain their common goal and fundamental vitality as a sovereign democratic republic and an international organisation respectively. If human rights were to be promoted as the sheet-anchor of a stable world community, it were the human economic rights that remained as the most outstanding and in need of a permanent guarantee. To begin with, it was in the field of International Economics that the mutual cooperation between the United Nations and India was understood to be the more harmonious when they would come to assist each other in the fulfilment of the ideal of a welfare institution and a welfare State at the same time. The two believed in the overall realisation of the "minimization of suffering and the maximization of happiness—human" as Professor Linus Pauling phrased it in the course of Azad Memorial Lectures, 1967, in New Delhi. It being the supreme urge that the Twentieth Century had put

forward, both of them could abide by and appreciate, at least in principle if not always in practice, identical socio-economic virtues and values in the process of carrying out the mission towards the ultimate emancipation of Humanity. The faculties were to be cultivated to the extent of bringing out what was best there latent in an individual, the gap between the haves and the have-nots had to be narrowed down and the exploitation of man by man terminated in the task of reconstructing the world as a whole in the post-war period. In this larger programme of the U.N.O. India invariably came to find her share out of her own accord as she happened to be laying down one at home which could only be expected of any national or international organisation in the aftermath of a global war. And this has certainly gone a long way in the evolution of the new International Economic Order. Both India and the United Nations, again, recognised the intrinsic worth of the truth that modern Capitalism had to modify itself further in order to infuse some radical innovations of social security into its organism so that it might be made adaptable to the demands of the times. The same could be said of Socialism that had to transform itself so that the twin systems could be oriented nearer the goal of the upliftment of the Man. Moreover, the Indians were bred in ancient liberal tradition like that of the "Loka Hita" and at the same time the intelligentsia was deeply influenced by the fineries of the European socio-economic theories as that of John Stuart Mill and Lord J.M. Keynes. This was preceded by the impact of the Industrial Revolution that left a durable economic relationship of India with the West. When it could be said that the United Nations, at least at its formative stage, was but a European institution, the problems were no longer European alone and it had to reflect the Asian image as well. If the world had been made safe for democracy, it was yet to be made safer for economic democracy.

Foreign Policy

To return to the Directive Principles of State Policy. Regarding the external affairs of the Indian Union, it is laid down in Article 51 that "the State shall endeavour to (a)

promote international peace and security; (b) maintain just and honourable relations between nations; (c) foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another; and (d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration".⁷ Broadly speaking, these constitute the objectives of the United Nations Organisation as contained in the Preamble. Thus the U.N. Charter inspired the fathers of the Constitution and was accorded due respect and consideration in the making of the same. The restatement was to follow inevitably as both the instruments were entailed by similar motivations and were directed towards the same line. Besides, notwithstanding the obligations under the Charter, the Indian Constituent Assembly intended to ensure at home that in its working, the Constitution may not deviate from but be subservient to the main current of world tendency as epitomized in the general policy of the United Nations, of which India was a member. Hence it can be observed that the Constitution of India bears clear impressions of the Charter and vice versa. As such, through the incorporation of common ideals in the U.N. Charter and the Constitution of India, 1950, India and the United Nations discovered fresh fields of collaboration not only in the formal relationship of a member to an association but in something more than that. Even though there was no direct and deliberate nationalist Indian participation in the framing of the Charter, the two adopted the common ideology independent of each other. It was that the Charter bore not merely a reflection of the basic ingredients of Indian foreign policy, but the embodiment of the same in many respects while their identity on various aspects of international life was an undeniable factor leading to a common stand in the sphere of world problems. It was feasible for them to go together in most of the cases. While one was on the way to do something for its own sake, very often it involuntarily turned out to do something for the other as well that was only natural when the two owed each other in several commitments. The exposition of the cause of the United Nations inadvertently involved the furtherance of the cause of the Indian attitude. Indubitably, this intrinsic functional oneness on their part was traceable to the very

original concept of the fundamental unity of mankind from which flowed the sources of the two inasmuch as the core of Indian foreign policy comparatively was nearest in harmony with the appeal of the text of the Charter and U.N. policies for both were laid on almost the same foundations. The Eastern Economist (New Delhi) wrote on the event of the inauguration of the Republic of India:

“And it is the substance which matters and not small technicalities. There is always a difference between the substance and the form, and, so long as the form does not distort the substance, the difference is not a vital thing. In the great Charter of the United Nations as finally adopted at San Francisco on June 26, 1945, it was again the peoples of the United Nations—not their Governments—that resolved to accomplish its great aims. That, too, was the truth, although there were not all democratic Governments that signed the deed. The test by which the issue should be judged is whether there is ground for believing that the people’s will is clearly reflected in the deed drawn up in their name. There is no doubt that this condition is satisfied by the Charter of the United Nations; equally there is no doubt that it is satisfied in the Constitution which on the 26th January came into force”.⁸

Absorption of Force

For India the United Nations helped to serve as a sounding platform wherefrom she could make her presence felt in order to gain international stature and also to make her experiment of non-alignment further intelligible to the Western Powers through the dynamism of the Charter. The fact that the United Nations as a champion of ultimate human values and individual liberty endeavoured to absorb all the progressive forces of the time could equally be established from the Indian angle, too, that a good deal of outstanding Indian ideas and convictions formed an inalienable part of the general trend of world opinion of the period. The U.N.O. was deemed to have been erected not only on the ashes of its predecessor but more so upon the hopes and aspirations of Humanity twice ravaged by the holocaust of war. Thus the emergent United Nations made it a task to attract and capture the then prevailing mood

and thinking of the people of the world which apparently centred, around a guarantee towards future security and the Right of Self-Determination. If no theory is ever intelligible save in the context of its time, it is obviously so in the case of an international treaty. Therefore, the framing of the Charter alone was evident of the respect accorded to world verdict not only in the political but in the socio-economic field as well, the latter being ignored by the League Covenant with subsequent lukewarm treatment. India's contribution to the U.N., so far as this aspect is related, had undeniably been the most far-reaching when from the San Francisco Conference onwards India counted upon the significance of the socio-economic role that the U.N.O. was given to play in a new world and consequently presided over the creation of the Economic and Social Council. Afterwards, delivering the Inaugural Address at the Third Session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), held at Ootacamund (India) on June 1, 1948, Mr. Nehru said: "... We have taken part in your various Commissions, because we have felt that, quite apart from the political aspect of the United Nations, the economic aspect is at least as important, if not more important: indeed we cannot consider the one without the other. Politically we have not met with great success so far, but I think that if we succeed in the economic field, that will affect the political (field) also".⁹ It was the Indian assertion that social injustice, and even more, economic injustice lay at the root of war in all times and climes (and so in a way redefined Aristotle's Theory of Revolution). In the United Nations Conference on International Organisation, Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, the leader of the Indian Delegation, reminded the nations of the existence of one great reality, one fundamental factor and one eternal verity which all religions taught and which ought to be remembered by all. That was the dignity of the common man and the fundamental human rights of all beings all over the world. Again, the evidence that the U.N.O. of late has proved to be much more useful to the world as a socio-economic institution rather than as a political one amply bears the testimony of India's achievement in this realm.

Trusteeship System

India's role in the period under review could be said to have been mostly self-imposed. On her own, she felt it incumbent upon her to take up the share of international responsibility as, in the long run, that would accrue to her own material advantage. Thus she came into closer contact with other States on her private initiative and willingly played different roles, particularly that of a vehement critic of imperialism and racialism. That India wanted the elimination of domination over subject people everywhere and its replacement by the guardianship of the U.N.O., wherever deemed desirable, is construed from the ensuing lines in connexion with the question of the Disposition of the former Italian colonies:

"The third proposal, submitted by India, and supported in general terms by Pakistan, the Philippines and Burma, called for direct United Nations administration of Libya and Somaliland under international trusteeship for a period of ten to twenty years, with terms to be drafted by the trusteeship and administrative committees of the (General) Assembly, and the dispatch of a special commission to Eritrea to determine the actual wishes of the population of that area in regard to incorporation into Ethiopia".¹⁰

According to the Indian opinion, should there be any trusteeship, it had to be international in composition when the ultimate goal of the people was to be the attainment of complete independence. India envisaged the extension of the functions and jurisdiction of the U.N.O. in that if the single-power trusteeship was to give way to the benign caretaking of any other body the best suited was none other than the world organisation to the time the people gained maturity for self-government. It had been her consistent view that in all the trusteeship agreements entered into under Chapter XII of the Charter, there should be a definite recognition that sovereignty resides in the people of a trust territory. The pertinency of her viewpoints were later confirmed by the General Assembly through necessary legislation. In the process, India was only going to bring about the fulfilment of the conditions

of International Trusteeship System as laid down in Article 76 of the Charter, the basic objectives of which are but a corollary of the Purposes of the United Nations that include the promotion of "... the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence ...". Hence India threw her weight in favour of the emancipation of the millions of people whose only crime was that they were not as advanced as their rulers. India's efforts for the upliftment of the people of "non-self-governing territories" have been no less noteworthy. Had she not taken action under such circumstances, she would not have been living up to the ideals of the U.N.O. from which, again, she derived so much.

Anti-Colonialism

It is only clear from the above proposal that India reiterated her attitude against Colonialism that she regarded as one of the prominent causes of international conflicts. To her, these were the antagonistic forces that hindered the development of the world organisation. Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, the Indian delegate, had unequivocally declared at the first session of the General Assembly in October 1946 that India regarded imperialism, political, economic and social, as being inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter. So if India was fighting against colonialism as a matter of policy, it was also in vindication of the principles of the Charter. It is intelligible that through her stand on anti-imperialism, India went to help create an international atmosphere that would be found healthy for the progressive functioning of the U.N.O. as well as the tangible application of the Charter provisions to the widest possible extent. If any external force was acceptable to her, it was only that of the United Nations authority, as that force alone was not directed towards any kind of exploitation of the people concerned but towards their all-round welfare. Both the United Nations and India believed that the existence of colonialism negated the prevalence of peace and a solid foundation of international

security could not be laid unless and until colonialism was eliminated as a world force. If anti-colonialism formed a basic pillar of Indian policy, the U.N., on the other hand, had taken up Decolonisation as one of its pilot programmes, though inspired by different circumstances. This was so because both of them respected and responded to the radical demands of the age. A satisfactory fulfilment of the ideals contained in the Preamble to the Charter was not forthcoming vis-a-vis the tolerance of imperialism and racialism as the White Man's Burden, and when it stood in the way of India's firm adherence to the Charter. Thus it was the maiden venture in which India and the U.N.O. found it worthwhile to go ahead in unison and accord since they were bent upon uprooting the common evil in general interest. Actually, the U.N. decolonisation movement gained momentum considerably because of the presence of India as an active member. Hence, in the U.N. personality, India discovered a major medium wherefrom to give vent to her unflinching stand and cooperation which, again, came to form a part of the larger U.N. project. India, as she was firmly opposed to any form of colonialism, could not put up with Imperialism in any form, gross or subtle, visible or invisible. Originating in the national experience, her anti-colonialism was based upon the singular distrust of the West. Even at the risk of wounding the susceptibilities of her Western friends and at the cost of antagonizing Big Powers, she made her debut as a power which stood for wiping out colonialism from the lesser-developed areas of the world. "The dominant notes in Indian foreign policy during the period were a vigorous vocal stand against colonialism and racial discrimination and apathy towards and criticism of the great Powers for dividing the world into hostile blocs which were endangering world peace".¹¹ India's role in calling the Delhi Conference on Indonesia, her condemnation of Portuguese Colonialism and championing the cause of Malayan freedom along with her clear stand on the U.N. Trusteeship Territories adequately reflect her uncompromising attitude towards colonialism. That was a good record so far as it went, though some critics thought that Indian anti-colonialism, despite its exclusive character, had really been lopsided as her

approach to the satellite countries of Eastern Europe was adjudged deplorable. The late Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, outlined the intrinsic behaviour of Indian anti-colonial policy when he remarked with a note of caution: "It was an astonishing thing that any country could still venture to cling to that doctrine of colonialism, whether by direct or indirect rule. After all that has happened, there is going to be no more objection to that, but active objection, an active struggle against any and every form of colonialism in any part of the world".¹²

Non-Self-Governing Territories

India also emphasized international responsibility for the non-self-governing territories—the dependent territories outside the trusteeship system. In one of the early meetings of the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, the Indian delegate pointed out that these colonies were far more important in population and area than the trust territories and he put forward the view that, in their administration of these colonies, the colonial powers should be answerable to the United Nations in much the same way as the trustee powers were in regard to the trust territories. "The Indian view on the relations of the United Nations with dependent territories could be summed up as follows. As far as possible, United Nations organs must facilitate the extension of freedom in these territories, and where it is not possible to do so in the immediate future, the world organisation must exercise its responsibility to see that the welfare of subject peoples is not sacrificed in favour of the vested interests of the colonial and trustee powers".¹³ Before the proposal to constitute a special committee to deal with the non-self-governing territories took shape, the question of the application of the Trusteeship System to them had already been discussed. During the meeting of the sub-committee in the 1946 session of the General Assembly, India moved a resolution to the effect that a decision be demanded from the States administering territories under Chapter XI of the Charter as to whether or not they would be willing to place any of these territories

under the International Trusteeship System. Referring to Article 77(c) of the Charter, which enables administering powers voluntarily to place non-self-governing territories under the system, the Indian delegate expressed the hope that this provision of the Charter would not be allowed to become a dead letter. But this resolution was ruled out of order by the Chairman as being outside the terms of reference of the sub-committee as laid down by the Fourth Committee. During the meeting of the Assembly's Trusteeship Committee in 1947 India again moved a resolution with these provisions:

“... WHEREAS the International Trusteeship System, in conformity with the high principles and purposes of the Charter, provides the surest and quickest means of enabling the peoples of the dependent territories to secure self-government or independence under the collective guidance and supervision of the United Nations ... THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLVES that Members of the United Nations responsible for the administration of such territories be requested to submit Trusteeship Agreements for all or some of such territories as are not ready for immediate self-government”.¹⁴

This resolution was opposed by the U.K., the U.S.A. and other Colonial Powers. They doubted whether the Trusteeship System, which was not firmly established in 1947, was superior to the Colonial System. They also considered that this resolution cast a reflection on the Colonial Powers. During the discussion the British delegates made long speeches expatiating upon the virtues of the British Colonial System. The resolution, in a modified form, was however passed in the Fourth Committee, but did not obtain the required two-thirds majority in the plenary session of the Assembly.

South-West Africa

The exclusiveness with which India put up the cause of the subject peoples in the United Nations is also implicit in the following fact from the debate in the Trusteeship Council on November 4, 1946:

Sir Maharaj Singh (India)... again strongly attacked the South African Government, describing its rule in S.W.

Africa as "Fascist", declaring that the intelligence of the natives was kept so low that the number of those "able to appreciate the difference between incorporation and trusteeship is infinitesimal", alleging that the Union Government's educational programme for the natives "compares very unfavourably with what is being done by the U.S.S.R. for their Asiatic fellow-citizens or with other countries in Africa such as the West African territories and Uganda", and referring to Field-Marshal Smuts's "isolated position" with only the "regrettable support of the United Kingdom".¹⁵

India held definite views on the question of the United Nations role in trust territories and specifically on the functions and powers of the Trusteeship Council. India's general approach had been based on the following considerations. At the outset, the United Nations must have the ultimate power to supervise the administration of the trust territories, and the administering powers should act only as the agents of the United Nations. Secondly, early steps should be taken to grant complete self-government to the people of the territories. Thirdly, no form of racial discrimination should be practised in the territories. Finally, the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of the Charter should be observed by the administering powers in a broad and liberal spirit. As in the case of the Italian Colonies, India sought the termination of the South African mandate over South-West Africa at an early date for she believed that a misdirected mandatory administration would not prove the appropriate agency for the advancement of the cardinal principles of human rights of the people involved, as ensured by the Charter, when these rights were most vitally concerned with the future of the non-self-governing and trust territories than with any other. On the contrary, these rights were being violated in that the resources of the territory were being exploited towards the promotion of the interests of the mandatory powers themselves, through the suppression of the paramountcy of the local requirements. In this, again, South Africa as a member was not living up to the ideals set forth in the U.N. Charter, while she had already defied the recommendations of the General Assembly in regard to racial discrimination. Therefore, only an international

trusteeship system would prove capable of guaranteeing the rights of the people leading to their final goal of self-government. "As such, India along with Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt and the Philippines submitted a draft in the plenary session of the General Assembly in 1952 that was adopted by 33 votes to none with 17 abstentions. This draft reasserted the Assembly's position that the normal way of modifying the international status of the territory would be to place it under the international trusteeship system by means of a trusteeship agreement in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter".¹⁶ When the Union of South Africa, unlike the other mandatory powers, refused to place the mandated territory of South-West Africa under the United Nations trusteeship system, India questioned the legal validity of South Africa's action. Many other member States and the International Court of Justice did not agree with the Indian view that South Africa was legally bound to place the territory under trusteeship. India maintained that, apart from the legal aspect, the question could not be isolated from the broad principles of international morality and consideration of the liberty and welfare of the inhabitants of South-West Africa. On the basis of these principles India suggested that South-West Africa should be placed under the United Nations trusteeship system because India believed that the interests of the inhabitants would be better promoted by this step than by incorporation of the territory with the Union of South Africa. India took a leading part in the discussion and moved a resolution in the Trusteeship Committee expressing regret that the Union Government had not complied with earlier Assembly decisions to place the territory under Trusteeship and that it had repudiated its previous assurance to submit reports on the administration of South-West Africa to the United Nations. This resolution, as amended by Guatemala, was accepted by the Committee by a vote of 31 in favour, 11 against and 4 abstentions. (Another resolution passed in the Committee requested the International Court of Justice to give its opinion on the legal aspects of this issue.) In the Trusteeship Committee India's resolution was opposed by Great Britain, Australia, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway,

Norway, Sweden, Greece, and Turkey. The U.S.A. was one of those who abstained. In the plenary session of the Assembly (1949) India did not press her original resolution, which was strongly worded. Instead she sponsored, jointly with Denmark, Norway, Siam and Syria, another resolution asking the International Court of Justice to give its opinion as to the international obligations of South Africa with regard to South-West Africa and as to whether the Union Government had the right to modify the international status of South-West Africa and if not, who possessed the right. This resolution was accepted by the Assembly. Those who opposed the resolution were South Africa, Liberia and the Soviet group, and they obviously did so for different reasons.

Indonesia

India, on the one hand, wanted to drive the Charter through the Security Council to its original Purposes and Principles and on the other to establish herself as the leading Power belonging to that class of States which are known as underdeveloped ex-colonies. Her repeated attempts to acquire for herself the membership of the Security Council, too, can only be seen in the light of her desperation to gain more in dynamism and effectiveness in a new order while strengthening the world organisation. That India sought to drive the U.N. Charter through the Security Council to its original Purposes and Principles is evident from the resolutions passed by the Security Council which she supported or from those resolutions which India herself presented to the Security Council. As an instance, the Resolution adopted by the Conference on Indonesia, held in New Delhi on January 22, 1949, and which was later submitted to the Security Council, providing a basis for the final settlement (The Hague Agreement) may be cited here. Under Para 8(b) the Conference recommended to the Security Council of the United Nations:

“That, in the event of either party to the dispute not complying with the recommendations of the Security Council, the Security Council shall take effective action under the wide powers conferred upon it by the Charter, to enforce the said

recommendations. Member States of the United Nations represented at this conference pledge their full support to the Council in the application of any of these measures".¹⁷

It is discernible from the above statement that India while accommodating the process of bilateral negotiations was at the same time reaffirming her implicit reliance upon the Purposes and Principles of the U.N. Charter under Articles 1 and 2 and was also keen to ascertain that they were vindicated through the actions of the Security Council under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter in order to restore international peace and security. India was well conversant with the fact that the Security Council was formed as the principal organ of the United Nations for the task of translating the Purposes and Principles of the Charter into reality which, inter alia, include the provision, "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace". Moreover, India went to redeem her obligations under Articles 2(2), 5 and 43 of the Charter in providing her full support to the Security Council so as to enable the Council to evaluate the initial ideals that governed the Charter. Thus India actually had the distinction of reviving faith in the ultimate character of the United Nations and of forcing the attention and consent of world opinion upon the same whenever the members deviated from the appeal of the San Francisco Conference. Although India brought the Indonesian dispute to the notice of the Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter, later she shifted her emphasis to Chapter VII. This shift was due to legal objections raised by the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom that the matter was one of domestic jurisdiction, and that the Council was not competent to deal with the issue. India was very anxious to get the Council to consider the dispute as a matter of international concern. As a matter of fact, the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia served this purpose of pointing to international concern.

To India, again, the United Nations, sans all its shortcomings, was "something that was good" as Mr. Santhanam once observed. It had to be encouraged and supported in every way, and be allowed to develop into some kind of a world government or world order. A world devoid of the United

Nations would have been something inconceivable to her. She reiterated that some sort of organisation was to be evolved even if the U.N. did not exist for it was the inevitable product of the historical forces at work. Should her independence of action be ever qualified, it was by the stipulations of the Charter alone, which to her were irrevocable and sacrosanct. Accordingly, any national policy had to be able to find consistency with the course of the U.N. for acquiring general justification as what the U.N.O. stood for, in principle, was the disinterested welfare of humanity, something above petty politics. She was of the opinion that the future of the nations lay in how far the world organisation itself was made secure and perpetuated. Her conviction in the ultimate U.N. potentialities for the maintenance of peace and the attainment of progress remained unshaken. In the course of lending added impetus and dynamism to the world body in the task of eradicating colonialism and racialism, India even went a step further and endeavoured towards the comprehensive application of the Charter provisions, not excluding Article 52. As such her efforts to see the Security Council as the mouthpiece of the U.N. gaining in effectiveness was understandable. That India attached the foremost importance to the strengthening of the United Nations as a reservoir of the aspirations of mankind and obtained the realisation of the spirit and letter of the U.N. Charter through the Security Council by recourse to individual and collective actions is contained in the following extract from Mr. Nehru's Presidential speech inaugurating the Eighteen-Nation Conference on Indonesia (January 20, 1949):

"Believing as we do that the United Nations must be strengthened as a symbol of the New Order, we were reluctant to take any steps which might appear to weaken its authority. But when the will of the Security Council was itself flouted, then it became clear to us that we must confer together to strengthen the United Nations and to prevent further deterioration of a dangerous situation. We meet, therefore, within the framework of the United Nations and with the noble words of the Charter before us. That Charter itself recognizes regional arrangements as a means of furthering international peace and security. . . . Our primary purpose is

to consider how best we can help the Security Council to bring about a rapid and peaceful solution of the Indonesian problem. We meet to supplement the efforts of the Security Council, not to supplant that body".¹⁸

Finally, India, in the act of forwarding this Resolution, also established the genuine nature of the Principle contained in Article 2(7) regarding Domestic Jurisdiction and in doing so exposed the falsity of the domestic jurisdiction argument of the Dutch Government. In this way, India upheld the overall supremacy of the Charter whenever the parties deviated from its salutary discipline.

Kashmir

The efforts on the part of India to make the Security Council uphold the Charter in all respects and bring its actions nearer in conformity with the Purposes and Principles could again be observed from the fact when Mr. Nehru, while making a statement on Kashmir in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) on March 5, 1948, said:

"Our making a reference on this issue to the Security Council of the United Nations was an act of faith, because we believe in the progressive realization of a world order and a world government. In spite of many shocks, we have adhered to the ideals represented by the United Nations and its Charter. But those very ideals teach us also certain duties and responsibilities to our own people and to those who put their trust in us. To betray these people would be to betray the basic ideals for which the United Nations stand or should stand".¹⁹

From the foregoing exposition, too, it is intelligible that by making a reference of the issue to it, India expected the Security Council to take appropriate actions through the exercise of the powers as vested in it under the Charter for the restoration of international peace and security and thereby to endorse the ideals contained in the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. India had taken into consideration the obligation laid in Article 2(3) of the Charter that, "All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a

manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered". Hence, India was optimistic that the issue would be settled by the Security Council in sincere consonance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter.

Korea

Moreover, it was while working in unison in the Korean crisis that the common approach of India and the United Nations on international affairs finally emerged as the most prominent. Following her role in the Korean War, Mr. Nehru's policy of non-alignment received a fresh impetus and recognition all the world over. The big Powers in particular and the world in general got a first-hand experience of the inherent strength of Nehru's foreign policy and its ability to play a positive role towards lessening international tension and conflicts. And India was looked upon to exercise her influence to resolve deadlocks wherever they occurred. It was indeed a unique occasion when India and the United Nations were at their best. The stand that India took on the United Nations action in Korea in June, 1950, and later, reveals to a great extent the Indian attitude towards the United Nations in general and towards the enforcement of collective measures under its auspices in particular.

"In the first resolution adopted on June 25, 1950, the Security Council noted 'with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea' and expressed the opinion that it constituted a breach of the peace (G.A.O.R., 7th Session, 1st Cttee; 575th Mtg; March 16, 1953, p. 454). The resolution called for immediate cessation of hostilities and called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel forthwith. The Security Council also called upon all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities."²⁰

India, along with eight other Security Council members, voted for the resolution. She considered the armed attack upon South Korea a clear case of aggression and favoured action to

repel the attack. Mr. Nehru, in a Press conference held on July 7, 1950, stated that when the North Koreans attacked South Korea, it was clear, without even great enquiry, that this was a well-planned and large-scale invasion. He further suggested that either the United Nations condemn that aggression and put a stop to it or come to the conclusion that it has ceased to be an effective instrument of peace. On June 27, 1950, the President of the United States of America ordered U.S. air and naval forces to give the South Korean Government troops cover and support. Later, on the same day, the Security Council passed another resolution which recommended that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of South Korea as might be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area. The representative of India, not having received instructions from his Government, did not take part in the vote on that resolution. On June 30, 1950, he announced that his government accepted the resolution because it was opposed to any attempt to settle international disputes by resort to aggression. The halting of aggression and the quick restoration of peaceful conditions were essential preludes to a satisfactory settlement. It was also made clear that the acceptance of this resolution did not involve any modification of India's general foreign policy. The Indian delegate explained that India's policy was based on the promotion of world peace and the development of friendly relations with all countries. It remained an independent policy which would continue to be determined solely by India's ideals and objectives. The Government of India earnestly hoped that even at that stage it might be possible to put an end to the fighting and to settle the dispute by negotiation. It was this emphasis which India placed on negotiation even at the time she accepted the Security Council's recommendation for collective measures that made the Indian attitude different from that of other governments which accepted the decision. The moves made by India in the course of the Korean question could be explained on the basis of two assumptions which appear to have dominated Indian thinking. First, India kept in view the non-obligatory aspect of the Security Council resolutions. Secondly, it attempted to

maintain, though not very clearly and consistently, a distinction between the members of the United Nations contributing forces in response to the recommendations of the Security Council and the United Nations as a whole. India's attitude on the whole Korean question was significant in many respects. While accepting the initial Security Council resolutions concerning the attack on the Republic of Korea and assistance to it, India at the same time emphasized the importance of settling the dispute by peaceful means. The fear that any major war involving the big powers, even if it was waged in the name of the United Nations, would lead to the disruption of the Organisation rather than to the strengthening of it, was ever present in India's mind. This was the reason why India opposed the resolution branding the new government of China an aggressor. India's predominant aim was to preserve and promote the broad based and universal character of the United Nations. The government of India never lost sight of this aim when it was formulating its policy towards collective enforcement measures, in general, and the United Nations action in Korea in particular. "All in all, India can be said to have agreed with the purposes of the United Nations action in Korea, but disapproved of the manner in which it was conducted and with the results expected to be achieved".²¹ The difference between the Indian point of view and that of the Unified Command of the U.N. in Korea concerns more on the methods of achieving the settlement of the Korean problem rather than on the principles involved in the matter. Considering that the cease-fire line in Korea (1953) was close to the 38th parallel, India's desire in October 1950, to see the United Nations forces stop at the 38th parallel, seems to have been ratified by military circumstances. Similarly, considering that a permanent solution to the Korean problem has not been found, nor seems to be in the offing to this day, India's consistent position that a political conference including the People's Republic of China should be held to discuss all Far Eastern problems, was well worth giving a try. A correlation could also be detected in the attitude of India on different issues, internal and external, that was expected in the context of the preservation of her national self-interests. India based

her reactions on world problems on how her own disputes were received and treated within and without the United Nations. Her appreciation of a specific means of international settlement was determined by the extent to which it was found applicable to herself. Mr. G. F. Hudson, in the course of an address "Korea and Asia" at Chatham House, London, on October 17, 1950, remarked:

"... Kashmir has affected Indian policy over Korea in another way also. The United Nations Security Council in its endeavours to settle the Kashmir dispute did not make the withdrawal of Pakistan forces from Kashmir a condition of negotiations over the future of Kashmir or the holding of a U.N.-supervised plebiscite, and Indian opinion considers that the insistence on the military surrender of North Korea as a preliminary to a political settlement in Korea is inconsistent with this precedent. The effect has been, on the one hand, to stiffen the Indian attitude on Kashmir (which is now that total withdrawal of Pakistan forces must precede any plebiscite) and, on the other, to oppose the prosecution of war a outrance in Korea while the United Nations does not apply measures of coercion to Pakistan".²²

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *The Indian Annual Register*, 1946, Vol II, p. 252.
2. Durga Das Basu, *Introduction to the Constitution of India* (First Ed.), p. 49.
3. Raghubir Chakrabarti, *Human Rights and the United Nations*, p. 202.
4. A.C. Banerjee, *The Constituent Assembly of India*, p. 203.
5. G.N. Joshi, *The Constitution of India*, p. 124.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-31.
8. *The Eastern Economist*, Vol XIV, January 27, 1950, p. 124.
9. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, Selected Speeches, September 1946—April 1961, p. 254.
10. *International Organization*, Vol III, No. 3, August 1949, p. 473 (Doc. A/C 1/448).
11. J.C. Kundra, *Indian Foreign Policy 1947-54*, p. 53.
12. Quoted in R.N. Mathur, "United Nations and World Peace, India's Contribution," *Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol 19, April-June 1958, pp. 125-26.
13. *India and the United Nations*, Study Group, p. 36.
14. Quoted in K.P. Karunakaran, *India in World Affairs*, Vol I 1947-50, p. 215.
15. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol VI, 1946-48, p. 8324.
16. *International Organization*, Vol VI, No. 2, May 1952, p. 256.
17. *Ibid.*, Vol III, No. 2, May 1949, p. 391.
18. Jawaharlal Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 409.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 451.
20. *India and the United Nations*, Study Group, p. 146.
21. B.V. Govinda Raj, *India and Disputes in the U.N.*, p. 254.
22. *International Affairs*, (Lond.) January 1951, p. 22.

2

PEACE AND NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

THE peaceful approach of emergent India in international politics can best be explained in that *vis-a-vis* the growing interdependence of the world, the overall maintenance of international peace and security was a *sine qua non* for the reconstruction of her economy and also for rebuilding the socio-political structure. If India ever needed peace it was acutely felt in the initial period of her independence as part of the world wide process of putting things in order. It had to be economic peace at least, and in her own terms, in order to consolidate her position against the first hand problems presented by the Partition and her old war-ravaged economy. Any international issue deteriorating into a regional or global conflict would have adversely affected her ambitious programme of national recovery and development upon which rested the future prosperity of her people. India knew well in advance what a war stood for especially to the underdeveloped countries and so she greeted the renunciation of war as a means of settling international disputes in the U.N. Charter. So for Peace and Stability were concerned the then world opinion was near-unanimous peace everywhere seemed to be the more valuable after the bad experience of a major war. It had to be UN PEACE, positive and just.

Hence, though militarily less prepared and culturally and morally left on the verge of disruption because of the inroads of a deep-seated colonialism, India, at the utmost, vigorously sought to gain economic viability that she adjudged to be her foremost requirement in freedom. She knew that without a sound economic footing little political stability and permanence, internal and external, could be within the reach. As Mr. Nehru declared in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) on December 4, 1947, that a vague statement that India stood for peace and freedom by itself had no particular meaning, because every country was prepared to say the same thing whether it meant

it or not. Therefore, the above argument had to be developed in the economic field as to what India stood for. He regretted that in spite of the fact that he and his colleagues had been for some time in authority as a Government they had not produced any constructive economic scheme or economic policy so far which when developed would govern the Indian foreign policy more than all the speeches in the Constituent Assembly.¹ It was high time that a way to the economic emancipation of India be discovered after undergoing repeated economic exploitation at the will of the foreign rulers. Industrialisation was the need of the hour as the British industrial policy had kept India an agricultural and backward country.

In fact, India's policy as conceived by Nehru was meant to serve economic development better and more purposefully. In her efforts to transform her traditional economy into a modern one and to lay an industrial structure, India had to acquire and develop technological processes, promote trade relations, seek aid and so on. This could be done only in a climate of peace, friendliness and cooperative approach between nations. The need to frame a policy that would seek and promote amity and friendliness between nations—which is a prerequisite for economic cooperation—was, therefore, found to be imperative. With its stress on internationalism and international cooperation, Nehru's foreign policy was a response to this need. India was convinced that in a world troubled and tormented by cold war and power politics, non-alignment offered the best guarantee for peace and economic development. Alignment with either of the blocs would have also strengthened one sector of the national economy at the expense of the other. The Western countries were hesitant to enter the public sector wholeheartedly while the socialist countries were reluctant to give such aid as would boost up the private sector. Thus in any case of alignment, the healthy functioning of the Mixed Economy in India would have been seriously impaired with resultant loss in general stability towards which the nascent India was working. The very nature of the pattern of economy called for ploughing a lone furrow if the peaceful conditions for indigenous growth were to be maintained. So it was somewhat of an obsession with her that no international development should divert her attention and demand of her

limited energies and resources. India was not in a position to provide material support to any country. Her outworn figure and go-alone policy did not warrant it though moral support was frequently forthcoming. The Indian attitude was sometimes interpreted by the Great Powers as "sitting on the fence" whenever they failed to enlist the concurrence of the vote of the Indian delegation on a certain resolution in the United Nations.

India could not afford to be involved in a worldwide conflict in the foreseeable future and opted for a lasting Peace. Hence, she endeavoured to keep herself aloof from any entanglement whatsoever and earnestly encouraged the speedy settlement of disputes among nations through recourse to every pacific instrument short of war under the auspices of the United Nations. On the other hand, what she deemed wise on her part was first to effect the maximum preservation and nationalisation of what was left of her once pent-up potentialities and to sincerely seek an economic regeneration on the basis of the same. One of the outstanding factors in her policy of non-alignment stemmed from the logic that any involvement with any one of the two blocs would invariably invite trouble. Any political or economic involvement with one of the rival blocs might result in the denial of economic assistance from the rival bloc. This would, again, go to limit India's freedom to play an effective role in lessening world tensions. Thus, as an indirect proclaimed policy, India succeeded in receiving foreign aid reaction of her and technical know-how from both the sides without much rancour. Moreover, India was quite conscious that the involvement of the Big Powers in any prolonged armed conflict anywhere would imply drastic curtailment of economic aid she was deriving from them. This fact, in a sense, goes to clarify her repeated peace overtures. Non-alignment enabled India to keep the avenues of intimate economic contacts with all countries open. On account of the tradition of friendliness which India had established with each of them, it was less difficult for the Super Powers to extend a helping hand to India in her economic difficulties. However, India did not herself choose non-alignment solely in anticipation of material assistance from both sides. In fact on account of the policy of non-alignment India had to suffer considerable indifference

and hostility at the hands of the Super Powers in the initial stages of her free existence.

“For the sake of achieving her aim of internal economic development India found further that a peaceful world was necessary. To carry on her work of economic development, it was not only necessary that she should not be involved in a war but also that she should be able to draw upon outside help, wherever possible, and also be able to purchase the necessary machinery and capital goods from abroad, which she could not manufacture at home in the first place”.² Whether India was involved in a war or not, Indian policy-makers were well aware that the mere fact of a world conflagration breaking out would seriously hamper her industrial and economic development. As reiterated, for having material progress, India had the twin aims of time and a peaceful world in view. Internally, this was much more vital. Hence the two abovementioned aims jointly worked towards India's taking upon herself the role of a peace-maker and of easing tensions that might lead to war. India, thus, worked simultaneously for the attainment of her two principal objectives by trying to prevent a third world war altogether or, at least, by holding its break-out till her own economic plans were well under way and by keeping herself in a position from where, if a war occurred, she would not be obliged or forced to plunge into it. This aspect of the domestic background upon which India had to function could adequately be summarised in the words of Professor Michael Brecher:

“India's economic weakness and the basic goal of development alone provide powerful inducements to the policy of non-alignment. The doors must be kept open to all possible sources of aid, Western and Soviet, if the desired economic revolution is to be achieved. For these reasons, too, peace or war is an issue of paramount importance for India. The outbreak of war between the Super Powers would wreck the ambitious program set in motion by Nehru and his colleagues and would make a mockery of the pledges for a better way of life which figured so largely in Congress propaganda during the freedom struggle. It is only in these terms that Nehru's efforts to mediate international disputes and to localize conflict, as in Korea and Indo China, can be properly understood. Indeed,

all other factors which shape India's view of the world are subordinate to this overriding consideration, as Nehru had candidly stated on numerous occasions."³

Five Year Plan and Foreign Commitments

Again, it was the First Five Year Plan that she had formulated for the progress of her economic growth that prevented India from making undue commitments to other countries during this period. Hence, India welcomed those foreign commitments that were conducive to the progress and success of her Five Year Plan that included both bilateral and multi-lateral financial agreements with other Western Governments and international agencies though she generally preferred the latter. On the other hand, she tried to eschew those international involvements in power politics that would have adversely affected her programme of development, one way or the other. A great deal depended upon the success of the First Plan and so India wanted to see that no unnecessary foreign commitments were made that would interfere with the working of the Plan or extract her energies and attention out of the Plan targets. It was wise on her part to keep out of any of the Power blocs that enabled India to secure assistance from the USSR after 1953 that had a salutary effect upon the ultimate outcome of the Plan. In fact, the programme of national planning dictated, to a considerable extent, the exercise of Indian foreign policy during the period under review. "The self-confidence and maturity which India displayed in the formulation of her foreign policy during 1950-53 was reflected in the manner in which she tried to grapple with her economic problems in this period".⁴ To begin with, even in 1950 the Indian economy continued to suffer from the evil effects of Partition and inflation. Unfavourable trends in the balance of payments continued to cause concern. Policies initiated along with the devaluation of the rupee had yet to take shape. The problems of the Korean boom further complicated the situation. It was under these circumstances that the Government of India appointed the Planning Commission to coordinate the economic development activities of the Central and State

Governments and to formulate a Plan for the most effective and balanced utilization of the country's resources. Although the Plan evolved by them was modest and cautious, the process of planned development that they initiated had baneful effects on the economy.

For India, a peaceful reconstruction was not all that she concentrated upon to make possible. What was expected to be realised was an all-round development of the national economy through a democratic planning in order to facilitate the higher rate of assimilation of indigenous capacity and a befitting reception to what the country had to offer. It was also to manifest her solidarity with the new world plan consciousness that had arisen in the wake of the U.N. Charter declaration to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. She was confronted with the task of re-shaping an underdeveloped agricultural economy into a progressive, industrialised unit and to ensure socio economic justice to her millions that were only permissible through a systematic and balanced approach preceded by a survey of the total available resources. "The problem of development of an underdeveloped economy is one of utilising more effectively the potential resources available to the community, and it is this which involves economic planning".⁵ But the economic condition of a country at any given time was a product of the broader social environment, and economic planning had to be viewed as an integral part of a wider process aiming not merely at the development of resources in a narrow technical sense, but at the development of human faculties and the building up of an institutional framework adequate to the needs and aspirations of the people. It thus coincided with the ideals put forward in the United Nations Charter and of the UNESCO. The self-realisation of the individual which was to be feasible in and through the modern State organisation no less called for the harmonised progress of human society.

But the domestic resources were not in a position to cover the entire Plan outlay and so the introduction of external resources came to be associated as an integral part of the First Five Year Plan. "How much of the resources needed to raise national output and incomes should come from domestic effort

and how much should come from external sources cannot, of course, be determined in advance or on any *a priori* basis".⁶ Much depended upon the circumstances in which a country was placed and upon the general conditions affecting the flow of capital from surplus countries. The United States, for instance, had relied a great deal in the initial stages of her development upon foreign capital while Japan had depended very little upon external resources. This was probably explained by the shortage of manpower and the consequent heavy capital investment required for opening up the continent. Partly also it was conditioned by the policy of protection followed in the United States and the free movement of capital between countries which characterised the nineteenth century. On the other hand, in Japan, the State had played an active part in financing industrial development and introducing new forms of organisation needed for industrialisation. The Soviet Union provided another instance of a country which had developed rapidly with her own resources. In this case, it meant even greater hardship and suffering than in Japan. That a plan of development in modern times must, in the main, rely on domestic resources could hardly be over-emphasized. In the first place, the conditions governing international investment were no longer what they were when some of the highly industrialised countries of the day like the United States, Australia, and Canada had begun their career of development. Secondly, external assistance was acceptable to India only if it carried with it no conditions explicit or implicit, which might affect even remotely the country's ability to take an independent line in international affairs. There were also obvious risks in excessive reliance on foreign aid which depended on the domestic political situation in lending countries and which might be interrupted by any untoward international developments. These factors, taken together, explain as well the inclination on the part of India towards the United Nations assistance and greater reliance upon the International Agencies wherein the conditions were found to be more durable and promising and subject to lesser fluctuations. Yet external resources at strategic points and stages could be of assistance to such a degree in a period of rapid development that it was

deemed to be desirable, consistent with other objectives, to create conditions favourable to their inflow. The Planning Commission admitted that India had a programme of development larger than could be financed from the resources internally available. To a certain extent, the volume of domestic resources available for investment could be augmented through appropriate fiscal and economic policy, through compulsory savings, and through drawing on unutilised manpower. There would, however, still remain certain shortages which would tend to restrain the whole pace of development, and it was in meeting those that external resources could be of help. "While the draft of the Plan put the main reliance on internal resources for the financing of economic development, yet the realistic attitude which was shown in the formulation of the Plan generally improved the prospects for foreign aid both official and private. It was also possible for India to present a more integrated scheme for the six-year Colombo Plan at the first meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee held in Karachi in March 1952. India's revised six-year Colombo Plan involved an outlay of Rs. 2,333.7 crores as against Rs. 1,839.6 crores which was previously planned for. Out of the total outlay of Rs. 2,333.7 crores India agreed to raise as much as Rs. 1,551 crores from internal resources leaving a gap of Rs. 782.7 crores to be provided by external aid".⁷

No country could hope to attain economic progress without the participation of foreign aid. Even if all resources were raised internally, external assistance would still be necessary. An underdeveloped country could scarcely have all the equipments and technological requisites for promoting economic development on modern lines. Machines were to be imported, so also technical know-how. Some of the essential raw materials might also have to be imported. For attaining a certain rate of progress, developmental imports had to be stepped up, and no underdeveloped country was in a position to effect immediate payment for them. As such, the use of foreign capital in terms of loans and grants was an essential aspect of the attainment of economic progress as well as the ultimate success of the Plan. "Use of Foreign Capital is an essential aspect of attaining economic progress; in fact the pace of national deve-

lopment is sometimes limited by the availability of international capital.”⁸ It had been, in essence, rather unthinkable on the part of most of the underdeveloped economies to commence with their programme of development confining themselves alone within their own limited periphery of natural resources that were very often felt to be inadequate in order to cope with the problems of growth that were, again, always of a large-scale character. On the other hand, modern economic planning admitted the place of foreign aid as a basic factor in the task of national upliftment. Again, because of the very existence of the past history and association of colonisation, a certain newly-independent nation could not claim to possess all the required skills and techniques for achieving reasonable progress, one had to turn to those European nations advanced from ages and who had gained exemplary proficiency in the arts though it might have been able to avoid the direct financial assistance. Throughout the course of domination, the secrets of development, especially industrial, were kept away from them by their rulers on account of which they later came to be termed as “backward” and had to count upon the experience of others.

Hence, foreign aid was bound to creep in somewhere in one shape or the other. Thus, also, even if foreign economic aid was in the last resort not inevitable in the case of an underdeveloped country due to the devotion on self-reliance through the impact of nationalism, foreign technical assistance would indispensably come into the picture if the economic planning set-up was to succeed at all. This was equally true of the Indian context. Moreover, the technical assistance was of a far-reaching consequence than the economic. Human skill would continue to pass on from generation to generation once it had come to stay and would be inextricably inculcated into the subconsciousness of the incumbent. Talent could not tangibly be paid back. It was also all the same recognised, as pointed out by Prime Minister Nehru in his announcement on April 6, 1949, about the industrial policy in regard to the participation of foreign capital in India that Indian capital had to be supplemented by foreign capital not only because it was necessary for rapid economic development but also because in many

cases the scientific, technical and industrial knowledge which was required by the country for its development would accompany the foreign capital.⁹ But this could at best be an academic exercise, for in practice, any underdeveloped country could not help accepting aid in all forms *vis-a-vis* the tremendous issues that confronted it. The singular consideration would be how far the national sovereignty was compromised in the transactions. Foreign aid, which India received, was thus an essential and a normal feature of the use of foreign capital for developmental purposes.

Technical Assistance

For a hypothetical case, in the process of capital formation, India could have undertaken intensive domestic measures, as noted earlier, such as compulsory savings, super taxation and the allowance of inflationary trends even at the voluntary sacrifice of the privileges of the citizens and the observance of total austerity through constitutional means as a temporary expedient. But in the matter of technical education, she could not mobilise the resources from amongst her population, far lagging behind in general and elementary education, let alone the specialised. The bulk of the Indian intelligentsia who were so far trained in the Western seminaries comprised mostly the Humanities Group who sought to probe into the inner affinity of the Western and Indian Thought in their own way, whereas the spirit of scientific instruction that had caught the imagination of the Europeans and the Americans in the post-war era was still a novel field for the Indians to enter into. The prevalence of the Hindu out-of-the-world tradition also stood in the way of any encouragement in this direction though Science had itself one of its most ideal fruitions in ancient India. But the necessities of the later half of the Twentieth Century called for the introduction of a scientific life as well and the vitality of laboratory experiments and applications in a successful economic planning and industrialisation was only too glaring. The hour to think and act revolutionarily had arrived and the day-to-day tangible problems of the modern State could only be tackled on a regulated and analytical plane as human progress came at times to be identified with

the advancement of Science. It is not that the leaders of the Indian democracy were quite unaware of the new transformation in human faculties. Beginning with Nehru they punctually realised the implications that if planning was to approach its targets with consequent economic betterment, the Indian nation had to incline towards the knowledge of mechanical support and placed emphasis upon the potentialities of scientific apparatus. So much so that the Indian Premier once went on to say that if the world was to solve its problems, it could inevitably have to be through the means of science and not by discarding it and that in his view, two things would stand out in the history of the future; thereby meaning "the coming of atomic energy and the emergence of Asia". Given all the efforts of the Indian Government towards the popularisation of technical education in India where the unbalanced study of human urges had taken the toll of the material amenities of the masses for the immediate years of independence at the least, India had no other alternative but to 'import' scientific know-how and equipment from abroad in order to meet her shortcomings in the working of the First Five Year Plan while she prepared her own ground. In the long run, all these external assistance put together constituted only a major part of foreign aid that was found unavoidable.

Agriculture

As for instance, the agricultural development was given the highest priority in the First Plan, as it was considered the base for future progress. Recognising the importance of Agriculture, the sheet-anchor of Indian Economy, it was accorded the first place in the maiden adventure of the country towards a concrete, practical programme for the attainment of physical gains. Agriculture, including Power and Irrigation, was a way of life and not only an industry in India. Naturally, the end of inflation, attainment of self-sufficiency in food, betterment of rural conditions and stabilisation of the economy by increasing agricultural productivity was the foundation stone on which the entire super-structure of the new, rebuilding India was to rest. Therefore 17.5 per cent of the total outlay was allocated for the agricultural sector, excluding irrigation and

power. Hence, also 25.5 per cent of the total outlay was allotted for agricultural programmes, exclusive of multipurpose irrigation projects. 19 million additional acres were expected to receive irrigational facilities, including 8 million acres from minor schemes. 10 million additional acres were also expected to be brought under cultivation which, besides other, was likely to increase about 4 million acreage in rice, 3 million acres in wheat, 3.4 million acres in raw cotton, 3 lakh acres in sugareane, 8 lakh acres in raw jute cultivation. The production potentialities of the various programmes were as follows:

| | |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Major Irrigation | 2.0 Million Tons ¹⁰ |
| Minor Irrigation | 2.3 " " |
| Land Reclamation | 1.6 " " |
| Manures and Fertiliser | 1.1 " " |
| Improved seeds | .6 " " |
| | <hr/> |
| | 7.6 M.T. |

Thus, the very first step that India was going to take in regard to her economy was the modernisation of her traditional agricultural system, which, in turn, primarily implied the innovations of machinery in the farms. Being predominantly an agricultural country, the success of her planning naturally leaned heavily upon the extent to which she was going to be able to provide a scientific outlook and better processed accessories to the farmers in the rapid implementation of the projects. Progress would have been unsystematic and slow had she followed her own techniques typically preserved for generations with poor efficacy. Besides the replacement of the age-old ploughshare by the tractor and the crude irrigational facilities by modern systems, India also contemplated to introduce heavy engineering into it and asserted that the emancipation of the rural class lay in the construction of dams and power projects. Moreover, India could not ignore the close relationship between agriculture and other branches of Science and recognised that scientific process was the best possible to get the most out of her natural resources. But,

again, all these endeavours were not complete in the absence of foreign collaboration. India was not in a position to produce the agricultural machinery needed and she also lacked in experts and information, all of which had to be brought in from abroad, in addition to the already existing financial difficulties. As in other sectors of the economy, here too, the undertaking of river valley projects and rural upliftment programme called for active foreign collaboration, both in cash and kind, in order to translate the dream of the millions where the common people had so far been able to look upon the rivers as only sacred but not useful to themselves to this extent. However, foreign assistance in her technological aspect of the Plan was forthcoming. The minor irrigation schemes consisting of construction and repairs of wells, drilling of tubewells under the auspices of the Grow More Food campaign and Indo-U.S. Technical Cooperation Programmes, digging of new tanks, streams and water, lifting appliances benefited nearly 10 million acres. The Central Tractor Organisation reclaimed 11.86 lakhs acres against the target of 11.1 lakh acres. The area under the Japanese method of rice cultivation rose to new heights as the Plan unfolded. Actually, the greater burden of the mechanisation of Indian agriculture fell upon the other developed countries. Not only the fields but also the very way of Indian rural life had to be transformed in order to give a fresh impetus to the agricultural front of the national planning and to bring about a "Green Revolution". In this task, too, the foreign models played a decisive role as the N.E.S. blocks. Thus, if the success of the First Five Year Plan presupposed the optimum fulfilment of the agricultural targets, the latter in its inward fashion relied upon the overseas supplies for its proper implementation.

Plan and Policy

Nor could India, as aforesaid, forego the cause of foreign financial assistance. To arrive at the crux of the matter, the First Five Year Plan depended a great deal upon the availability of foreign loans and grants for its success. The revised budget estimate of external assistance for 1951-56 in the Plan standing at a higher level and the volume of discussion on the

probable support to Planning from outside conspicuous by its reiterated reference only indicate that India counted considerably upon the role of foreign capital in the task of stabilising her economic framework. She expected the aid to go up as supplementary, for in the case of the same not forthcoming in the required measure, the Plan itself would have certainly ended in a deadlock as internal resources were not in a position to meet all the exigencies latent in the Plan process. Herein, the sterling balances and dollar deposits of India, too, figured prominently. Thus, it could also be said that the contribution of foreign aid towards the ultimate completion of the Plan was indeed substantial. During the First Five Year Plan (April 1951-March 1956) the total amount of economic aid authorised by the donor countries for the development of India, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, stood at Rs. 388.9 crores. The total amount allotted by the United States of America out of the above figure was Rs. 220.3 crores, which was approximately 60 per cent of the total foreign aid authorised. (Canada Rs. 32.3 crores, Australia Rs. 11.1 crores, Norway Rs. 0.7 crores, New Zealand Rs. 1.7 crores, the U.K. Rs. 0.4 crores, and the USSR Rs. 64.7 crores.) Out of this U.S. assistance, India was to utilise Rs. 134.6 crores during the Plan period which was 69.3 per cent of the total. Again, the total contribution of the I.B.R.D out of the above total foreign aid amount of Rs. 388.9 crores was Rs. 57.7 crores of Rupees that was approximately 15 per cent of the total foreign aid authorised. Out of this World Bank assistance, India was able to utilise Rs. 33.8 crores during the First Plan period, which was 17.4 per cent of the total. Her own administrative and other technical shortcomings were responsible for the partial utilisation of the funds available. While the total investment made by India during the First Five Year Plan stood at Rs. 3,360 crores, the total foreign aid utilised by her in this period was Rs. 194 crores, that is, approximately 50 per cent of the total amount authorised. On the other hand, the foreign aid utilised by India was 5.8 per cent of the total investment made.

The above statement shows that the First Five Year Plan of India was drafted in wide anticipation of foreign economic

economic resources and the overall estimate of foreign assistance had a considerable domination over the final approval of the Plan. It thus followed that the unhampered completion of the Plan was subject to the continued flow of foreign aid, and the economic development of the country was more or less identified with the circulation of adequate external loans and grants. Of dependence on the West, again, it was the USA that helped India in a far greater degree in comparison to other countries and accordingly the USA had a definite place in the framing and exercise of Indian policies and pattern especially with regard to the Plan. Moreover, India, at the least, was persuaded to change her attitude, if not the substance, when she treated the issues of the Cold War in which the USA was directly or indirectly involved as her effort to bring peace and maintain the goodwill of the Western Powers was evident in cases like the Korean War, as both were deemed vital for her healthy pursuits. Hence, she could not afford to antagonise the benefactors by preferring to look at every issue "on its own merits". This was so though foreign loans and grants could not be dubbed as "aid" in the strict sense of the term as in that matter, this would, by and large, be equally true of all other transactions, financial and internal as well, like the bankers' loan and the public borrowing programme. There is no denying the fact that foreign aids unmistakably influence the policy of the recipient towards the donor country within and without the United Nations. Whether the assistance rendered may be fruitful or not, the very act of support involves the aided country into a long-term commitment for actions and obligations cannot be separated into watertight compartments. Howsoever a government might falsify the charge, it is so, for the former could not have carried on with the outright condemnation of all the acts of the latter while accepting offers from it at the same time. Besides, the aid did not come without any conditions attached, whether technical or otherwise, and mutually agreed to. A country assisted had to abide by those stipulations, if no other that curbed her discretionary capabilities, for a commitment did always exist in reality. Eventually, it could be said in summary that the working of the Five Year Plan and of the Republican

Constitution of 1950 at large, prevented the uninhibited growth of Indian foreign policy and impelled it to be channelled towards a premeditated end.

Owing to the adverse economic consequences of Partition India faced a deficit in her own governmental reserves besides other long-term curtailments. She agreed to allocate Rs. 7.5 crores to Pakistan out of the cash balances to help the latter make a start in accordance with the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal. Though the payment of the balance of Rs. 5.5 crores was later withheld pending a settlement in Kashmir, it was finally disbursed when Mahatma Gandhi went on a fast on January 13, 1948, and appealed for better relations between India and Pakistan. But at the root of the question lay the very backward nature of the Indian economy where the masses were already overtaxed. "Poverty is thus the basic malady of an underdeveloped economy and India is a sad victim of this secular misfortune. If amongst the many differences, there is one common link that binds India together, it is poverty, colossal and sometimes even staggering".¹¹ Paradoxically, her own rich philosophy and cultural heritage not only tolerated material poverty, but in some way contributed to it. The caste system and other rigid social institutions, superstitions and beliefs all leading to a sense of otherworldliness brought inertia and inaction. All these, taken together, proved to be a serious hindrance in the smooth progress of the Plan and led to a large dependence upon the Western capitalism as economic development was to be determined by the behaviour of foreign loans and grants.

That India made for a substantial amount in her budget estimate as expected external assistance affirms that the presence of foreign aid was a *sine qua non* for the ultimate success of her experiment in Democratic Planning which, again, she was well aware of. When a plan of such vital significance in the economic recovery of the country was being drafted in expectation of a major inflow from external sources, it lends credit to the fact that India could only have developed a foreign policy that was strictly in consonance with her development programmes. As such, her foreign policy in the period under review was Plan-oriented and aspired to be an instru-

ment predominantly to further the interests of the Plan. If her external actions were guided by economic considerations, the overall body of the Plan influenced her immediate overtures and reactions outside. Thus, if the Plan represented the internal conditions, the latter eventually came to dictate her policies. The requirements of the projects determined her movements in the international sphere and limited the free exercise of her will even though her foreign policy was ostensibly said to be an independent one.

To sum up, an unfettered policy could never have run parallel to such an extraordinary engagement of alien allowances, in the truest sense of the event. Again, as the basis for a stable foreign policy thrived on a sound economic footing, the Plan and the policy acted as complementary to each other in reciprocal growth. The prospects of the Plan figured in the formulation of important policy-decisions, and her stand on various world issues was going to be conditioned by the extent of external resource she was in a position to mobilise for the full implementation of the Plan, though actually the policy of non-alignment did not originate in the field of foreign aid. Hence, the element of the working of the First Five Year Plan was a prime determinant in the evolution and moulding of the Indian emergent foreign policy. As economic development was equated with the supply of foreign loans and grants, it was but natural for India to seek "friendship with all and enmity towards none" as she was bent upon gathering materials from every possible source irrespective of ideological and other considerations. India realised that the struggle on the self-sufficiency front should always have precedence over that on the emotional and nationalistic front. It could well be perceived from the fact that as the First Plan made headway and approached the crucial stage, India withdrew from her policy of vehement attack upon imperialism and colonialism in the United Nations and ushered into the era of negotiation and peaceful coexistence for the latter implied an intermission wherein each could develop oneself in order to be a potential deterrent afterwards. She felt that wholetime adherence to one specific stand did not pay much dividends. In essence, foreign aid acted as a moderator that tempered her exu-

berant outpourings in foreign affairs whenever it tended to overflow and imparted it a definite direction to proceed, if not the goal. In the meantime, India also expanded her existing economic relations abroad and sent Agents-General and Commissioners-General whose main task it was to explore fresh avenues of commitments and to safeguard the overseas Indian economic interests. Moreover, the Indian diplomatic missions, too, considered trade and loan negotiations to be the foremost among their duties. To add to this, various delegations and dignitaries went out from time to time with similar end in view.

That India turned towards the Soviet Union after Stalin's death could as well be seen in the light of things that foreign aid from the capitalist countries threatened to strengthen the private sector alone and in a sense stood in the way of her goal of a socialistic pattern of society through democratic planning. The Russian experience in the realm of planning was no less valuable for the Indians though differing in certain fundamentals. Several experts have noted that there was a definite shift in Indian foreign policy after 1952 and if that was so, the demands of the First Five Year Plan played a decisive role in the same. The policy of non-alignment had to be reflected in the economic sphere as well. The exigencies of the internal limitations restrained her voice and she had to hide her real feelings as she could not utter many things about the donor countries in particular and the international affairs in general, that she wanted to. Mr Nehru once disclosed that he would have shouted from the housetop had he not been bound up with the official responsibilities. Thus, it could also be inferred that certain important elements in policy-making could not be included or had to be shelved, that the original framing intended to foster and India's foreign policy could not be carried forward as it should have been, in several respects.

Throughout the period, the chief issue that drew the constant attention of India was none other than the fate of the Plan that was kept modest keeping in mind the availability of resources, both internal and external, when all other national requirements were made subservient to it. Apparently, it was also discernible that the first spirit of the achievements in foreign policy was sought in the satisfactory completion of the

Plan. The yardstick that measured the inherent vigour of India's foreign policy in the period was how far it was able to bring home as much as possible incentives for a systematic reconstruction while, at the same time, maintaining its singular character. Planning was an inevitable medium for the future stability of India and was an endeavour towards the attainment of economic independence without which the ingredients of a full democratic life in a Welfare State with a morsel of human rights to the people, including an exclusive stand on foreign affairs, were not feasible. "What does independence consist of? It consists fundamentally and basically of foreign relations. That is the test of independence. All else is local autonomy".¹²

As such, India was found prepared to resort to every other means to the effect that the working and the completion of the Plan were not hampered or delayed due to any internal or external happenings, and so she appealed for peace, as aforesaid, whether it be in Korea or Indo-China. "The economic progress of India's 300 million people had been arrested during the last 200 years. So much so, that her people are weaker, poorer, less well-clothed and housed and very much less efficient and equipped with education and knowledge in the modern scientific ways of production, organisation and development than so many other peoples. To raise their standards of living, education, efficiency and industrial equipment and to liberate them from chronic famines, underfeeding, diseases and frequent epidemics, India needs a long period of peace and concentration of all her energies upon the development of her productive resources and industrial and commercial equipment of her people. Therefore, she has to explore all possibilities for avoiding wars".¹³ Apropos the deliberations made, it could be permitted to conclude that India's foreign policy in the early fifties was taken also for a defensive policy especially concerned with and hovering around the Five Year Plan. Much more depended upon the scheduled termination of the Plan and its unique place among the subsequent plans could hardly be denied it. The period under review was still a formative one so far as the nation's policies were concerned. In the field of external economic relations, India was limited by the widely uneven growth of her economy. Two hundred

years of foreign rule had retarded the development of the national economy. It had made it dependent on outside sources for many of its basic requirements and had geared it to the needs of the economy of the British Empire. "What is important, therefore, is not the immediate policy on external economic relations (which is largely determined by the exigencies of the internal situation) but the pattern of national reconstruction that the country had set before itself—the pattern which would ultimately determine India's economic position in the world".¹⁴ It is significant that although the Planning Commission had not included it as one of the objectives of planning in India, the overwhelming majority of articulate opinion in India, including the ruling party, was thinking in terms of an industrialised and largely self-sufficient economy. While the First Plan naturally addressed itself to correcting some of the basic maladjustments which stood in the way of initiating such a process of development, it was apparent that its success would be followed by a Plan which would not only be bigger in volume, but also bolder in outlook.

At the time, India could not even boast of her internal peace where the national life was still a distorted picture of heterogeneous elements. If freedom involved responsibility and presupposed the capacity to sustain it on the part of the State concerned—these tests were severely put in the case of India. With the well-known British device of "divide and rule" ending in the Partition and the option granted to the Indian States for accession, perhaps fewer countries were to be found as compared to India that were confronted with such an overwhelming lot of problems at the dawn of independence. "Mr (Winston) Churchill added that disputes and deadlocks were not the issue at stake. They were only symbols of the passion and hatred of thousands of years. The unity of India was a superficial appearance imposed there by long generations of British rule and it would pass away for long periods of time once the impartial element of guidance from outside was withdrawn".¹⁵ During the first stage of the development of Indian foreign policy, i.e., from August 16, 1947, to January 1, 1949, the day when a cease-fire was called in Kashmir, India was facing "tremendous internal problems of an overwhelming

nature". The economic situation of India following the war was bad enough but was made infinitely worse by the country's partition into India and Pakistan. The riots and violence that followed created a huge problem of rehabilitating millions of refugees. Relations with Pakistan were extremely strained and the two countries were fighting a limited war in Kashmir. There was also the problem of the integration of nearly 600 and odd Indian Princely States, and its solution included a police action against Hyderabad (September 13, 1948), and trouble with Pakistan over the State of Junagadh, which had, to the great bewilderment of the Indian Government, acceded to Pakistan. As if all these problems were not enough, the Indian Government was being seriously harassed both by fanatic Hindu elements and Communists with their own versions foreign policy ideologies respectively feeding on communal passions and economic difficulties prevailing in India. "All this led the Indian leaders to the belief that, first of all, they must consolidate the internal situation in India, if the country was to be saved from chaos and disorder. So far as external relations were concerned, India had enough trouble nearer home with Pakistan. Hence relations with that country were the main concern of the Indian foreign office".¹⁶ How all these legacies of a divided independence, taken together, went to affect the original status of India as a young member of the Family of Nations that she was so keen to develop and the extent to which it gave cause for anxiety to her leaders, is understandable from the following admission by Nehru in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) on March 8, 1948:

"Another factor—and that is more applicable to us—is that owing to the unfortunate events that have happened in India since the 15th August, 1947, anything we did in the world outside suddenly lost weight or lost weight for a time. We counted for something, not very greatly, of course, and more potentially than in actuality. Indeed, potentially we counted for a great deal, though actually we need not have counted for much. But the events that occurred after the 15th August in India and Pakistan—Pakistan I might say naturally did not count for much because it had no background; it was a new-comer; it was we who counted—those events suddenly brought down our credit in the international domain tremendously".¹⁷

While trying to preserve the nascent and hard-won freedom, India was head over ears in a desperate bid to find suitable solution to her own social and political problems, some of which were of such import that they forebode a grave threat to national security. During this period India was engaged in a life and death struggle for survival. The rehabilitation of refugees, the drawing up of the Constitution and the holding of elections were the major steps in the country's progress towards unity and stability. Moreover, the Indian society of the past, with all its paraphernalia, was to be recast on an altered model so that it could be made adaptable to the prevailing atmosphere. Thus with varied antagonistic forces at work within herself, the challenge on the home front itself was no less imposing to her. India was passing through a critical stage in her history and during this transitional period her entire energy and attention were directed towards the stabilisation of the fundamental structure found dilapidated at the advent of freedom followed by a redefinition of her age-old conglomeration of social and political institutions. It was in her immediate interest to see that the new order had firmly come to stay as a good augury for the federation. "There was a school of thought in India, Indonesia and Burma which held that the threat to the established order in these countries could come only from a deep economic crisis or from an uncertain political and military situation in their countries, arising from war. To avoid such a crisis the governments in these countries were engaged in raising the standard of living of their peoples, and following foreign policies based on non-alignment with the major Powers who were engaged in the 'Cold War'. That was why they welcomed economic and technical help from outside but not any military with any Big Power. These were the countries which constituted the strong elements in the 'peace area'. They also wanted to promote and expand that area".¹⁸

Any policy in favour of one of the two groups of Powers competing for world supremacy would have resulted in the polarisation of the effective public opinion within the Congress and upset the balance between the Congress and other parties. Further, alignment with one bloc might have provoked the

other bloc to support and strengthen secretly or indirectly such forces within the country as were in its favour. "If the balance of forces within the country is not as stable as it is in the U.K. or elsewhere, bipolarity in international politics on the basis of ideology tends to create bipolarity or division in internal politics".¹⁹ It has been observed that alliances interfere not only with the political balance of forces but also with the normal working of the national economy. On account of formal pre commitment, political considerations are liable to outweigh economic considerations regarding rational allocation of national resources within the country. In fact, the economy of the aligned countries, particularly those which are geographically contiguous with one of the Super Powers (e.g. the economy of East European countries and of South America), tend to get integrated into the economy of the stronger partner. Further, as it happened in Pakistan and Thailand, economic aid to satellite States inclines to acquire the nature of intervention in favour of certain special economic groups within the recipient States. This policy, in so far as it could promote peace by lessening tension, helped economic development indirectly. Conditions of belligerency disrupt the free flow of capital and technical know-how. Hence one can safely arrive at the point that the policy of non-alignment augmented internal balance of forces and positively it helped in creating such conditions as would enhance political and economic stability that India required so urgently during her formative stage. Again, as aforesaid, she contrived to bring about a balance of power in her favour through the integration of the Indian States in order to compensate the territorial loss caused by the division of the subcontinent. Apart from geo-political considerations, the merger of these States was also called for the economic revitalisation of the newly-formed Indian Union as some of them like Hyderabad and Travancore-Cochin were prosperous non-sovereign entities that could have either given an impetus to the national economy or proved a hindrance to its progress. "The attempt to control the exchange manipulation . . . the insistence on Trade Agents in foreign countries and the right to receive hard currency for Hyderabad equivalent to its exportable surplus . . . are part of a well-planned

scheme to make Hyderabad economically sovereign and so powerful as to make India's position difficult. In future settlement, the economic factors should not be lost sight of".²⁰

Hence, the restoration of a healthy solidarity at home unequivocally called for the greater maintenance of international peace and security. India could not face the breach of peace both at home and abroad at the same time and she was bound to have her hands free at least from one side. Emerging out of centuries of bondage and struggle, it was quite understandable on her part to go after some relaxation that she badly needed. If "India had found herself again" it was yet a long way to regain her full national self-consciousness and to recapture a bit of her old self. Thus, what she aspired for was Time with Peace for ample contemplation for laying down a solid foundation to the popular democracy, wedded to the goal of a socialistic pattern of society. "We want at least 10 to 15 years of peace in order to be able to develop our resources".²¹ Furthermore, India was well-informed of the fact that after the havocs of the World War, followed by the enunciation of the "Four Freedoms" of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Peace and Freedom in all their manifestation were the only twin objects that caught the instant imagination and interest of the suffering mankind. In pursuance of it, the outstanding universal demonstration of dynamism in which she could collaborate with the other Members of the United Nations furnished her with the agreeable environment to introduce herself to the Family of Nations. Therein, she was successful in winning popularity and consensus of view to a higher extent for most of the problems of the underdeveloped ex-colonies were similar in nature and when they required peace for their own development. That India cared to keep pace with the progressive notions in vogue has been to a far degree responsible for the rapid enhancement of her international stature and confidence. In this process, the United Nations brought in a long overdue via media through which India could translate her ideas into reality. This phenomenon is aptly corroborated by the international cases that came up before the organs of the United Nations headed by the Security Council and in which India played a decisive role.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 25.
2. J.C. Kundra, *Indian Foreign Policy 1947-54*, p. 61.
3. Michael Brecher, *India's Foreign Policy—An Interpretation*, Secretariat No. 1 Prepared for the Lahore Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, February 1958, p. 5.
4. K.P. Karunakaran, *India in World Affairs*, Vol II 1950-53, p. 201.
5. *The First Five Year Plan*, Planning Commission, p. 7.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
7. Mohd. Shabbir Khan, *India's Economic Development And International Economic Relations*, p. 84.
8. K.N. Bhattacharya, *Indian Plans*, p. 88.
9. Quoted in Mohd. Shabbir Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 95.
10. Birendra Kumar, *An Introduction to Planning in India*, p. 58.
11. K.N. Bhattacharya, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.
12. Jawaharlal Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 240.
13. N.G. Ranga, Member, Indian Parliament's Standing Committee for External Affairs, "Bases of India's Foreign Policy", *The Eastern Economist*: Special Number, January 2, 1948, p. 58.
14. K.P. Karunakaran, *op. cit.*, pp. 235-36.
15. Debate in the House of Commons, December 11-13, 1946.
16. J.C. Kundra, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53.
17. Jawaharlal Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
18. K.P. Karunakaran, *op. cit.*, pp. 252-53.
19. K.P. Karunakaran (Ed.), *Outside The Contest*, p. 77.
20. K.M. Munshi, *The End Of An Era*, p. 275.
Letter dated February 29, 1948, from Shri K.M. Munshi, the Agent-General of India in Hyderabad, to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the Minister for States.
21. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Independence and After*, p. 258.

3

U.N. AND ECONOMIC AID

INDIA, as an economically backward nation in 1946-47, wanted to take full advantage of the various economic activities of the United Nations Organisation. This followed from the fact that with her adopting a policy of non-alignment with the Power blocs, India apparently could not expect a stream of economic and technical aid from the members of the blocs when they were required most—when she was confronted with the foremost task of reconstruction of the national economy. If such assistance ever came from any quarter, it was not in proportion to the field left to be covered and, moreover, invariably involved the attachment of some kind of political strings which she was not in a position to accept. This was made clear by her Prime Minister:

“If it is considered right in the larger interest of the world that a country like India and other countries in the East should be industrialized, should increase and modernise agricultural production, it is in the interest of those countries that can help in this process to help the Asian countries with capital equipment and their special experience. But in doing so, it is to be borne in mind that no Asian countries will welcome any such assistance if there are conditions attached to it which lead to any kind of economic domination. We would rather delay our development, industrial or other, than submit to any kind of economic domination by any country”.¹

The truth that the developed countries in coming to the succour of the underdeveloped States were not merely doing service of a humanitarian character but always kept their own national considerations in view was aptly mentioned in the Mutual Security Act, 1951, of the United States of America that expressly laid down that U.S. foreign aid should go only to those countries which were conducive to the extension of U.S. national self-interests. Thus, the only alternative left to

India was to turn to the United Nations and to seek aid and loans from the U.N. bodies like the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The funds of these sources were, no doubt, supplemented by the Big Powers but in accepting such offers India could harmonise the demands of her national economy with the fundamentals of her foreign policy. As such here, too, India actually had to fall back upon the good wishes of the bloc countries but the case was a different one in that though foreign aid was coming to her intact, it was of course without those political obligations. Again, her faith in the economic potentialities of the world organisation goes back to the very inception of the Charter when (as noted earlier) India laid stress upon the economic aspect of world issues, eventually playing a decisive role in the formation of the Economic and Social Council which, India was aware at that time, would come to contribute substantially in her socio-economic rehabilitation. The same motive underlies her membership of the Commonwealth in the face of vigorous criticism by a section of the Indian public opinion. With no Marshall Plan for Asia it was somewhat imperative on the part of every newly independent post-war Asian country to make her own arrangements for economic development. Hence the activities of the various U.N. agencies and commissions were of vital significance to India including primarily that of the World Health Organisation, the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation as well as the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East in order to meet the aspirations and deficiencies of her teeming millions at home. Moreover, the second category of Human Rights, i.e., the economic, social and cultural rights of the individual demanded the active cooperation of the various specialized agencies, for financial and other means lacking, these rights would have remained mostly unrealized. In his speech in the United Nations General Assembly in November, 1948, Pandit Nehru declared that it was a strange thing that when the world lacked so many things, food and other necessities, and people in many parts of the world were dying from hunger, the attention of that Assembly of Nations

was concentrated only on a number of political problems. There were economic problems, too. He wondered if it would be possible for that Assembly to take a holiday for a while from some of the acute political problems which faced it, and allowed men's minds to settle down and looked at the vital and urgent economic problems, and at places in the world where food was lacking.

The Western pressure upon India manifested itself in various shapes and colours. India as an infant nation emerging from alien domination was an underdeveloped country and had no alternative but to turn towards the Western Powers for national sustenance and development. Had the nationalists of Asia despised colonialism, they could not afford to deny the hard realities facing them and ignore Western affluence and ingenuity. Especially for the first decade of freedom, India was substantially dependent upon the West for her requirements till the time the balance was restored after the Iron Curtain was raised and the Soviet Union came to her assistance in 1953. Thus the very first field in which Big Power pressure was forthcoming was none but in the economic as in the case of any underdeveloped country. This fact was further aggravated by her taking a solitary stance in world affairs where her policy was not intelligible enough to be appreciated by the Big Powers and if she looked upon them with distrust, the Powers in return could not take her into their confidence. As such they were hesitant to come to her assistance and even if they did at all, their allotments invariably involved stricter conditions that India at times found too much a price to be paid for or unacceptable as a whole. The rates of interest charged upon the loans were such as to keep India dependent on the Powers for a long time. Further, the Powers intimidated to discontinue the aid whenever India chose to differ from their viewpoints. Whenever, as for an instance, the quota of foreign aid to India was discussed in the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress, her foreign policy objectives very often stood in their way. India had received from the USA assistance of a different sort which went a long way in solving India's problem of dollar deficit and also provided the much-needed finance for economic development. This was

the U.S. wheat loan of June 1951. The Indian Ambassador in Washington requested the U.S. Government in December 1950 to consider the granting of a loan to the Government of India to finance the purchase of about a million tons of U.S. wheat for consumption in this country so that the developing food crisis could be tackled. The loan was duly sanctioned by the U.S. Congress by special legislation, though not before June 1951 and not without some attempts to discuss in the progress of this legislation some aspects of India's foreign policy. Much of the desired effect on Indian opinion was thus lost, from the American point of view, and perhaps the feeling began to grow in many quarters that too much reliance on foreign aid might vitally affect the country's policies. The onerous charges upon which the World Bank loans were advanced to the war-victim countries of Asia could also be seen in the light of the fact that the Big Powers, who were actually behind the scenes in the Bank management, wanted to make the developing countries discouraged of the U.N. assistance and turn solely dependent upon the inter-governmental aid, for the more the underdeveloped countries looked forward to the U.N. agencies for assistance, the Big Powers would further lose in their private designs, for foreign aid has remained only a convenient lever in the extension of national self-interest. "The aid and trade may or may not, on paper, be without strings, but in passing it is worth noting that you may just as easily and effectively be strangled with silk as with string".²

Hence, in her initial stages of freedom, India found it quite irksome on her part to maintain a delicate balance between the Big Power economic pressures and a policy which professed to look at every issue "on its own merits", coupled with the goal of a "socialistic pattern of society" that were undoubtedly repulsive to the capitalists. The Big Powers endeavoured to fish in troubled waters and left no stone unturned in getting India veered towards the Western camp that called for a higher sense of courage and integrity on the part of India. Thus if she could guarantee the immunity of the basic tenets of her policy, her tone and the mode of presentation necessarily underwent variations. In return for aid, the Powers also expected at least abstention from, and not opposition to, their proposals by the

recipient countries in world assemblies. The greater Powers, for once, did not appear to place their faith upon the truth that a permanent system of international peace and security could only be laid upon solid economic foundations and they went a step further to explore every avenue of economic pressure upon the have-nots not excluding trade. They took every possible advantage of the distinguished position in which destiny had placed them and if the better half of the world could prosper, it could do so only in their own direction and favour. In the sphere of international trade, too, India was at that time at a disadvantageous juncture when the reversed balance of payments position had seriously affected her import-export policy. The post-war trends in India's foreign trade were not encouraging either and reflected the weaknesses of the internal economy, posing grave problems for the planners. The situation was worsened by the fact that "tied loans" were offered by the Big Powers according to which the amount authorised could be invested only on specific projects mutually agreed upon and also that foreign purchases with the money could only be made in the donor country or certain indigenous products of strategic and other importance could be exported to a particular country alone. This obviously restrained India's trade policy and in turn conditioned the external affairs in the main whereas the trade element has continuously governed the conduct of the foreign policy of independent India. The stipulation that the aid be used to procure goods from only the aid-giver country naturally entailed a heavy setback upon the foreign exchange reserves and the volume of trade of India for the goods were generally more expensive than goods produced elsewhere in the world market and that higher freight and costly shipping of the donor country be used to transport them further added fuel to the fire from the standpoint of an underdeveloped economy. Economic aid ushered in the wake of the failure of the military-political scheme of the Great Powers involving the non-aligned nations. Hence, what these aids were expected to fulfil, at first hand, was the political end and economic afterwards, if any. Assistance was rendered to the underdeveloped countries in order to help them ensure at least a constant, if not a rising, standard of living to the inhabitants

who might otherwise be won over by the ideology that the Powers wanted to restrain in all parts of the world. As Professor Martin C. Needler puts it:

“The political purpose to which aid is directed is rather to create situations that are in themselves favourable to United States interests and aspirations, regardless of any feelings of gratitude that may or may not be involved, by strengthening popular well-being and national independence. In other words, it would usually be equally valuable for the United States to give aid “anonymously” if equivalent changes were wrought in the recipient economy as a result”.³

The above explanation amply affirms the fact that the United States capital investment in India was often concealed behind nominal French, Belgian, or also Indian ownership, so that the official figure fell short of revealing the true position. In 1961, when India stated her willingness to mediate in a peaceful settlement in Korea, she was suffering from the effects of a harvest failure and was compelled to appeal to the USA for food relief. But the USA, Mr Chester Bowles writes in his Ambassador's Report, was sharply critical of Indian efforts at mediation. So instead of the generous, wholehearted reaction which the Indians expected from America, they found themselves the target of attacks and criticism—demands that if they wanted help from the USA they must first throw their support behind her in the Cold War. To the sensitive Indians this sounded suspiciously like the use of the huge food surpluses of the USA as a political weapon against a hungry people. In fact, Indian opinion was disturbed by the hesitancy with which the United States approached the question of aid for economic development in this part of the world in contrast with its total commitment in the recovery of Europe. And it attributed this lukewarm attitude on the part of the USA to the failure of India to qualify on the political front within the larger context of the Cold War. There could be little doubt, at least in the minds of those who visited the United States; that dollar loans would have been immediately available if India could have qualified herself on the Western front. The Chicago Tribune of May 17, 1952, stated in its leading article entitled “Neutral India” that if India should possess a control-

ling voice in the settlement bringing the Korean War to an end, there was little question that the almost three years of American sacrifice there would have been entirely to no purpose. And a strange way was that the Americans should be sold out by a country upon which the United States had lavished hundreds of millions of dollars in economic aid in the vain hope of ensuring a friendly attitude towards American interests.

Notwithstanding all this, the Big Powers also sought to exert pressures upon India in the context of the Kashmir problem. The prolonged dispute between the Governments of India and Pakistan over the future of Kashmir, involving even military operations for a period, provided opportunities for both Britain and the United States to take a hand in the dispute, the latter especially utilising the machinery of the United Nations for the despatch of a series of conciliators, negotiators, boundary commission and military experts. The special interest in Kashmir reflected not only its intrinsic importance and considerable economic potentialities, but also its special strategic significance on the borders of the Soviet Union. It was the geo-political aspect of the Kashmir question that engaged the keen interest and attention of the Big Powers and repeatedly postponed its solution. Hence the Powers made it a condition that if India wanted any support from them, she should first of all come to an understanding with Pakistan over the Kashmir issue even as it involved drastic concessions. Thus, the State of Jammu and Kashmir had become a pawn on the chess-board of power-politics. On January 17, 1948, the Security Council approved by nine votes its first resolution (S/651) on Kashmir submitted by Van Langenhove as the representative of Belgium. Immediately after the Security Council had adopted the resolution, the British delegate, Mr. Noel Baker, proposed that the President of the Security Council meet the representatives of the parties "to find common ground on which the structure of a settlement may be built". The suggestion was unanimously approved. Accordingly, four successive monthly Presidents of the Security Council (Belgium, Canada, China and Colombia) held conversations with the two parties. The resolutions moved during the period were the product of

these conversations. Unfortunately, however, only one of them, the resolution of January 20, 1948 (S/654), moved by the representative of Belgium and supported by the representatives of the U.K., Canada, France, Syria, China, and Colombia, had the agreement of both the parties.

On January 22, 1948, the Indian delegate, Mr. Gopala-swami Ayyangar, objected to a change in the agenda from the "Jammu and Kashmir question" to the "India-Pakistan question". Philip Noel Baker (U.K.) supported the Indian contention that the Jammu and Kashmir question should be dealt with first. Mr. Gromyko (USSR) also expressed surprise at the "Jammu and Kashmir question" having disappeared from the agenda. Jose Arce (Argentina), El Khouri (Syria), and Lopez (Colombia), however, considered that the President was right in having changed the heading to the "India-Pakistan question" following the receipt of Pakistan Foreign Minister's letter of January 20, 1948 (S/655), as the questions listed in the Pakistan and Indian complaints were interlinked and it was a well-known judicial practice to join claims and counter-claims in a suit. Philip Noel Baker, thereupon, withdrew his proposal for listing Junagadh and other questions as a separate item on the agenda and accepted the change on the understanding that the Jammu and Kashmir question would be dealt with first. The Indian delegate also had no objection to items in the Pakistan complaint being considered at a later stage although, in his opinion, there was nothing in the complaint to endanger international peace and security. The change to the "India-Pakistan question" was accordingly approved on the understanding that "the Kashmir question" would be discussed first as a particular case of the general India-Pakistan dispute though this would not mean that consideration of the other issues in the Pakistan complaint would be postponed until consideration of the Kashmir question had been completed.⁴

Referring to the strong support given to the arbitration proposal by the British delegate, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the Indian delegate said that he would only ask whether Mr. Gladwyn would agree to a proposal that matters of military security vital to the United Kingdom should be decided not by its own

government, nor with its consent, but by arbitrators chosen by somebody else after consultation with the country that had invaded British territory. To add to this, on November 6, 1952, the United Kingdom and the United States again moved a resolution on Kashmir in the Security Council. The resolution urged the Governments of India and Pakistan to enter into immediate negotiations at the Headquarters of the United Nations in order to reach an agreement on the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. The resolution suggested that the armed forces to be kept on the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line should be between 3,000 and 6,000 in number and those on the Indian side should be between 12,000 and 18,000. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the British delegate, who introduced the resolution, told the Security Council that the proposal to limit the forces on the Pakistani side to an armed civil police force while leaving a military force on the Indian side was not consistent with a really free plebiscite. Sir Gladwyn also recalled the Anglo-American proposal of 1951 that a "neutral force" might be used in Kashmir to facilitate demilitarization, in case either side had any doubts about a renewal of conflict. The spirit behind this Anglo-American resolution and the British delegate's speech was to equate the status of India with that of Pakistan in Kashmir. India's representative to the United Nations, Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, did not mince her words in the meeting of the Security Council while she was expressing dissatisfaction at the British stand. She said that it was surprising that anyone should think of suggesting to India that she should admit foreign troops whose withdrawal was an essential feature of Indian independence. To her, it did not matter in what guise they were sought to be introduced or by whom and would not permit that to happen. However, the Security Council adopted the U.S.-U.K. resolution. India rejected it while Pakistan accepted.

Similar pressures were discernible with regard to the Korean crisis. At the very first instance, India was conscious of the Big Power interference not excluding the jurisdiction of a particular body of the United Nations functioning elsewhere. The representative of India, Mr K.P.S. Menon, who was the

Chairman of the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea, in a speech to the Korean nation broadcast from Seoul on January 28, 1948, set the tone of serious purpose which characterized the Commission's substantially successful attempt to ensure that the Korean elections would be genuinely free when he said:

"If the elections are to be of any value at all, they must be free and unfettered. They must faithfully reflect the will of the people. Not only must the electors be free to vote as they please at the time of the elections, but there must be freedom for the candidates of all parties—parties of the extreme right, right, middle, left, and extreme left—to put their views before the electorate on a free and equal basis. The Commission will insist upon the observance of this elementary principle, not only at the time of, but before, the elections. We would rather pack up and go home than be idle spectators of a faked election".⁵

On November 17, 1952, the Indian delegate, Sir B.N. Rau, circulated a resolution which attracted much attention in the U.N. circles and elsewhere. The resolution was drafted after exhaustive consultations with various Arab-Asian delegations. The prominence of this resolution arose from the fact that it was suggested that the proposals contained in it were framed with the knowledge, if not the approval, of the Government of China. The specific proposals contained in the Indian resolution called for the establishment of a Repatriation Commission consisting of representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland. They also provided for the appointment of an umpire by the Commission. According to the Indian resolution, at the end of 90 days, the disposition of any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands had not been effected in accordance with the procedure set out would be referred by the Repatriation Commission to the Political Conference to be called under Article 60 of the draft armistice agreement. Despite the general support of a good number of delegations (including the United Kingdom), the U.S. delegation was not in a position to appreciate the constructive character of the Indian resolution. They thought that the Indian resolution did not unambiguously guarantee fair treatment to those prisoners who did not wish to be repatriated. Moreover, they

thought that the resolution was vague about what would happen to those prisoners who opted against repatriation. The United States Government was also afraid that the proposed Political Conference would not work smoothly. They, therefore, insisted that to make the Indian resolution acceptable to them, the reference of the issue of the prisoners of war to the Political Conference must be ruled out. Afterwards, the United Kingdom called for two amendments to the Indian resolution so that it may be acceptable to her. Her representative said that in the interests of effective and impartial operation, the "umpire" should be made a full member and President of the Repatriation Commission and more explicit provision should be made for the welfare of non-repatriated prisoners. The Indian delegation accepted these suggestions and moved amendments to their own resolution to that effect. In regard to the unrepatriated prisoners of war the Indian amendment to the resolution stated that "if at the end of a further sixty days there are any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands has not been effected under the above procedures and whose future has not been provided for by the Political Conference, the responsibility of their care and maintenance and for their subsequent disposition shall be transferred to the United Nations, which in all matters relating to them shall act strictly in accordance with international law".⁶

In view of the fact that a large number of the non-Communist States supported the Indian resolution and that these amendments partly met the American objections, the USA was prepared to drop the 21-Power resolution and accept the Indian proposals. But, on the other hand, the USSR representative, Mr. Andrei Vishinsky, criticized that the Indian resolution attempted to use the provisions of the Geneva Convention to support or cloak a possible refusal to repatriate the prisoners and it was in conflict with the articles of the Convention and reduced the matter to an exchange of those prisoners of war who voluntarily expressed a desire to be repatriated. He also deplored that the Indian resolution gave the decisive voice to an umpire who would act as the Commission's Chairman, thus in the last analysis, making the United Nations a judge in its own case. Another of the Soviet

delegate's criticisms was that the Indian plan made no mention of the question of the cessation of hostilities and did not show the gateway to a peaceful settlement. According to him the draft resolution of the Indian delegation was designed not to put an end to the war but to perpetuate it. India's intervention on the Korean prisoner-of-war issue in November 1952, at first so adroitly handled so as to set in motion a new chain of international cross currents and apparently driving a wedge within each of the two Power blocs, became however a dismal failure through acceptance of British amendments (presumably initiated under American inspiration) which endangered the neutrality of the proposed Neutral Commission, and left the ultimate fate of the unrepatriated prisoners not on the Political Conference but on the U.S.-dominated United Nations. The main, immediate result of pressing forward this amended resolution (even when it was known to be unacceptable to one major party in the dispute) was to put the Chinese in the wrong and rescue the Western Powers from an awkward situation at a moment when Mr Noel Baker was urging in the House of Commons (November 6, 1962) that a cease-fire should be concluded on the basis of points already agreed and Mr Anthony Eden was finding it difficult to get support for the American view.

The election of India, first as a member of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea and then as the president of that body, was due to the positive role played by India in the discussions relating to Korean questions in the General Assembly. India was one of the sponsors of the first resolution relating to Korea in the General Assembly. Some major changes were made in the U.S. draft proposals on India's initiative. These were the adoption of the principle of adult suffrage for elections in Korea, the principle of secret ballot and the holding of the elections in Korea not on a zonal basis under the auspices of the occupying Powers as suggested in the U.S. draft, but on a national basis under the supervision and direction of the U.N. Commission. The Indian member was doubtful about the advisability of the reporting to the Interim Committee—a body boycotted by the Soviet bloc. When, however, the non-cooperation of the Soviet authorities in North

Korea made it necessary for the Korea Commission to report to the Interim Committee for advice, the Indian Chairman, Mr K.P S. Menon, made it known that, under the Assembly resolution, the Commission was concerned with Korea as a whole and not with one part of the territory, and that most members of the Temporary Commission had expressed concern that the formation of a separate government in South Korea would not facilitate the objectives of the Assembly resolution. This attitude which India shared with the majority of the members of the Commission was in consonance with the broad principles of her policy. Suffering herself from the evil effects of partition, India has been opposed to measures which might entail the partition of a country as in the case of Palestine and Germany. Anyway, the next step taken by India in accepting the advice of the Interim Committee about implementing the Assembly resolution "in such parts of Korea as are accessible to the Commission", though members of the U.N. Commission had genuine doubts whether it was legally open to them to implement the Assembly resolution in one part of Korea only, was completely inconsistent with her policy in the immediate past.

This decision, taken in February 1948, might have been at least partially a reflection of internal politics in India where the Communists had withdrawn their support from the Indian National Congress and had taken to violence. The first formal step towards the division of Korea was taken by the United States. Soon after the Chairman of the U.N.T.C.O.K. had submitted his report, the USA introduced a resolution leading to the establishment of a separate sovereign State in South Korea, calling herself the "Republic of Korea"; and by way of instant reaction a "People's Republic of Korea", claiming jurisdiction over the whole of Korea, sprang into existence in the North. The U.S. Government brought considerable pressure to bear on the members of the U.N., and her resolution was carried by an overwhelming majority, the only dissentients being Canada and Australia. At the time of voting, India suddenly changed her mind. She parted company with her two Commonwealth colleagues on the Commission and, falling in line with the United States, voted in favour of the resolution. The volte-face on the part of India—and that in the presence of

the Indian Chairman of the Commission who had deprecated the proposal for the establishment of a sovereign State in South Korea—led to much speculation that was only natural. The circumstances which led to India's voting were indeed peculiar. Dr. P.P. Pillai, the Indian Permanent Representative to the U.N., who had great experience of international organizations because he was the first Indian to have entered the Secretariat of the League of Nations, felt that "the tide of opinion in the U.N. was running strongly in favour of the American resolution and that it would be futile, and even harmful, for India to row against it".⁷ Dr Pillai's judgment though respectable, his argument was unconvincing for, after all, India had always taken pride in saying that she would put principle before expediency.

For a final observation, there was an undercurrent of apprehension in Mr Nehru's mind that his representative in the Security Council might subordinate long-term consideration to an immediate understanding with the Western Powers. He warned Sir Benegal Narsing Rau, in the course of a letter:

"We cannot guess what the future will bring. It seems to me that even though we might avoid a world war, we are in for a fairly long period of petty wars and intense conflict on the political plane. All this will require important decisions from day to day. We may not be able to do just what we like and often we may have to accept a lesser evil, though that is always a risky business. But in any event we must avoid being hustled into any decision or action and must remember our basic objectives and policy. I can well imagine that in the United States there is some kind of hysteria which prevents any reasoned thought. It was bad enough before this Korean affair: it must be worse now. We have to deal with this state of feeling with calmness, without surrendering to it or merely getting angry with it".⁸

Meanwhile the pressure from the Western Powers on India was continuing for an immediate commitment. Sir Benegal Rau attempted but without success to obtain the Prime Minister's reactions by telephone. Compelled to act on his own judgment of the situation, and in feeble health (after an operation for cancer), he went to a Security Council meeting.

He told Mr Nehru later that there was no time to consult the Government of India upon the draft resolution submitted by the USA. Events seemed to be marching with great speed and urgent decisions were called for. The text of the resolution had been cabled to New Delhi for obtaining definite instructions. The Western Powers' fear was that the least delay in taking a vote might enable the Soviet delegate to walk into the Security Council and veto the resolution. India voted for the resolution, without, however, binding herself to offer armed assistance. Her vote (he told the Prime Minister) "was hailed with joy and relief by the USA, the U.K. and France. . . ."

"I do not know whether we should go on waiting indefinitely, while every day's delay increases the prospects of a world conflagration. It has often seemed to me that it is worthwhile our putting forward some plan even if India is in a minority of one (provided of course we think that the plan is a step in the right direction) and let those who reject it take the responsibility for its rejection. We can then comfort ourselves with the thought that we at least had done our best. There is, of course, the possibility that our suggestion might find wider support than we now think".⁹

Problems of Independence

The economic difficulties of India at the advent of independence were multiple and complicated in nature. As already a backward country, her involvement in the war proved the costlier. She aided the British war efforts with both men and material, despite severe strain at home and so when she emerged as a free nation, it was in fact a hollowed glory with a deep crisis on the economic front. Moreover, here was a case of a different kind as compared to others because independence was granted to her with a division of the geographical territory with a consequent bifurcation in the economic unity that the British India represented. It was a feeble freedom, vulnerable from the economic angle. Thus, though India gained in political stature, she had little inherent vigour to sustain herself fully and for a long time. The economic consequences of the Partition were only too glaring to be ignored and India within a short notice turned to be an importer of

several essential items that she produced till the other day. During 1948-49, there came into existence a big cleavage between India's exports and imports. This was, to some extent, due to the inflationary potential latent in the post-war economy, but it was more directly the outcome of the structural changes consequent upon the Partition. A new economic force in the form of Pakistan was curved out of her own organism that posed as a contender to her former place in the world market. After Partition, India became a net importer of raw jute, raw cotton, and foodgrains. All these together had an adverse impact upon India's balance of payments position. If India socially and politically suffered in the aftermath of the vagaries of the Partition, it was in the field of economic deficiency that she did the most. Moreover, though she was supposed to be at the helm of economic affairs at home, she had, in reality, only a partial hold over the economic life of the country. The British economic imperialism still had the sway over her industries and the problems, such as capital formation, indigenous growth of management and the process of industrialisation, needed prompt and priority determination. The national and per capita incomes were far below the average and the population problem presented a threat to neutralise her elementary progress. An idea of the economic poverty of India may be had from the fact that the per capita annual income in India, during 1948-49, was only Rs. 246.9 or about \$50. Furthermore, the issue of the rehabilitation of the refugees had a precedence over the final consolidation of the national structure. The bulk of the above problems were capable of solution by recourse to a planned endeavour alone. But India could not even expect to raise internally the total financial resources involved in a plan. The governmental reserves were depleted and there was a yawning gap between the haves and the have-nots awaiting correction and presenting a serious hindrance in the way of the ideal of Democratic Socialism.

Also for India, adopting a parliamentary form of democracy within a republic, it was not admissible to resort to totalitarian measures in order to regiment the entire nation towards the fulfilment of the targets. This did not call for the

declaration of a state of Emergency. The limited capacity of the socio-economic framework prevented the comprehensive working of the Republican Constitution that, in turn, had its reactions in external affairs. There flourished concentrations of economic power as in the case of the private life insurance companies while, on the other hand, the larger section of the mass lacked the wherewithals for a bare sustenance. Once more, inflationary pressures coupled with deficit financing were the order of the day. Again, the major part of her dollar deposits and Sterling balances, as referred elsewhere, rested with Great Britain that did not come to her use when ever she required it as supplementary expenditure for developmental imports. Last but not the least, the vast manpower and natural resources of India were yet to be utilised to the maximum and lay dormant in the absence of the necessary skill and fund. In this sense, she was a backward country. Hence, to sum up, what India could not accumulate was economic power at a rapid pace without which a concerted future was not assured to her and she had no other way but to look beyond the frontiers in order to recoup her strength. She had to share in the economic power of the others, till she was in a position to generate her own. Thus the fact of the material discrepancies at home made foreign capital an essential pre-requisite. With the commencement of foreign aid, India could no longer plough a lonely furrow though apparently she professed to follow a non-aligned policy. Though, in her opinion, she had adopted the best possible course *vis-a-vis* the obtaining international situation, she could have been speaking from the long-term point of view. But for the moment, the circumstances were not favourable and she had to suffer on account of her uncompromising attitude towards the Big Powers. In reality, a sound and independent foreign policy was feasible only on the part of a developed and self-sufficient country. It can be observed here that Mr Nehru's statement that when freedom was imperilled India was not neutral could also be equally applied when her own economic freedom was jeopardised. On March 17, 1950, Mr Nehru actually said in the Indian Parliament that India was following a non-alignment policy but "that does not mean that, in our economic life or in

other spheres of life, we do not incline this way or that".¹⁰ Thus though India's policy of non-alignment gained momentum, there was a tangible variance in theory and practice, as her economic difficulties continued to temper her actions abroad.

Policy And Investment

Through the Industrial Policy Resolution of April 6, 1948, the Government of India recognised the principle of Mixed Economy and accepted the need for encouraging the investment of foreign capital in India. The Indian Government's policy, as was clearly stated by the Prime Minister in Parliament, was to give all reasonable facilities and encouragement to foreign capital investment in the country. The Government of India's attitude towards external economic assistance could be inferred from the following declaration of the Planning Commission:

"Priority will no doubt go to such external investment as is available from institutions organised on an international basis. The resources of such institutions are however limited, and it would be shortsighted to exclude without good reason investment of funds from advanced countries, either on an inter-governmental basis or on the basis of negotiations between individuals or corporations in the countries concerned. The terms and conditions on which foreign investment may be received will of course have to be judged in the light of the basic objectives of national policy and also in the light of the contribution which the proposed investment will make to development along lines accorded a high priority in the country's development programme".¹¹

The First Five-Year Plan envisaged a total outlay of Rs.2,356 crores and there was a huge gap in resources, part of which was expected to be filled by foreign capital. In addition to this, India required the said capital for industrial and economic development outside the Plan as most of the industrial sector was left to private enterprise and capital was required for the promotion of this sector. But foreign capital was not coming to India in sufficient quantities as was anticipated. Foreign private capital was shy to enter the Indian undertakings because of the socialistic pattern of society that India

adopted as her socio-economic goal, for under such a constitutional set-up the foreigners did not deem that their long-term interests and profits were secure. As for its political implications, it is clear that the Western public opinion did not favour the idea of a large democracy in Asia as was India going the socialist way that would have resulted in serious disadvantages to them in the ultimate analysis apart from the preliminary economic maladjustments. "Committed as it is to the perpetuation of free enterprise, the U.S. must wrestle with the dilemma of assisting in the development of a 'socialist pattern of society.'¹² In pursuance of it, even though foreign investment was forthcoming, it tended to prefer the private sector rather than the public sector. It is evident from the fact that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as and with other sources, avoided the State enterprises as far as possible offered loans to the Tatas and other Indian companies. This inclination was later on corroborated by events when the Cooley Fund founded by the USA in 1954 out of the sale proceeds of agricultural commodities supplied under PL 480 expressly intended to strengthen the private sector and to cement the economic stronghold of the USA in India. For the very reason, India's accomplishments at the initial stage from the point of view of fresh external capital inflow were few. In fact it proved to be a study-period to the outsiders in order to watch and wait while those already committed to Indian industries were speculating about retaining their hold and to be able to adapt themselves to the changed environment. Hence, also the capital available was of not much importance in the governmental scheme of advance towards its cherished values of Socialism, and prevented the balanced growth of the twin sectors of mixed economy that was, again, no less detrimental to the cause of the nation as a whole.

Apart from the technical drawbacks, this resulted from the fact that in the past most of the capital investment in India was of British origin as was natural with colonialism, but after the Second World War Britain's financial difficulties had reduced the amount of British capital investment in foreign countries, including India. As such, it was not possible for the British investor to spare a large sum for investment in India.

The Americans had capital which they could afford to invest in India but they were not yet accustomed to large-scale fiscal involvement in the East. Moreover, the U S. Government anticipated its Indian counterpart to toe the line of American policy before allowing the investment of U.S. dollars in India. Hence the ideological dilemma stood in the way of the desirable flow of external resources into India. In addition to this, the sensation created by the bogey of European economic invasion leading back to political domination had not entirely subsided in the Indian public opinion. "Political domination, it is admitted, leads to economic domination, but an invisible or semi-invisible economic domination creeps in unless you are careful; if that creeps in, it will lead immediately to ill will and not to that atmosphere of cooperation which is so essential in this matter".¹³ However, India received a sum of Rs. 156 crores from foreign (non-Communist) countries in the shape of aid and loans by the time the First Five-Year Plan was finalised. The above capital came to her mainly from the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. To date, the break-up of the loans and grants¹⁴ received by India from abroad in the initial planning period, which could be used for its development programme was as follows:

| Particulars | Amount (in crores of rupees) |
|---|---------------------------------|
| 1. United States Food Loan | 90 |
| 2. Commonwealth Assistance under the Colombo Plan | 12 |
| 3. Assistance under the Technical Cooperation Agreement, 1952 | 25 |
| 4. Assistance under the first Supplement to the Technical Cooperation Agreement, 1952 | 18 |
| 5. Proceeds of Loans from the International Bank, 1950 | 9 |
| 6. Other aid | 2 |
| Total | 156 |

U.S. Aid

The major part of foreign aid received by India during this period came from the United States of America in various forms. It had been a cardinal point of U.S. foreign policy in the beginning of the period to render assistance to the under-developed countries in order to help them to ensure at least a constant, if not a rising, standard of living to the inhabitants who might otherwise be won over by the ideology that the USA wanted to restrain in all parts of the world. From India's viewpoint, there was nothing to be lost by accepting such aid as it did not entail any political or other strings which might affect this country's independence and freedom to choose for herself the type of society that suited her requirements. The acceptance by India of governmental aid began in December 1950 when the first agreement under the Point Four Programme was signed with the United States on the same lines as those signed between the United States and the Philippines and Thailand. From Point Four funds a provisional allotment of \$ 1.2 million was made to India for specific projects, including agricultural and child welfare schemes. By the following year, Point Four had come of age and under the vastly expanded U.S. programme of economic aid India was allotted \$ 50 million. Meanwhile, India had received from the U.S.E.C. Agency assistance of a different sort which went a long way in solving India's problem of dollar deficit and also provided much-needed finance for economic development. India had approached the U.S. Government for an ad hoc assistance of two million tons of foodgrains during 1950-51. The United States Congress in its turn enacted on June 15, 1951, the India Emergency Food Aid Act, under which India was to be given a long-term loan (popularly known as the Wheat Loan) of \$189.7 million (Rs. 90.3 crores) to finance the purchase of two million tons of wheat during the period ending June 1952 in order to meet an acute food shortage at home. The loan earned interest at $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent and was repayable in half-yearly instalments over a period of 30 years commencing from June 1957. The net sale proceeds of the foodgrains were to be placed in a Special Development Fund within the

Central Government's account and the money made available mainly for the grant of short-term and medium term loans to the State Governments and partly for financing development schemes of the Central Government. In special cases, grants could also be made out of the fund to States for schemes approved by the Centre. Out of the interest paid a sum up to \$ 5 million was to be used for purposes of training Indians in USA and U.S. citizens in India, and for the purchase of scientific books from America. It may be noted that the whole of this amount had been utilised by the end of the First Five-Year Plan. There was substantial loss involved in the transaction of the loan in as much as the sale price of the wheat in India did not cover its full cost, including freight and incidental expenses. Thus, although the amount of the loan in Indian currency was about Rs. 902.5 million, the amount credited to the Fund was estimated at Rs. 735.4 million, the balance of Rs. 161.1 million being treated as a capital loss to be written back to revenues over the total loan period. The proportion of capital loss worked out to 18 per cent. The Fund was mainly used for development loans and community projects.

A further step in this programme of large-scale penetration of American capital into India was reached in the beginning of 1952 with the announcement of an agreement signed between the Indian and United States Governments for the establishment of an Indo-American Technical Cooperation Fund. Close upon the food loan, India started negotiations with the United States for a programme of technical assistance in amplification of and supplementing Point Four assistance. The new aid would take the form of capital as well as technical assistance and was to be rendered under the general auspices of the newly-formed Mutual Security Organisation of the USA. Although a section of Indian opinion was inclined to interpret this fact as evidence of India's being linked up with the Western bloc, it was explained by authorities on both sides, to the general satisfaction of opinion in India, that this aid would not involve any strings. The first Indo-U.S. Technical Cooperation Agreement was signed in January 1952. The new agreement provided for an immediate advance of the earlier announced U.S. grant of \$ 50 million up to June 1952 and a Government of

India contribution of Rs. 25 crores, making in all about Rs. 50 crores or \$100 million, for the formation of an Indo-American Technical Cooperation Fund. The agreement also provided for further advances over a period of five years, totalling \$250 million. Under a second agreement concluded in November the same year, India received a further \$38.35 million. Up to March 1954, India was authorised grants under the T.C.A. of Rs. 81.6 crores. The grants were to be used not for advancing the industrialisation of the country, but for projects which were aimed primarily at raising the efficiency of agriculture. The Fund was to be administered jointly by an American Director of Technical Cooperation and an official of the Finance Ministry of the Indian Government. The Director, it was stipulated, would be an American official appointed by the United States Government, and working under the general supervision of the American Ambassador in India. This American Director and his staff, it was further stipulated, would enjoy "all the privileges and immunities, including immunity from suit in the courts of India, which are enjoyed by the Government of the USA in India".¹⁵

The agreement for joint projects was that the total rupee expenditure to be incurred by the Government of India was much more than the dollar aid received for them. Over community development, for example, rupee expenditure far outstripped dollar expenditure by as much as 9 to 1 in some fields like fertilizers and iron and steel. Major items for which large sums had been allocated under the T.C.A. were: community development, fertilizers, iron and steel; ground water; river valley schemes; and training of village level workers. Apart from the joint projects, the Indo-U.S. agreement also provided for the supply of American technical specialists to India (for whom the Government of India was required to ensure certain privileges and amenities) and the training of Indian technicians in the USA. Assistance from America to India's economic development during the period was not confined to her government alone. Private agencies, most notably the Ford Foundation, have rendered important contributions since 1951. Foundation's activities were integrated with the development schemes of the plan and its funds have been used for two pur-

poses—to initiate those urgent programmes of development for which financing through the usual governmental procedure would involve inordinate delay, and to have experimental development projects. A description of American aid cannot be complete without a reference to the community projects, started in October 1952, to change the face of rural India by an intensive programme of development in all spheres. A year later, the national extension service blocks, where development activity of an extensive nature was undertaken, were organised. Although the American contribution to the schemes under the T.C.A. was only a fraction of the total cost involved (the dollars were used for purchasing equipment abroad), it can hardly be denied that the undertaking of this mighty adventure was, in a large measure, the result of American interest in it.

Colombo Plan Assistance¹⁶

| | Amount | Form | Utilisation |
|-------------|--|----------------------------------|--|
| Canada | \$ C.15 million for 1951-52 | Wheat & Automobile Chassis | Mayurakshi Project (W. Bengal); Road Transport, Bombay City |
| Australia | £ A. 4.2 million for 1951-52 | Wheat & Flour | Tungbhadra Project (Hyderabad) |
| New Zealand | £ .25 million Sterling for 1951-52 | | All India Medical Institute, New Delhi |

Britain in Colombo Plan

While Britain did not directly make any assistance available to India, her agreement to release Sterling balances, concluded in 1951, was regarded as an indirect measure of help. The salient features of the agreement were as follows: (1) A sum of £ 310 million was transferred from No. 2 to No. 1 account to be held by the Reserve Bank of India as a

currency reserve; and (2) Transfers from No. 2 to No. 1 account of a sum not exceeding £ 35 million would be made in each of the six years beginning July 1, 1951, subject to certain conditions. The sterling balances agreement not only finally settled one of the important post-war problems of Indo-U.K. relations to the satisfaction of both, but also to a great extent paved the way for bolder economic planning in India. It is to be noted that the deficit financing contemplated by the Planning Commission was to be backed up by the creation of a balance of payments deficit to be met by the sterling release as provided for in the agreement. It was not necessary, however, for India to draw on the sterling balances to the full extent of the release, because of the support of the American Wheat Loan.

But, as noted beforehand, when assistance is rendered by individual countries, they have an association of some political element. Viner has aptly pointed out that governmental grants or loans cannot be very important except for political and strategic considerations. Very often grants based upon such motivations might go only to serve the vested interests of the donor country and might not lead to the genuine welfare of the people so assisted. "In pursuit of the goals . . . our (U.S.) aid programme has become a major instrument of our foreign policy directed toward furthering our national interests".¹⁷ In fact, the donors are not so much concerned regarding the extension of human rights in the distant countries through the betterment of standard of living than they are with their own. If they are at all interested in the development of the under-developed regions, it is because their national economy might be affected by adverse consequences in those parts of the world. The mission entrusted to external assistance is the accomplishment of certain long-term objectives in a particular region and once this is effected, the continuance of aid becomes an absurd liability. This would indicate to what extent the donors are sincerely committed to the promotion of the cause of the recipients. The developed countries were not certainly out to practise charity and toleration inspired by ethical viewpoint. They could not afford to do so either. Aid allocations formed a part of the annual budget and an account

of the foreign aid programme would periodically have to be presented before the parliament of the donor country by the Minister-in-charge and the purposes it served so far. Occasionally, it had to face severe criticism from the members for what foreign aid implied in truth was nothing but the burden of tax paid by the citizens of the donor country. "Because of the intrinsic unpopularity of spending money, and because the foreign aid program cannot count on the support of a set of clearly defined interest groups in the United States that feel they benefit from it, as is normally the case with domestic programs, it is never an easy matter to get a foreign aid Bill through the Congress".¹⁸

Thus aid was only an instrument of foreign policy and the donor would like to see that it was fully utilised to the last farthing in order to protect and further its interests in that region where diplomatic manoeuvres had turned out to be infructuous. The Objective of the United States Economic Assistance Programmes lays down that it was often suggested that the U.S. Government should use or withhold aid to influence the foreign policy tactics of potential recipient countries. In this view, aid was to be used as a lever to gain United Nations votes, to secure speeches favourable to the United States, or more importantly, to secure and hold otherwise perhaps reluctant countries to military alliance. Thus, when the aid was invited by the needy country to employ it for the improvement of her status, it was released by the donor country in order to satisfy her own national self-interests. This conflict of interests generally made the impact of aid insignificant and ended up with loss to the recipient. If, on the military front, the USA had formed a cordon sanitaire around herself, the foreign aid served the same purpose on the economic front. It was the struggle in this direction that emerged prominent in the post-war world, when there was a "scramble for the third world". Bipolarisation continued to be the inspiration of the new era while the ideological rivalry of the Big Powers had its culmination in the economic competition. With the character assassination of MacArthysm at home, the foremost motive of the USA in offering aid to the underdeveloped countries in the Cold War period was to retard the advance of

Communism, especially in South-East Asia, and to maintain the zone of U.S. influence in the Far East. This led the USA to making the membership of the military alliances of the Western bloc a criterion for the grant of aid which was undesirable to the non-aligned countries like India. India could not fulfil those conditions as she had condemned those alliances in no uncertain terms. However, she had to secure assistance for her development while retaining the policy of non-alignment intact at the same time. In that, India's case was an exclusive one that called for unusual efforts on her part. Whatever she was able to receive as Western aid was not what she would have got had she forsaken her stand and taken to alignment. The strong sense of independence somewhat coloured India's outlook on foreign aid. In a foreign policy debate on June 12, 1952, Mr Nehru said in the Indian Parliament:

"There have been times when a word from us would have brought us many good things of life. We preferred not to give that word . . . if at any time help from abroad depends upon a variation, howsoever slight, in our policy, we shall relinquish that help completely and prefer starvation and privation to taking such help. I think the world knows that well enough".¹⁰

The Government of India reiterated its position of singularity although her desire, rather a pledge, for economic development had often compelled India to accept that aid when offered without strings. So she felt that overall dependence upon bilateral and multilateral aid was not to her advantage, as the basic values she nurtured were repeatedly questioned in the process. As such, she was determined to explore fresh avenues of assistance where her interests and policies would not come into conflict with those of the other party. Such a field was provided by the international assistance falling within the purview of the United Nations and to which India now turned.

IMMUNITY AND INVOLVEMENT

INSISTENCE ON U.N. ASSISTANCE

(A Study of Indo-U.N. Relations During the Period 1947-1952)

India's bid for receiving grants and loans through the

various U.N. agencies during this period is also understandable. Since 1949 the Indian attitude on foreign aid had been based on two fundamental points. First, assistance under the international auspices of the United Nations was preferable to direct bilateral inter-governmental arrangements. "Though Indian opinion was thus favourably inclined to the receipt of foreign aid at the governmental level, the emphasis was on international rather than on bilateral aid. The old fears of interference, influence, and strings accompanying aid still lingered in respect of inter-governmental aid and led to vociferous demands for guarantees of various kinds to govern aid from foreign governments".²⁰ Secondly, it was necessary to establish a new United Nations agency especially for this purpose rather than to use existing agencies. Owing to its limited funds and strict requirements, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development could not fully meet the needs of economic development in underdeveloped countries. A new agency was required not only to supplement the existing agencies but also because of the need for an agency with the sole task of promoting economic development—one which would coordinate technical assistance, assess the extent and pace of development, and supervise development projects. These arguments were forcefully elaborated in 1949 in the Sub-Commission on Economic Development (a subsidiary organ of the United Nations Economic and Social Council) by Mr V.K.R.V. Rao, the Indian member, who was Chairman of that body. Subsequently, he presented to the Sub-Commission a proposal for the establishment of the "United Nations Economic and Development Administration". Although the subject was discussed during the next few years, no action was taken until January 1952, when the General Assembly requested the Economic and Social Council to submit a detailed plan for establishing a special fund for financing economic development. The Committee established to perform the task completed its report in March 1953. It stressed that economic development of underdeveloped countries should be accelerated through a system of grants-in-aid and suggested the establishment of a fund for this purpose as soon as expedient. India, in common with many other underdeveloped

countries, consistently supported proposals for a fund and the Indian delegates to the Economic and Social Council considered that its establishment should not have to await progress on disarmament.²¹

On the other hand, the potential key role of the U.N. inter-governmental bodies in making possible a regeneration of world peace through the acquisition of stability had seldom escaped the attention of India. The work of the specialised agencies of the United Nations was the surest foundation for peace, Nawab Ali Yavar Jung, the Indian delegate, told the Economic and Financial Committee on October 29, 1952. Referring to the Regional Commissions—the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the Economic, Social and Cultural Organisation and the Technical Assistance Administration—he said that it was to those bodies and their investigations and achievements that the members should look for establishing the surest foundations of peace. The Indian representative said that experience had brought out clearly that an increasing flow of technical assistance in the field of industry, agriculture, public utility institutions, education and other social services was essential if the development programmes were to be carried out effectively and in time.²² At home, the Planning Commission noted that it would be desirable that foreign capital was channelled into field of high priority, more particularly where new lines of production were to be developed or where special types of experience or technical skill were required. Favouring the system of joint enterprises with Indian industrialists, the Commission said that such agreements should, however, be subject to the approval of the government. They also welcomed the flow of equity capital from abroad, but pointed out that it would be necessary to obtain capital at fixed interest through official or quasi-official institutions like the World Bank.

India was also aware of the difficulties arising out of the uncertainty of the magnitude of, and the purpose for which, bilateral and multilateral aid were likely to become available over a period of time. Such an uncertainty stood on the way of efficient planning and execution of even individual projects as could be seen from the delays that occurred in the execu-

tion of several power projects on account of the shortage of foreign exchange in the early years of the Second Five-Year Plan. Engaged as India was in the comprehensive development of her economy through the adoption of Five-Year Plans, an advance knowledge of the resources that were likely to become available through aid in all aspects became all the more important, particularly because her own reserves of foreign exchange to provide cushion against such an uncertainty had fallen to a low level. Effective planning, in this respect, presupposed not only an estimate of the foreign exchange requirements of the various projects, schemes and programmes but also an estimate of their continued availability. Although India had an adequate basis for an estimate of the former, it was not so in the case of the latter. However, in regard to international aid, the aforesaid element of uncertainty was far subdued, if not eliminated, in comparison to inter-governmental aid when the point India was all the time hinting at was an uninterrupted flow of foreign assistance. It was feasible since the international agencies of the United Nations were going to discontinue existing provisions on widely varying terms, e.g., only in the event of the final depletion of the respective funds or the non-fulfilment of the conditions by the recipient itself, and which were not certainly their regular features. Furthermore, should termination of assistance come about at all, the member would be allowed sufficient precautionary interval in order to supplement the gap thus created and as notified by the agency concerned, whereas bilateral aid could come to a standstill almost overnight and with little respite to gather oneself up whenever the donor government thought otherwise in its own interest as in the case of U.S. aid to Ceylon. Hence, again, the international assistance was more reliable than the others although all of them were subject to variation and termination some time, somewhere. In view of the crucial role of the First Five-Year Plan in laying down the economic foundation of a new India, the ensured and perennial inflow of foreign capital irrespective of the amount involved could not be overemphasized. In other words, India could not afford to disrupt the progress of the Plan half-way by taking up a general view of the foreign assistance programme

on which in turn its success rested a great deal. Moreover, the major difference between bilateral and international aid was the freedom associated with the latter to buy from any source of supply determined by the recipient. There was also more of expert examination from outside both at the aid-giving stage as well as later in the case of aid received from international sources, while in the case of bilateral aid, such examination was usually undertaken on a joint basis. On the whole, it would be true to say that aid received from international agencies presented fewer problems. Though at times much larger in volume, the bilateral aid was more dependent upon the political climate than with regard to the international and held lesser guarantees of continuity.

The great advantage that India derived from the membership of the International Monetary Fund was the assistance she obtained from it to satisfy her need for dollars. Partly on account of imports of capital goods and foodstuffs and partly on the invisible trade account, India was running a large deficit with the dollar area. She had been able to purchase dollars from the Fund from time to time to meet a portion of this deficit. "It was in March, 1948, that she applied to the Fund for the first time for U.S. dollars. The Fund assented to her purchase of \$28 million. Ever since she had been making continuous purchases of dollars from the Fund. She bought \$100 million in 1949, which meant that she exhausted her limit of credit for the year.²³ For under the rules of the Fund, no member country was permitted to draw on its limit of credit beyond 25 per cent of its quota during any one year. The rate at which India had been using up her limit of credit with the Fund had been exercising the minds not only of the Government of India but also of the authorities of the Fund. A mission of the Fund visited India to study the different aspects of India's economy as well as the general economic structure as a whole, and had satisfactory talks with the Central Government in New Delhi on the subject. While it had been recognised that India's case was peculiar, due to dislocation of her economy on account of Partition and that her adverse balance of payments was being principally caused by heavy food imports, it had been emphasized by Mr Parsons, the leader of the

Fund mission, that the Fund's function was to extend its assistance to a country during the period in which it was taking steps to correct a disequilibrium in its balance of payments but not for meeting regular deficits on trade account. The inauguration of the I.M.F. in 1945 heralded an era of closer monetary cooperation among nations. India joined the Fund as an original member and, for the very start, obtained a permanent seat on the executive directorship. She notified to the I.M.F. that the par value of the rupee would be 0.0086357 ounces of fine gold on the basis of the then prevailing exchange rate between the rupee, the sterling, and the dollar. It was decided not to change the par value of the rupee in the downward direction, in keeping with changes in its internal value, because of the realisation that in the immediate post-war years first priority should be given to increased production rather than to exchange adjustment. It was maintained that the disequilibrium in the balance of payments was mainly due to structural changes consequent upon the War and the Partition rather than owing to the internal monetary factors. In any case, it was argued that the situation was so fluid that it was not wise to experiment with a new lower ratio.

By 1949, the reconstruction of war-shattered Europe was more or less complete, owing largely to the assistance forthcoming from the "dollar zone". But now the West European countries were faced with the serious problem of dollar shortage. It was strongly felt that a readjustment of the exchange rate could go a long way towards bridging the deficits on the dollar accounts of the West European countries. Consequently, in September 1949, the Fund approved a major devaluation on the part of twenty-eight non-dollar countries, including India. In the case of India, it was obviously necessary to bring about a downward revision of the exchange rate to adjust the rate of exchange to the changes in the internal value of the currency. Left alone, however, India would have preferred to postpone the decision to lower the par value of the rupee. But, as a "defensive measure", she was forced to devalue her currency to the tune of 30.5 per cent of the internal par value. "This was the first major use of the Fund provision by India. India also availed herself of the Fund facilities from the very start.

Developments in India's balance of payments are invariably reflected, *inter alia*, in India's dealings with the Fund. A review of the lending operations of the Fund shows that the "Fund-India relationships have been always close and accommodating".²⁴ Taking the First Five-Year Plan period as a whole, the actual current deficit was much below than that had been envisaged. The favourable turn in India's balance of payments, on account of a lower level of imports of food and machinery, and also because of the lagging behind of the planned targets of the actual levels of investment, enabled India to bring about a substantial liquidation of her short-term liabilities to the Fund, though repurchase of rupees to the extent of Rs.17.2 crores each in 1953-54 and 1954-55, and of Rs. 7.1 crores in 1955-56.

India's preference for loans from the World Bank and other internationally controlled agencies has been made clear on various occasions. Although the rate of interest that the Bank charged on its loans continued to be a source of complaint, during the period under review further loans were negotiated. On August 18, 1949, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development granted a loan of \$34 million to the Government of India for railway development to be utilised in the purchase of locomotives, boilers and locomotive parts. The loan was for a period of 15 years, with amortization payment to begin in August 1950. The interest rate was 3 per cent plus the usual 1 per cent commission. This loan amount was reduced on May 16, 1950, at the request of the Government of India to \$ 32.8 million which was disbursed by March 1951. The second loan was granted by the Bank on September 29, 1949. The amount was \$10 million. It was repayable in 7 years and the rate of interest plus the commission were the same as in the case of the first. The object was reclaiming by tractors 3 million acres of weed-infested land in Madhya Pradesh and Bhopal. (Press Release No 171, February 8, 1950-IBRD.) A loan of Rs. 3.43 crores was disbursed out of a larger original amount sanctioned, that is, \$10 million but reduced from time to time at the request of the Government of India. It carried a rate of interest of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent and was to be repaid by 1959. The loan was specially meant to finance the

import of equipment for the reclamation of land by clearing jungles and the weed-infested land. The whole of the amount released had been utilised by the end of the First Plan. A third loan of \$ 25 million to finance a part of the foreign exchange cost of the Bokaro Thermal Power Plant in the Damodar Valley had been received by India. A loan worth Rs. 7.96 crores was granted to the Damodar Valley Corporation in 1950 and was used for multipurpose projects of electric power development, flood control, and irrigation. It was envisaged that the completion of the project would provide electrical energy for the expansion and development of industry in the minerally rich areas of West Bengal, and would also help flood control and agricultural development by providing irrigation. The loan was for a period of 20 years at 4 per cent rate of interest. Its repayment was to commence from 1955. The loan was used up fully during the First Five-Year Plan. Again, a loan of \$ 31.5 million was negotiated in April 1950 for the Bokaro-Konar power project of the Damodar Valley Corporation. The rate of interest carried by the loan and the period remained unchanged as in the case of the previous loan to the Corporation. For the construction of a thermal plant located at Trombay to be owned and managed by three companies of the Tatas, the IBRD disbursed Rs. 6.64 crores. This plant was meant to provide electric power in Bombay State and facilitate the industrial development of the area. Out of this only Rs. 2.09 crores was utilised leaving a balance of Rs. 4.55 crores to be used during the Second Plan.

It was the first time for the private sector to receive official assistance when the IBRD made a direct loan of Rs. 14.29 crores to the Indian Iron and Steel Company to finance a five-year expansion programme of the Company. It was to double the steel production capacity and to increase the output of iron from 160,000 tons to 400,000 tons, thus increasing India's finished steel capacity by about 33 per cent and that of iron by 200 per cent. The amount utilised during the First Plan was Rs. 2.78 crores leaving Rs. 11.51 crores for the Second Plan.²³ The same Company was sanctioned in December 1952 a loan of \$ 31.5 million for increasing output of IISCO to approximately 700,000 tons of steel and 400,000 tons of pig

iron. Interest charged on the loan was 4½ per cent and the period was 15 years. It was thus obvious that the loans were meant for building up the future capacity in agriculture and means of communication and transport. This was in accordance with the theory of economic progress of underdeveloped areas in that it was a prerequisite development that some funds be spent on the developmental projects and communication besides the availability of a surplus in food production, which might establish a base for future agricultural and industrial production. An analysis of these loans also shows that the main objective for which the IBRD was prepared to grant loans was development of the overheads to build the base for the agricultural and industrial development. In matters of industrial expansion, the Bank's policy had been to mobilise private resources, internal and external, for use of productive enterprise. A mission from the International Bank visited India in November 1951 to survey the development programme of the country and to recommend to the Bank the extent to which it could assist in financing the execution of the programme, particularly of schemes finding a place in the Five-Year Plan. The mission visited a number of projects under execution and held discussions with the Central and State Governments and the Planning Commission and later stated that they had been impressed with India's determination and readiness to go ahead. Subsequently the head of the World Bank also paid a visit to India to familiarise himself with the economic conditions in India and her Five-Year Plan. Another type of assistance from international agencies was the U.N. Technical Assistance Programme, under which India received approximately Rs. 50 lakhs up to the end of 1953. A number of experts, especially from the F.A.O., had been supplied to India mainly for rural development work. As regards the Indian opinion of the IBRD, Sir A. Ramaswami Mudaliar, the Indian delegate, speaking during the U.N. Economic and Social Council's debate on the Bank's record of work, voiced the feelings of India when he accused the Bank of neglecting the case of backward and underdeveloped countries. He criticised the Bank for its failure to finance bold schemes of post-war economic development, for its unwillingness to take risks even more than private investors

and for its charging a high interest rate. Mr. Mudaliar's criticisms were supported by delegates from Peru, Brazil, and Chile. (*The Statesman*, February 17, 1949.)

A summary of the United Nations economic assistance to India during the period under review could be had from the following statement:

*India's Borrowings from the I.M.F. and I.B.R.D. during 1947-1952*²⁶

(\$ Million)

| Years | Borrowings from the I.M.F. | Loans disbursed by the I.B.R.D. |
|-------|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1947 | .. | .. |
| 1948 | 68.3 | .. |
| 1949 | 31.7 | 14.7 |
| 1950 | .. | 20.1 |
| 1951 | .. | 10.2 |
| 1952 | .. | 5.7 |
| Total | 100.0 | 50.7 |

Note: Rupee devalued on September 22, 1949.

Special mention has also to be made in this section of the unique aid that India received from Norway. Towards the end of 1952, an agreement was signed in New York between the Governments of India and Norway and the U.N. Technical Assistance Board for the provision of technical assistance to India by Norway to the extent of 10 million Norwegian Kroners to begin with. So far India had received aid on a government-to-government basis from the USA and some Commonwealth countries and in both cases the interests of the aiding countries were directly evident. Norway was the first foreign country, with neither the plenitude of America nor the close links of the Commonwealth, to offer aid. Moreover, this aid was rendered through the U.N.O. thus conforming to the Indian preference for aid under U.N. auspices.

When India's firm adherence to the ideals of the U.N.O. was there intact, her insistence on closer cooperation with it was indeed relative to the degree of pressure in varied forms brought upon her by the Western Powers from time to time. So in their own typical way, the Powers concerned contributed to the already existing proximity between India and the United Nations as the former sought to safeguard the fabrics of her non-aligned policy. The indispensability of the U.N. to India enhanced as the Cold War took a turn for the worse and so she demanded more of constructive dynamism and functional collaboration from the U.N., which appeared to her as a historic economic institution as well. Moreover, it was the immunity of the policy that was her first concern and U.N. aid came only afterwards. She did not emphasize her preference for the U.N. assistance because quantitatively it was superior to the inter-governmental aid. On the other hand, sometimes the volume of U.N. aid tended to be trifled by the enormous possibilities of the assistance from the bloc countries. In reality, the funds of the International Agencies originating in the coffers of the Big Powers, the latter would not be willing to part with it unless their own needs were satisfied. Despite its advantages, the U.N. assistance would not be substantial enough to cover the entire programme of development and consequently bilateral and multilateral aid could not be ruled out. Therefore, it follows that it was the challenge to her new-born policy (that had fewer adherents at that time) that actually made India to revitalise her relations with the world body for the comprehensive process of economic growth hung over how the national policy was carried forward. If U.N. assistance involved political disinterestedness and hospitable conditions, that only implied lesser implications and a safer ground for her foreign policy to operate. Hypothetically, India's progress would have been tripled had she decided to join in a military alliance for between the aid to the allies of the Powers and that to the outsiders there was always a big margin. This confirms the secondary place of the aid factor in India's leanings towards the U.N. It, of course, does not lead to the argument that the economic potentialities of the world organisation did not count

to India at all. She appreciated it alright as it could meet her minimum requirements. But her long-term interest was unquestionably the maintenance of the course of her foreign policy itself. Hence her stress upon the economic aspect of the U.N.O. was only a means to her ultimate political ends. After all, the political aspect would come to dominate the complete picture in the long run.

From the foregoing analysis, it again, under the circumstances, follows that the strains that were placed upon the exercise of sovereign powers by India due to Big Power pressures were solely responsible for her aspiration to come as closer to the United Nations as possible. Indubitably, it was the force of circumstances that she came across while functioning as an independent sovereign member of the world community that supplied the incentive to India's immediate and apparent anxiety to find deeper affinity with the U.N.O. even in self-interest. But this was only temporary and superficial. What it did, at the most, was to accelerate and visualize the pace of intimacy between the two in the process. It could not perform more than that because it ultimately failed to convert India into an aligned country—the mission it was entrusted with. But, as aforesaid, the original and fundamental unity of purpose and action was inherent there in the spirit of the common faith and philosophy of India and the United Nations. It was neither that the U.N.O. Charter was fashioned after the foreign policy pronouncements made by the Indian leaders in the pre-independence days, nor that India advertently dovetailed her policies behind the U.N. programme. This is something undeniable for the independence of Indian foreign policy stands for India's freedom of contemplation, decision and execution not only in relation to Power blocs but of the United Nations as well. It certainly does not exclude the commitments under the U.N. Charter for the provisions of the Charter have proved a hindrance to those States alone that repose their trust in some other convictions foreign to the U.N. Principles. To India, her acquiescence to the goal as accepted by the United Nations Organisation has frequently gone to advance the cause of her own guiding principles and has at the same time resulted in the formation of helpful environment

wherein her international personality could thrive. The identical tendencies of the two were thus not pre-planned. It had never been an accident of history but an inexorable and universal fruition of varied historical forces at work labouring down the ages. So the underlying parallel currents were already there and it was neither imposed from outside nor exposed to be publicised. Though tracing their origins to one and the same source, they developed independent of each other. Whenever India and the United Nations had occasions to deliberate or work together, accord and mutual understanding sprung forth involuntarily in most of the cases and the self-interests were readily integrated in the common interests of both.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 257.
2. Douglas Hyde, *The Peaceful Assault*, p. 45.
3. Martin C. Needler, *Understanding Foreign Policy*, p. 238.
4. P.L. Lakhanpal, *Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute*, p. 133.
5. Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace*, p. 326.
6. K.P. Karunakaran, *India in World Affairs*, Vol II, 1950-53, p. 118.
7. Quoted in K.P.S. Menon, *Many Worlds*, p. 259.
8. B. Shiva Rao, *India in the Security Council-I*, *The Statesman*, January 4, 1967.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Speeches 1949-53*, p. 144.
11. *The First Five Year Plan*, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
12. Leo Tansky, *U.S. and U.S.S.R. Aid to Developing Countries*, p. 101.
13. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 257.
14. *The First Five Year Plan*, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
15. Quoted in R. Palme Dutt, *India Today & Tomorrow*, pp. 282-83.
16. K.P. Karunakaran, *op. cit.*, p. 226 (abridged).
17. Leo Tansky, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
18. Martin C. Needler, *op. cit.*, p. 243.
19. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Speeches 1949-53*, p. 222.
20. V.K.R.V. Rao and Dharm Narain, *Foreign Aid and India's Economic Development*, p. 71.
21. *India and the United Nations*, Study Group, p. 180.
22. *The Hindu*, October 31, 1952.
23. Pramathanath Banerjea, *A Study of Indian Economics*, p. 498.
24. Sunil Guha, *Welfare Economics in India*, p. 309.
25. Mohd. Shabbir Khan, *India's Economic Development and International Economic Relations*, p. 92.
26. International Financial Statistics published by the I.M.F. Source: Division of International Finance, Reserve Bank of India, Economic Department, Bombay.

4

A COLD WAR DEPARTURE

THE conflicts faced by India in formulating a balanced and solid approach to her foreign policy were her ideologically-tempered policy-implementation and built-in weakness, economic, social, and political on the home front. Notwithstanding the fact of its being bred in the national experience of the past, the Indian foreign policy, in its actual application, ignored the hard realities of the world power-politics and India preferred to look at things, most of the time, from an ivory tower of her own making. While she came to re-enact the role of the Good Samaritan, her foreign policy as such degenerated into pious preaching which was resented by her friends and foes alike. In fact, it was her official programme to acquaint the outside world first with her forgotten philosophical niceties and then to export the doses of foreign policy ingredients from the rear. To her, the world was an arena of activities where absolute unanimity was accepted when, in practice, the mass owed itself to the subtle, relative forces of unanimity and not vice versa. It, after all, did not augur well for the entrance of India into the Family of Nations where she stepped into with a superiority complex to be superimposed on an idyllic, innocent place to live in. Immediately she found herself in a vortex of whirlwinds, and the predominance of ideology in her attitude at the expense of Real Politik was exposed. This resulted in the narrowing down of the spheres where Indian foreign policy was so far found adjustable and this in turn betrayed the inherently incompatible character of the policy vis a-vis the tune of the time. It had never been that the nations of the world had satisfied themselves with just the knowledge and hailing of the truth of Indian independence. But they knew pretty well in advance that this was an event not of Asiawide but of global repercussions. Thus by the time India attained her stature, the nations of the East and the

West had already pieced together the sequence of her tendency and to which end they, in anticipation, oriented their own policies. This development India failed to read and went ahead with her private convictions. Therefore, her very words were hurled back at her and she was accused of resorting to double standard in a number of cases. Though apparently a sound and tested policy, hesitations and vacillations were bound to accrue from the adverse confrontations in real practice much to the detriment of the national self-interests and a defeat in the objective of policy. This could at best be partially overlooked in view of the fact that India as a colony was held back from leading an international life. Inspired by the lofty ideals of the historical revolutions like the French and the Russian, the Indian leaders found that the ideals were still too sacred for the Indian mass to inculcate for they had no revolution of their own and when freedom had come to them in a peaceful manner.

The other factor that created disturbance in India's endeavour to place her foreign policy approach on a sure footing was her indigenous shortcoming in the various facades of the national life. The most acute as ever was her age-old economic backwardness that stood in her way to material emancipation that was supposed to follow the political. And if foreign policy is but an extension of home policy as Palmerston once said, the prevailing internal miseries indirectly ate into the vitals of the Indian foreign policy. "That is why I am, if I may say so, in spite of being Minister in charge of External Affairs, not interested in external affairs so much as internal affairs at the present moment. External affairs will follow internal affairs. Indeed, there is no basis for external affairs if internal affairs go wrong."¹ To drive the point home, it can be asserted that economic considerations were uppermost in the minds of the architects of nascent foreign policy of India. The genesis of modern economic planning in India may be said to date from 1931, when the Indian National Congress discussed the matter at length in its Karachi session. The Congress leaders, inspired by the Soviet experience, recommended a programme of State economic planning to eliminate poverty in India. The first positive step, however, was not taken until October 1938,

when a conference of Ministers of Industries adopted a resolution stating that industrialization was the key to economic growth in India. The fact that the Indian National Congress evolved a Planning Committee as a harbinger of its socialist ideals even in the pre-war period and that Nehru visited Soviet Russia to assess her economic progress as early as 1927, along with the Swadeshi Movement bear witness to the account. "Another equally important feature of Asian nationalism is the economic and social content of its political philosophy. The Asian national movements were also a revolt by a people with a keen sense of their poverty against the existing economic and social order which permitted gross inequalities of wealth and opportunities".² A new spurt to the discussions regarding economic planning was given in 1938 by the Indian National Congress under the presidentship of Sri Subhas Chandra Bose, which appointed a National Planning Committee, under the chairmanship of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, to enquire into the possibilities of a planned economy in India and to suggest practicable schemes for securing the desired end. But the N.P.C. could present little of value, claiming a plan could not be formulated until independence was obtained. "The importance of the subject (Commerce & Industry) is evident from the emphasis that Sir S. Subrahmaniar Aiyar laid on Village Resuscitation, and the need for loan societies, in 1914, after his retirement from the Bench. The Congress was pressed by Lala Lajpat Rai in 1899 to devote a half-day for the consideration of educational and industrial subjects, and appoint a Committee in that behalf. This was done and as a direct result of their deliberations, we note that the first Industrial Exhibition in Calcutta was held in 1901 and this institution has gone on steadily improving until, in the latter-day developments, the Khaddar and Swadeshi Exhibitions have come to replace the old order of things".³

The critical urgency of the economic situation was intelligible from the rush with which Nehru went to identify his foreign political policies with his foreign economic policies when he concluded that after all foreign policy was only an offshoot of economic policy followed by a country. "Ultimately, foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy, and until

India has properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate, and will be groping".⁴ If the foreign policy of a country alone is successful that can claim economic self-sufficiency, the economic disparity of India undoubtedly restrained her voice and limited or varied her actions in international affairs that was, again, the prime element in her sovereign character. She lacked the wherewithals for asserting her points of view while dealing with major governments. Again, had India in the duration of her colonial existence suffered loss in varied facades of the national whole, the economic stagnation was the most outstandingly felt for only an industrially backward colony would serve the vested purposes of colonialism as a reliable supplier of raw materials. This underdeveloped nature in the aftermath of the War and Partition left India on the verge of virtual loopholes. Hence if economic dictations, e.g., of trade, food and population, are the foremost in any foreign policy-making, it was here the most prominent when wholetime preoccupations with the problems prevented the maintenance of a desirable balance in other fields. That World War II replaced the political aspirations generated by its predecessor by economic ones, the attention of the United Nations as the international organization symbolizing the "greatest good of the greatest number" was equally warranted for the permanent resettlement of the better part of the war-torn humanity as it was expected to bring about socio-political stability throughout the world. Herein India invariably came into the picture as a representative of the hitherto overlooked Asia. If the U.N.O. was ever to justify its existence, it could only do so as an organization of the poor that it really is. The resurgent generation, in the meantime, did not fail to appreciate and recognize the truth underlying the maxim of the Philadelphia Convention, "Poverty anywhere is a danger to prosperity everywhere and prosperity anywhere must be shared everywhere", that was to govern the kernel of international intercourse in the following decades. Addressing the third session of the ECAPF at Ootacamund (India) on June 1, 1948, the Prime Minister of India said:

"... if some countries which are fortunate enough today, more fortunate than others, think that they can lead their

lives in isolation irrespective of what happens in the rest of the world, it is obvious that they are under a misapprehension. Today, if one part of the world goes down economically, it has a tendency to drag others with it just as when unfortunately war breaks out other people who do not want war are involved. So it is not a question of the prosperous, merely out of the generosity of their hearts helping those who are not prosperous, though generosity is a good thing. But it is a question of enlightened self-interest, realizing that if some parts of the world do not progress, remain backward, they have an adverse effect on the whole economy of the world and they tend to drag down those parts that are at present prosperous. Therefore, it becomes inevitable to consider these problems in the global way and to pay even more attention to those parts which are relatively backward".⁵

There is no denying the fact that India was not so much impressed by the form of the United Nations as a political agency than by its role as a welfare agency. She had been a witness to the rise and fall of a number of political organizations generally European. But to her the economic renaissance that the United Nations represented was certainly a novel experience to be reckoned with, in which she was asked to coordinate her own actions on the basis of equality and justice. To the developed regions of the world, especially Western Europe and North America, the political image of the U.N.O. was far more significant than its welfare aspect as they had little to worry about their future prosperity. So again, they found the developmental schemes under the U.N. auspices almost redundant and entailed their neglect and at times even resentment. But to the underdeveloped countries of the world, particularly those of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the economic potentialities of the provisions of the U.N. Charter far outnumbered the political propensities in attraction and if they ever adhered to the faith of the ideals encompassing the United Nations, it was with this devotion that they did. In the course of the same Address to the ECAFE Mr. Nehru continued:

"Now, generally speaking, this political aspect of the Asian struggle is drawing to its natural and inevitable culmination.

But at the same time, the economic aspect continues and is bound up with all manner of economic problems affecting the world. From the Asian point of view, it has become essentially a matter of extreme urgency to deal with these problems. From the world point of view it is equally urgent really, because unless these problems are dealt with in Asia, they affect other parts of the world. I have no doubt that you, ladies and gentlemen, who are members of this Commission, realize the importance of what I have said, and will make it clear to the United Nations that any attempt to pay inadequate attention to Asian problems is likely to defeat the end which the United Nations has in view".⁶

In disarmament, India's 1950 proposal for breaking the Great Power deadlock—a plan offered as a device for stimulating thought along somewhat different but more fruitful lines—suggested an incentive for disarmament through the creation of a United Nations Peace Fund for developing underdeveloped areas. The proposed fund, as Sir B.N. Rau, the Indian delegate, explained it, was to be fed largely from savings effected by the reduction of armaments. (Official Records, Fifth Session, Committee I, Vol. I, p. 204.) Mr Rau's energy and enthusiasm on behalf of his own, if rather ill-timed, proposal (the Korean War and strenuous Western rearmament had just begun) led him to offer it not only in the debate on disarmament, but also in the debate on the Uniting for Peace resolution, the purpose of the latter having been, of course, to strengthen collective security. It was the second of the two efforts that was the more remarkable, for it amounted to an attempt to turn a resolution to the opposite direction from where it originally pointed. At the heart of the Uniting for Peace resolution were Sections C and D, pertaining to the readiness of national military units for service on behalf of the United Nations, and to the establishment of a Collective Measures Committee to study the problem of more effective sanctions—both of which were responsible for India's abstention on the resolution as a whole. Mr Rau, however, fixed on Section E of the Uniting for Peace resolution, a rather coyly inserted lure incorporating the reminder that "enduring peace depends not merely on security arrangements

but also on observance of human rights and the promotion of economic well-being". This, in signal contrast to Sections C and D, was "fine", asserted Mr Rau, "especially the part regarding the development of underdeveloped areas". In fact, the Indian delegate continued, India had introduced in Committee I a draft resolution "based on that part of Section E, and proposing the creation of a United Nations fund for the development of underdeveloped areas".⁷

To make matters worse, social discrepancies followed suit. The traditional Indian class structure with all its bulk of vices and orthodoxy was tottering and needed to be supplemented through some radical innovations. Indian foreign policy, like all policy, is a mirror of the competing purposes and pressures generated in a semi-colonial economy with a class as well as a caste hierarchy, at the same time conditioned by the fixed facts of geography and the fluid facts of power relationships in the changing context of world balance of power. With her innumerable religions and languages India was termed as a "unity in diversity" and if a nationalism ever grew up, it was not out of homogeneous factors. The concept of national integration was yet a far cry when wide communal disharmony was sought to be placated forthwith. Lord Macaulay had called for the creation of "a class who might be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern—a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and intellect,"⁸ and that class up till then had a considerable say in the affairs of the land. The Indian civilization itself was squeezed down by a European one and it was yet a long way when India could reassess her total image. Colonialism was a huge tree beneath which little could germinate. Again, though India adopted Democratic Socialism as her constitutional ideal, the ground for the same was not entirely ready, and her people were not in a position to appreciate and benefit from it in large measure. For universal education must precede universal enfranchisement, the Indians did not possess substantial political training and experience while the absence of a minimum of national consciousness threatened the very strata of federal solidarity. The few weeks immediately following the achievement of inde-

pendence by India on August 15, 1947, witnessed a large-scale disturbance of law and order inside the country. The new government had also to face a refugee problem of great magnitude and other problems arising from the partition of the subcontinent, which was until then administered as one economic and political unit. The fighting in Kashmir, which started in October 1947, added further difficulties. In February 1948, the Indian Communist Party adopted a policy aimed at weakening the established order in the country. The five hundred odd States, with almost autocratic princes ruling over most of them, constituted another problem. The economic situation, the food scarcity and the high cost of living made the conditions of the people still worse. The bickerings of the multi-party system and the entangling problem of the Indian States awaiting solution diverted most of the attention, time and energy of the Government of India and that told upon her all-time efficiency in tackling external affairs squarely. The following statement of Mr Nehru describes the situation during the period:

“We have not had a free hand in our external relations . . . I would beg the House to judge this period in the context of what has been happening in this country, not only during the past unhappy three or four months, but in the course of the past year when we lived in the midst of internal conflict and confusion which drained away our energy and did not leave us to attend to other matters. That has been the dominant feature of our politics during the past year and undoubtedly that has affected our foreign policy in the sense of our not giving enough time or energy to it”⁹

Thus India was equally found vulnerable from almost every side and in dire need of a defence and economic policy as her internal disruptions started to be reflected upon her international behaviour.

In the Cold War, the interests of the great Powers gradually became the interests of the smaller Powers. It was the prime objective of the great Powers to involve the small States into the entanglement of power-politics that they had created in order gain in more strength than the other side through the establishment of military pacts all over the world. They

exerted every power at their disposal in order to attract the small Powers towards their respective Camps either through persuasion or coercion. Thus the small States came to be concerned with problems with which their own national self-interests had practically nothing to do at all. They were led to support a cause or an ideal with which their own attitude was at variance or which their national pattern did not permit. Their political and economic destiny were to be dependent on the interests of major Powers. Most of the smaller Powers were not in a position to resist the call of the big ones since economically they had to rely much upon the great Powers and they had found it difficult to profess non-alignment in the face of an underdeveloped nature. The overall interests of the blocs were promoted at the suppression of the individual national interests or sometimes even at their sacrifice. According to the collective security system of the blocs any aggression against any member was an aggression upon the others as well and they were supposed to tow the line whenever the big Powers brought about any situation favourable to themselves. Their natural resources and talents would be dovetailed to that of the leading countries. The United Nations failed in bringing about the desired homogeneity in the field of membership and at the same time, in the name of unanimous decision in maintaining international peace and security fostered a real deadlock in the Security Council. Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter concluded in supporting the right of individual or collective self-defence and Chapter VIII specifically elaborated the system of regional arrangements. Since the Charter was framed in a period of Cold War, in spite of universal acceptance of the Principles and Purposes, regional arrangement under the leadership of great Powers naturally got its proud place in the Charter.

The attitude of a nation towards international problems is conditioned by the image of the world it carries in its collective consciousness. This image is a product of interaction of several factors, such as rational, emotional and historical. Two groups of factors, viz., rational considerations regarding the nature of Communism, capitalism, war, and war-like preparations and secondly, emotive factors, such as, nationalism,

anti-racialism, and feelings of zonal fraternalism, were responsible for creating in the mind of the people of India an image of a world which was different. As for the rational components, the political hierarchy as well as a section of the articulate and effective public opinion in India, did not take a doctrinaire view of capitalism and Communism. India was convinced that in spite of existing differences between rival ideologies, the points of similarities were growing and circumstances were bringing them nearer to each other. If fear was not present and threats and compulsions were not used, the process would be accelerated. Since capitalism had changed for good and so also had Communism in some respects at least, India was not inclined to be extraordinarily critical of either of them. On the contrary she found in each of them such features as would commend themselves to her in the prevailing circumstances. In fact, the Congress concept of socialist pattern of society, of which the mixed economy was an important feature, contained some of the ingredients of both the systems. These considerations determined the limits of India's opposition to and support for international Communist and non-Communist ideologies. India could neither accept the view that Communism was an unmitigated evil, nor could she endorse the claim that contemporary capitalism was outdated. Consequently, she was unable to take sides in the ideological conflict in which the Super-Powers were engaged.

Two more factors were responsible for India's refusal to take a partisan view of the ideological conflict. First, she did not believe that the Super-Powers were really earnest about ideologies. The Cold War as an instrument of foreign policy would become merely shadow-sparring, if the element of "real politics" was absent. In reality, ideology served as a veneer. As Nehru remarked, although there was a great deal of talk about ideology it was doubtful if they came into the picture at all except as weapons. He, therefore, refrained from such actions and decisions as would drag India into the conflict. Secondly, even if the Powers were serious about ideology, India had her own traditional attitude towards conflicts. She was not used to thinking in terms of absolute categories, such as good and evil, black and white, as far as ideals and concepts were concerned.

Therefore, she could not support a stand which smacked of self-righteousness and sectarian absolutism. Again, since the Cold War was a product of this kind of thinking, most Indians were not inclined to line up with either of the contestants. On the contrary, as of yore, they took a long-term view of conflicts, which, as the historical experience had taught them, generally tended to relax sooner or later. They knew that tension could not remain at a boiling point for long. Further, it was believed that the Cold War had its origin in a state of funkiness of mind. It was not a thrilling and an elevating contest of the courageous for more power, but a clumsy and enervating game whose participants, with all their brave gestures, were really scared of each other.

Moreover, powerful emotive factors determined India's attitude towards the Cold War. Anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, anti-racialism, and fraternal feelings for Asian countries did not permit India to move too far towards the West. On the contrary, they tended to render her attitudes rather critical of some of the actions and decisions of Western Powers. She could not openly and unconditionally align herself with the Western Powers singly or collectively because Western imperialism throughout the late forties and early fifties remained powerful in Asia and Africa. In fact, on account of the reluctance of colonial powers to retreat gracefully, she had to oppose the Western Powers openly and since the attitude of the USSR on these questions turned out to be in line with that of India, it appeared that she was supporting the Soviet Union. Just as emotional attachment to the ideal of freedom with justice, which often expresses itself negatively as a rabid form of anti-Communist sentiment, tended to impinge on the mind of the American people an image of a bipolar world, in like manner, opposition to colonialism and racialism impinged on the minds of the Indian people an image of a different kind of bipolar world with the "haves" or imperialist Powers on one side and colonial dependencies or the "have-nots" on the other. Again, that India denounced regional military alliances could even be endorsed on rational grounds for their being precursors of colonial expansion. But the difference in the manner and the general tone of the

of a different kind of bipolarity. She could not perceive the great ideological barriers that separated the two Super-Powers. The image of the world which she carried in her conception did not correspond to that which the USA and the USSR bore in their minds. As such, India could not develop a foreign policy based on the recognition of the division referred to.

Furthermore, it were also her international disputes that prevented India from entering the Power blocs in the Cold War. Since the inception of her freedom India had to direct her energies and attention towards finding a solution to a number of bilateral disputes in which her national self-interests as a sovereign State were found at stake. "Cold War, to him (Nehru), means the development of hatred, the spirit of violence, and the preparation for war, "violence all the time", and it is folly to spend all one's energy to do something which one wanted to avoid".¹⁰ Had she decided to join any of the Power blocs, hopes for an amicable settlement of disputes would have been lost as under such circumstances the disputes would no longer be left to India but would become a bloc issue. In that case the dispute would have lost its original purpose and legal character and could only serve as an instrument of Cold War diplomacy exploited in favour of the Big Power motives. It might not be possible to see it in its proper perspective but from a different angle. So if the dispute would ever be resolved after all, it would be so done in the interests of the bloc as a whole and not of India alone. Her apprehensions were adequately borne by the fact that despite her position outside the blocs, the Kashmir problem continued to remain there because of her reliance on the Security Council where the members of the rival Power blocs intervened in their own interests. The issue was left where it was only because a solution that could have satisfied the aspirations of competing power politics in equal measure was not feasible when the interests of the parties immediately involved were relegated to the background. As such, India had to reiterate her faith in bilateral negotiations and seek a way out through mutual settlement without the Power blocs. Under pressures, India would be left devoid of a national policy

and independence of action and she would be bound to surrender her primary functions to the leaders of the bloc concerned. Hence, her international disputes could but contribute only to the aggravation of international peace and security with herself emerging a complete loser. Thus she preferred to plough a lone furrow rather than to venture the quagmire of power-politics already found unwholesome through her distrust of any Western initiative. India was bent upon drawing the world opinion in her favour, legal, political and moral, and an alliance with either of the Powers would have adverse impacts upon the same. The popular Indian opinion of the Cold War and its repercussions was equally reflected in the resolutions of the Indian National Congress. The All India Congress Committee meeting in Calcutta on March 22/23, 1952, viewed, "with anxiety the continuation of conflicts in the international sphere, referred to as the 'Cold War', which are not only accelerating the drift to the terrible catastrophe of another world war, but are also casting an unbearable burden of armaments on the people and leading to a continuous deterioration in the economic situation in the world. The Committee is convinced that none of the great problems that concern humanity today can be solved by war, which can only result in uttermost destruction, the degradation of man, and the creation of new and far more difficult problems. Every possible effort must therefore be made to avoid this catastrophe. The Committee earnestly appeals to the great nations of the world to pursue policies of peace and to avoid, in particular, any action or word which adds to the present estrangement and bitterness".¹¹ The policy of non-alignment expressed the Government of India's desire to be impartial about such issues of the Cold War as did not affect Asia in general and India in particular. Hamstrung by her military weaknesses and domestic strains, she wanted to keep aloof from big blocs of nations—rival blocs—and did not consider it wise to get entangled in the problems of Europe which, according to Nehru, were "problems of power-politics". Nehru believed that India had no cause to be unfriendly to any country or groups of countries. It had no obvious reasons for being interested in problems of power. Therefore, regardless

of the implications to the balance of forces between Super-Powers, efforts were made to judge each issue on its merits and not to take a partisan view of the various problems in which the two Super-Powers were interested.

Commonwealth Relationship

In this connexion it is also pertinent to take into account India's relationship with the British Commonwealth of Nations during the formative period. After the departure of the British from India a power-vacuum was created, into which the emergent Great Powers like the USA wanted eagerly to step in. In order to avoid this development India found it more beneficial to retain her old ties with Britain and to strengthen them on the basis of a free association and partnership. India had also to turn towards the Commonwealth most of the time when the Western Powers sought to bring her into the fold of the Cold War by concluding military alliances with Pakistan through the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. Again, though India had been able to regain her freedom after centuries, her "sympathy, defence and economy" were all still linked with those of the West. "Obviously, countries so utterly dependent on imperialism economically could not aspire to genuine independence, even if they achieved national sovereignty. The attainment of economic independence is the basic condition for consolidating political sovereignty. However, those sovereign States of Asia and Africa, where power was assumed by the National bourgeoisie, on abandoning the system of imperialism failed to break away from the world capitalist economy, although they do occupy a special place within the latter. While they remain within the world capitalist economy, these countries have to pay dearly for the economic and technological backwardness inherited from their colonial past".¹² It was implicit in the act of independence that when the British left India, they did so only physically and constitutionally, while on the other hand, the profound impact that they had made upon the Indian life and ways would take some more centuries to lapse. The ghost of the English Patron haunted all the same and the "mental

nated the Indian monopolies as junior partners. The Federal Reserve Bank of India estimated the total of private foreign investments in India on June 30, 1948, at Rs. 5,960 million or £ 441 million, of which long-term private capital represented Rs. 5,190 million (market value—par value, Rs. 3,204 million) or £ 384 million ("Census of India's Foreign Liabilities and Assets, 1960"). This total was, in fact, an understatement, since it covered only recorded long-term business investment, and left out of account, not only private investment in Government and municipal debt, but all foreign banking capital, which was powerful in India, financing most of the country's foreign trade. According to a statement of the Indian Finance Minister, Mr. C.D. Deshmukh, in the Indian Parliament on June 16, 1952, the total repatriation of foreign capital in India between July 1947 and December 1951 amounted to Rs. 526 million, as against new investment of foreign capital amounting to Rs. 110 million. This would represent a net decrease of Rs. 426 million, equivalent to £32 million. In the same statement the Minister quoted the Federal Reserve Bank figure for June 1948, of Rs. 6,131 million for the total of the book value of all long-term foreign capital in India, both in government securities (Rs. 2,926 million, of which Rs. 2 505 million was held by the United Kingdom) and business investment (Rs. 3,204 million book value, of which the United Kingdom held Rs. 2,301 million, with a market value of Rs. 3,756 million). "Thus the total net repatriation of foreign capital during the four and a half years following the Mountbatten Settlement would represent, on the basis even of these figures which underestimate the real new investment, only one-fifteenth of the original holdings. Britain continued to hold 85 per cent of the foreign holdings of Indian Government securities, or £138 million, and 70 per cent of private foreign investment of long-term capital in India, with a market value of £232 million, or a combined total of £ 470 million, even on this conservative basis of estimation of British long-term capital invested in India".¹⁸ This represented one-quarter of the total of British overseas capital in 1948 (£1,960 million), and more than two-fifths of all British capital invested in the Empire (£1,111 million). Decidedly, the importance of India to British Capitalism had not diminished with the change of regime.

As regards the defence problem of India, she was still almost entirely dependent upon the British materials and manoeuvre. She had a divided, displaced armed force to start with out of the Partition and was faced with the task of reorganization in this field as elsewhere. In this India had to count upon the British acumen and experience as could be seen in her retention of the British officers like Admiral Mark Pizey and others after independence even when they had completed their terms. The military structure and strategic planning of the Dominion of India continued under British control and guidance. Even the Commander-in-Chief remained British in the initial period, together with hundreds of British officers in the Indian Army. The Kashmir war had a distinct exclusive colour in that both the sides, Indian and Pakistani, were manned by British officers. This control was especially close in the case of the Indian Navy and Air Force. Military and naval training, staffing and equipment were linked up with Britain, and the operation of air bases with the Royal Air Force. As Nehru had to say in reply to criticisms in the Lok Sabha that the defence services of India had been built up after a certain model and she had, as it were, inherited them from the British among other things. As with the Standardization of Weapons, the Indian defence production was technically oriented towards the British pattern and could supply only the specified samples. An army had to have equipment and it was easier for India to continue to get the kind of equipment she had been using, because there were sources which could supply it. Again, the most important thing was that there should be no breakdown in the organizational machinery of the Indian defence. India could not have advisers who thought along different lines, who used different equipment and different types of ammunition, coming to India and quarrelling amongst themselves while they advised the Indians. So India should follow a single system till she decided to change it. As such, the British defence advisers had found place. Moreover, India had a big department in London for military stores. She had to maintain it because she needed the type of things it supplied. They had sometimes to be procured through the good offices of the British War Office. The Indian

Commander-in-Chief had, therefore, to go there in order to look into those things. In addition to this, from the military point of view, Britain's martial presence in the East and South-East Asia was of vital significance to India. It provided her with a sense of security against attacks as the British naval bases were stationed in the Indian and Arabian Oceans. Britain, too, maintained a good number of Gurkha troops at army depots inside the Indian territory that she recruited from Nepal for deployment in Malaya and her other pockets, under due agreements. Hence Britain furnished India with a defensive umbrella, notwithstanding the absence of any specific agreements as such. In fact, the question of defence has dominated the agenda of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference for a considerable period of time, though India did not participate in it. Hitherto, the defence of the Dominions as of the rest of the Empire had rested with the United Kingdom; its economic strength, military and naval superiority provided the necessary basis. Peace and security in the region of the Indian Ocean and in the South-West Pacific were of cardinal importance to the Union of India. India's concern in the defence of this region was shared in greater or lesser degree by practically all the members of the Commonwealth. It was that which made the long-term relationship of India with the Commonwealth one of the crucial issues confronting her in the post-war world.

That India had no alternative but to count upon the British goodwill and cooperation was equally true of other departments whenever India called for the service of British personnel in the Indian Civil Service that was once considered the finest in the world. To crown it all, the last Viceroy, Earl Mountbatten of Burma, had the distinction of becoming the first Governor-General of free India for the sheer fact that an overnight transition to the Indian hands could have been deplorable. British Governors were maintained in the key provinces in the Dominion. Throughout all this process, if there was any Power available to survey and satisfy the varied shortcomings of India in the best possible manner, it was Britain alone and none else. With her enduring cultural and intellectual bonds in the West, it was also natural for India to be able to understand and estimate

European values better than the evolving Marxist ideas. If India resented the presence of British imperialism on her soil, she was also not found lagging behind in acknowledging the lasting contribution made by the Britishers to the brighter aspect of her life and civilization. Perhaps, there are fewer nations in the world between which the extent of mutual understanding is at this height as in the case of Britain and India. Had the Indians denounced the excesses of colonialism clamped down upon themselves, they would not ignore the British nation and its accomplishments as their Father of the Nation taught them to do. The Indian people, again, could not afford to fight shy of the English people when advantages in a substantial measure were bound to accrue out of the association while she lacked in several aspects of national experience.

Similarly, India wanted to affect world policies, not only directly in so far as she could, but to some extent indirectly as well, through the Commonwealth that would be to her own advantage and of the world at large. "By 1950, India had come to realize that the association in no way limited her independence or affected her self-respect, while, on the other hand, her membership of the Commonwealth would obviously help to create a better understanding between Asia and Europe. In fact it was realized that the Commonwealth could, in the altered circumstances, become a bridge between peoples of different races".¹⁴ But, by far the most vital part of the matter advantageous to India lay in that her attachment with the Commonwealth in no way affected the exercise of her independent policy in international affairs. India, along with Britain and Pakistan, recognized the People's Republic of China in 1950 while a number of other members (Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) continued to acknowledge Chiang Kai-shek. In the Korean War, India took an attitude different from that of Britain and the other members of the Commonwealth. Though this was a major issue of world-wide significance, it led to no crisis within the Commonwealth. In essence it might even be said to have demonstrated the value of the Commonwealth as a political association of nations with a differing approach to problems. On the other hand, the

Commonwealth, through informal and intimate meetings, afforded an opportunity for a free and frank interchange of views on world affairs at the highest level and helped to iron out many differences and eliminated mutual misgivings and suspicions on particular aspects of foreign policy. It was also possible to have parallel consultation between Commonwealth representatives either at, or prior to, international conferences and at the meetings of the United Nations so much so that it was once described as meaning "occasional consultation and reference to each other". Though having no common foreign policy of its own, the Commonwealth Relations Office in London kept the members abreast with the latest developments in the light of which it was convenient for the Governments to frame their policies with their own diplomatic reports supplementing.

To India, the Commonwealth membership was also invaluable so far as her place in the United Nations was concerned. She was a member of the Commonwealth and the Afro-Asian caucusing groups at the same time and it was very often possible for her to have a comfortable majority in her favour. Notwithstanding the fact that the Commonwealth possessed neither ideological nor geographical unity, the representatives of Commonwealth States usually understood one another rather readily. They had, in varying degrees, been influenced by British political traditions and their representatives were generally at home in the common medium of expression, i.e., the English language and other cultural affiliations. The Commonwealth group met about once a fortnight while the General Assembly was in session, and irregularly at other times of the year. The meeting was chaired by the senior British representative. (The chairmanship rotated after 1963.) The agenda consisted of those matters whose inclusion had been requested by any Commonwealth member. Representatives were free, if they wished, to express the views of their Governments on matters as they arose, but there was no obligation to reach a consensus. Although every effort was made to reach agreement on nominations for Commonwealth vacancies on United Nations organs, this was usually dealt with by discussion and consultation outside Commonwealth group meetings. An

important feature of the Commonwealth group was that it overlapped other groups and regions.¹⁵ The Commonwealth links proved particularly valuable during the Korean War. Lord Clement Attlee (the then British Prime Minister) in his discussions with President Harry S. Truman in Washington in December 1950 was greatly strengthened by the Commonwealth support he received. Both Western and Asian Commonwealth countries warmly welcomed concurrent Indian initiatives at the United Nations to secure a cessation of hostilities; and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers at their conference in January 1951 were able to agree on a set of principles to serve as a basis for a cease-fire in Korea. At this time India was able to report authoritatively on Chinese attitudes and Canada and the United Kingdom were well-placed to make sure Commonwealth views were not disregarded in Washington, despite the distinct coolness with which they were often received. Towards the end of 1952 the Indian delegation at the United Nations was instrumental in devising the formula on the prisoners-of-war issue which led in the following spring to the resumption of the armistice negotiations. And it was India which provided the chairman and the custodian force for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Throughout proceedings at the United Nations on the Korean issue, the main pressure for the coercion of the aggressor came from the United States, the efforts at conciliation from the Commonwealth. In securing an agreed resolution on the prisoners-of-war issue, the Indian delegation played the leading part. "But they could not have got the resolution through without the whole-hearted support of Mr Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, and of their other Commonwealth partners. From first to last, the intimate daily cooperation of the Commonwealth delegations was a decisive factor in gathering information, in forming opinion, and in mobilizing a majority in the General Assembly".¹⁶ To sum up, these were some of the factors that prompted the Indian Government to maintain the status quo in regard to the Commonwealth affairs vis-a-vis vigorous criticism in a section of the Indian public opinion. As Nehru said: "I have (in the context of the continued membership of the Commonwealth) naturally looked to the interests of India,

for that is my first duty". (Broadcast from New Delhi, May 10, 1949.) Thus during her infancy as a nation, the Commonwealth provided India with the first, immediate stage of reclining on something for the foreseeable future till she would be in a position to decide upon her plan of an international life. As regards the quarantine in which the policy of non-alignment could be put in its initial growth, the cooperation of the Commonwealth in that came next only to that of the United Nations.

Involvement and Immunity

Although India, on the eve of her independence, had hinted at the non-alignment policy she was going to follow (Interim Government, 1946) and even when the Big Powers were quite aware of her position, the odds presented by her own ideologically-tempered policy-implementation coupled with indigenous drawbacks were so overwhelming that it was feared that she could at any time be thrown into the camp of any of the two blocs by extraneous forces beyond her control. The big Powers were keeping the movements of young India under guarded surveillance even within the four walls of the United Nations. As Nehru put it, there was a suspicion in the minds of the first group that the Indians were really allied to the other group in secret though they were trying to hide the fact, and the other group thought that they were allied to the first group in secret though they were trying to hide the fact. Tensely surrounded by a galaxy of big, industrially-developed Powers to one of which interests she could easily fall a prey, the only possible defence for India perhaps was to get vigorously involved in the affairs of the United Nations. With her fabulous prudence, it was not advisable on the part of India to go on a solitary adventure when the furious Cold War gale was raging all around. Had she deceptively decided to join any of the blocs, her weakness would have been duly exploited for a second time at the advent of neo-colonialism, and a sheer handful of forces would have had the better of a small Power. As regards her national self-interests, it was imperative on her part to discover as

much affinity as possible between her policies and the U.N. Charter provisions in order to gain sufficient immunity from the magnetism of alliance. This accounts for the fact of India putting her heart and soul over all the aspects of the philosophy of the U.N.O. at least in the beginning of her career and also her desperate attempts to find a place on the stage of the U.N. organs including the Security Council. The Indian delegate to the United Nations said in a speech in the General Assembly in 1946 that as a country, geographically in a strategic position in the Indian Ocean with significant relations and cultural ties with her neighbours in Asia, the contribution she had made in resistance to aggression and the cause of human freedom and her role in world economy entitled India to a place in important organs of the United Nations. Hence though we may mistake it as "escapism" on the part of India, the United Nations came to her also, at the same time, in the form of an asylum wherein she could preserve and retain her national identity as well as political integrity. A reluctant involvement in the quagmire of power-politics would have amounted to the loss of her exclusiveness, but a vigorous participation in the activities of the United Nations, on the other hand, only redeemed and solemnized her fundamental principles. It was thought to be safer for Indian foreign policy to be nurtured and developed on the hospitable ground of the Charter rather than to go its own way. Thus India, in a way, derived supplementary strength from the United Nations whenever she faced imbalances and deficiencies at home.

Besides the given factors of policy-determination, Big Power-Politics is to be taken as a major policy-determinant for the foreign policy of small Powers like India follows the laws of Physics of how a body stands. This is particularly true of the Newtonian Theory of the Solar System. The forces gravitational and otherwise from all sides and more powerful than the body itself bring about the necessary equilibrium. So the concept of the balance of policy assumes equal importance to the concept of the balance of power. In foreign policy it is found that the Big Power pressures are responsible for a balanced policy followed by a small Power only so long as the pressures are of equal intensity. It was aptly applicable in the

case of emergent India as she was not in a position to pursue a balanced policy because of the fact that the pressures exerted by the big Powers were scientifically not of equal intensity. As such, her foreign policy approach veered around the simultaneous pull of external forces and its intrinsic pattern could not be established to the satisfaction of one and all although ostensibly professed as an independent policy. Therein the United Nations came to the rescue of India for the inequality in the intensity of the Power pressures had to be reinforced by the impact of the world body as a third force.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 34.
2. K.P. Karunakaran (Ed.), *Outside The Contest*, pp. 8-9.
3. B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1935)*, p. 68.
4. Jawaharlal Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 255.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 256.
7. Ross N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi, *The Diplomacy of India*, p. 142.
8. Peter Worsley, *The Third World*, p. 52.
9. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Independence and After*, pp. 199-200.
10. *Parliamentary Debates: 1956*. Vol. 3, Part 2, March 28, Col. 3728.
11. Indian National Congress: *Resolutions on Foreign Policy (1947-57)*, p. 11.
12. V.I. Pavlov, *India: Economic Freedom versus Imperialism*, p. 7.
13. R. Palme Dutt, *India Today and Tomorrow*, pp. 277-78.
14. K.M. Panikkar, *Commonsense About India*, p. 146.
15. Sydney D. Bailey, *The General Assembly of the United Nations*, pp. 35-6.
16. Geoffrey L. Goodwin, *The Commonwealth and the United Nations, International Organization*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, Summer 1965, p. 690.

5

U.N. IN ACTION AND INDIA'S ROLE (Case Study)

Indonesia

THE struggle for Indonesian independence provided India with the first opportunity to make a spectacular entry into the world stage for an experiment of her policy of anti-imperialism. As she was of the opinion that the existence of colonialism negated the values of peace, it was the logical guideline she felt incumbent upon her to follow. Moreover, it was primarily in her national self-interest that sister colonies be freed. The development of India, as Nehru remarked, necessitated the development of countries around her. Therefore, it was implicit in that the smooth and unhampered progress of the task of rehabilitation presupposed the creation and preservation of a peaceful environment or Peace Area, which was, again, feasible only when the countries bordering herself were independent, friendly and economically stable. "The attainment of independence by India was not an isolated phenomenon. The national movement of the country was itself symbolic of the general political awakening of the people of the East and their widespread resentment of all forms of imperialism—economic and political. The achievement of freedom by India made it almost incumbent upon her to follow the logical policy of resisting imperialism and colonialism elsewhere".¹ The infant Indian freedom was denied its first security so long a good number of colonies continued to exist in the neighbourhood. Great Britain left India a poor and ill-equipped country from the defence point of view and geographically she was vulnerable to onslaughts from any quarter, especially from the Indian Ocean as Sirdar K.M. Panikkar observes in his book *India and the Indian Ocean* (George Allen & Unwin, 1945). Again, according to Nehru, geography was a compelling factor and so India

was the natural centre and focal point of the many forces at work in Asia, which fact confirmed that any upheaval in South-East Asia was of direct concern to her. If interdependence was a fait accompli, it was more intense between herself and this region. So it was somewhat the solitary alternative left to her that peace at least in South-East Asia be maintained at any cost whatsoever vis-a-vis the strategic importance of the area. She ought to have a substantial participation in the power vacuum caused by the defeat of the Axis Powers while the almost simultaneous evolution of Pakistan and China and the freedom of adjacent colonies like Burma and Ceylon impelled her to promptly reserve a dominating position for herself in South-East Asia which she did with tact and courage. As India pinned her faith in the inevitability of reciprocity and the indivisibility of peace, she was inclined to be affected by any war, major or minor, in either of the hemispheres. Moreover, a war in South-East Asia would prove to be much undesirable to her when she had in very recent memory undergone the impact of Japanese occupation of that region and which she did not want it to be staged a second time.

To begin with, Indonesia was the first instance of India's policy of unreserved support for Asian freedom movements led by nationalists as her implicit objective was to build up the strength of Nationalism in Asia as a bulwark and counterweight against the resurgence of Communism which, once more, she thought to be a potential hindrance to her national progress as has been subsequently affirmed. With embarrassing Communist trouble at home and on the eve of the collapse of Kuomintang regime in China, the thought was uppermost in Nehru's mind. He hinted at the opening address to the Conference on Indonesia that if open and unabashed aggression was not checked and was condoned by other Powers, then the hope would vanish and people would resort to "other ways and other means" even though these might involve the utmost catastrophe. In view of the growing Russian interest in South-East Asia and apart from sentimental reasons based on a long, historical association and India's policy of avowed opposition to imperialism and solidarity with a neighbouring Asian country in great peril, India was obviously anxious to see that peace

and stability was restored in that part of Asia. She did not want that the nationalist forces in Indonesia be weakened and the Communist forces strengthened by a continuation of colonial rule, or by the continuation of an anti-colonial war in which the nationalist elements might be overtaken by the extremist Communist elements. Thus the Indian South-East Asia policy during the period could hardly be called anti-colonialism but an evolving anti-Communism. Together with Burma, Indonesia formed with India the core of the non-aligned nations of Asia, of the South-East Asian area of peace and was one of the pillars of Panch Sheel. Besides, in her policy of friendship and cooperation with the Muslim countries, India could capitalize on her good relations with Indonesia with particular emphasis on trade which India eagerly attempted to expand in the Arab world whenever she was urged to search out fresh markets for her manufactured goods and other products. By the way, the non-self-governing territories, in some cases, had a notable percentage of Indian settlers in their population and the opinion in India, both public and official, were keenly interested in their welfare and protection.

The above mentioned facts are carried out by the conspicuous zeal with which India along with Australia referred the Indonesian question to the Security Council in July 1947 as international peace and security were deemed imperilled by the Dutch military offensive ultimately leading to the adoption of a number of crucial resolutions by the Council as a preliminary for a peaceful settlement. "As a result of the action of India and other delegations, the Security Council passed a resolution on December 24, 1948, which called on the parties to cease hostilities forthwith, to release immediately President Soekarno and other political prisoners arrested since December 18, and instructed the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Security Council fully and urgently by telegraph on the events which had transpired in Indonesia since December 12, 1948. On December 28, the Council passed another resolution calling on the Netherlands Government to set free the political prisoners forthwith and to report within twenty-four hours. On January 28, 1949, the Council passed yet another resolution

calling for the immediate discontinuance of military operations by the Netherlands Government, the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners arrested since December 17, and the facilitating of their return to Djakarta, negotiations between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic for the setting up of a federal, independent and sovereign United States of Indonesia, the formation of an interim federal government, elections to a Constituent Assembly by October 1, 1949, and transfer of sovereignty by July 1950. At the same time, the Council decided to transform the Committee of Good Offices into a United Nations Commission for Indonesia".³ Moreover, the determined character of the Indian advocacy is noticeable in that India also brought the Indonesian question before the General Assembly on March 30, 1949, as she was leaving nothing to chance. It was, too, to provide added strength to the United Nations and thus to accelerate the final phase of the solution that India convened the Eighteen-Nation Delhi Conference on Indonesia from January 20 to 23, 1949. The various steps taken by the Security Council were no doubt dictated by the urgency of the situation, but they were no less powerfully influenced by the action of the Conference on Indonesia.

Palestine

Similar motives have dictated India's attitude on the Palestine problem and the birth of Israel. India had stood against the partition of the country and the creation of an independent Israel State in the midst of the Middle East inhabited by Arabs and Muslims and ruled by a number of Arabian Princes. As to the future government of Palestine, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine was divided in its Report for the year 1947. The majority proposed partition into an Arab State, a Jewish State, and the city of Jerusalem—but all within the framework of economic union of the entire country. The majority consisted of the representatives of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay. The minority (India, Iran and Yugoslavia) recommended one single State which should be a federation composed of a Jewish and an Arab State, each with powers of local

government only. In the minority plan Jewish immigration into the Jewish State for three years was to be permitted up to the absorptive capacity of the State, the latter to be determined by three Arab, three Jewish, and three United Nations representatives. The Australian representative abstained from voting for either plan. "The minority plan was basically satisfactory to the Arabs because it gave them their essential demand, i.e., an independent sovereign nation in which they could outvote the Jews and from which they could exclude future Jewish immigrants. The majority plan was opposed by the Arabs. It was reluctantly accepted by most of the Jewish organizations, since it would give the Jewish State control over immigration into itself. But the plan did not include all of Palestine in the Jewish State and was, therefore, unsatisfactory to the extremists".³ India's attitude meant no unfriendliness to the Jews. She had long admired Jewish enterprise and achievements and had an immigrant Jewish population of her own. Ostracised and excommunicated, haunted and hounded the world over, the Jews are known to have been received in Malabar (India), in their own words, with "a liberality that can scarcely be understood". Driven from their natural home in Judea after the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans, some 10,000 Jews in A.D. 70 sought refuge in the port of Cranganore or Shingly as it was then called. This was followed by a mass immigration of about 75,000 men, women and children in A.D. 370. The reputation of this lush coast as a haven of refuge for the dispersed Jews soon spread to Europe. Centuries later, when the Jews of Spain fell prey to the Conquistadors, at the time of the Inquisition in 1492, they instinctively set sail for Malabar. Not merely did the local princes give them food and shelter, they made them grants and such privileges as accorded only to the highest of Nair chieftains.

To add to this, being a champion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as implicit in her pioneer policy of fight against racial discrimination on all grounds, it was advisable on the part of India to ascertain that a discarded and isolated European race as the Jews be allotted its proper place of dignity and toleration in the galaxy of civilized nations of the world. What she disapproved of were measures which were bound to

unstabilize the Middle East and turn it into a bed of rivalries and conflicts (with enough room for power-politics) that could again, as an after-effect, go to tell upon her essential oil supplies and a vast market. Yet the active participation of the Jews in the regional affairs in collaboration with the Arabs was to be a vital factor in the maintenance of peace in the Middle East when partition would only bring more unnecessary disturbances in its train of which she was herself a victim and which later history has borne out. The zealous Arab nationalism devoid of the ingenuity of Jews, even as a necessary evil, would not come to much. As such, India as a member of the Palestine Commission forwarded a solution through the Minority Report that suggested a Federal Government for Palestine with complete local autonomy for the minority class of the Jews. But, once more, while on the one hand, India was highly impressed by the Jewish talents, on the other, she no less valued the friendship of the Arab world vis-a-vis the Kashmir problem. India's attitude towards the problem was influenced by many factors. On this issue Muslims in all parts of the world had taken a clear stand favouring the Arabs. The Muslim States of West Asia and Pakistan had displayed a keen interest in Palestine and uncompromisingly opposed the idea of partition. The Government of India, which wanted to encourage cooperation among Asian countries in the international field, could not afford to antagonize those States by adopting a different policy on this issue. Moreover, India had also to take note of the fact that Pakistan had tried to make capital out of the Hindu-Muslim disturbances in this country by propagating the view that her Government was hostile to the Muslims. Again, the feelings of thirty million Muslims of India on this matter were also important. Thus through the Federal Scheme she hoped to satisfy the desire of the Jews for a home of their own by conferring full autonomy, while at the same time assuring the preservation of the domination of the Arabs in the Middle East.

So while still pressing the desirability and justice of the Federal Scheme which she had supported, India expressed the view that, however imperative the need of the Jews for a homeland, it was not proper that the United Nations should force

a partition of the country on the unwilling majority constituted by the Arabs. During the debate on the future of Palestine in the Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly (Paris, Sept.-Dec. 1948), India reiterated her opposition to the partition of Palestine. Mr M.C. Setalvad, her delegate, suggested that the General Assembly should adopt a proposal for a federal State, with autonomous Jewish and Arab areas. No solution of the problem, which was not based on the agreement of the Arabs, could be satisfactory. The Arabs had refused to accept partition. Therefore, any attempt at finding a solution, which proceeded on the assumption that partition as envisaged in the 1947 resolution was sacrosanct, was doomed to failure. Events had proved this fact. Fully sympathizing with the Jewish desires and aspirations she voted against the partition in the 1947 session of the General Assembly. She maintained this position even at the first part of the Third Session of the Assembly held in Paris in 1948, as noted beforehand. But when the State of Israel became a fait accompli, India was among the first to welcome her as a member State of the United Nations at the second part of the Third Session of the Assembly in May 1949. Despite this, she continued to withhold the recognition of the new State on the sheer plea of keeping the Arabs in good humour notwithstanding the fact that the latter did not reciprocate in equal degree in some of India's international disputes and when the stand had defeated its very purpose. Even here the prominent motive guiding the approach of the Government of India had been the avoidance of any breach of peace as Dr B.V. Keskar, the Deputy Minister for External Affairs, said in reply to a question of Mr H.V. Kamath on August 4, 1950 (*The Hindu*), that among the factors to be taken into consideration in the recognition of Israel was the then prevailing grave international situation. Eventually, the Premier of Israel, Mr David Ben-Gurion, in a message of independence greetings in 1948 said that the Jewish people in Israel looked forward to friendly relations and cooperation with the Indian people. He further added that the epic of India's successful struggle for freedom had been an inspiration to all the oppressed and persecuted nations of the world and the Israelis had derived special encouragement

from that. Israel had once again returned to its home in Asia and it would set great store by relations of mutual friendship with a nation which had given so magnificent an example. Despite enthusiastic overtures of like nature of the Government of Israel, India advertently preferred to remain indifferent and reserved, though lesser intelligible.

Ultimately, on account of truce in 1948 under the U.N. auspices the legal existence of Israel was admitted by the Arab States themselves and India had to recognize its legal existence. But, again, she deferred the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, the initiative being implicit in the act of recognition. On the other hand, her Prime Minister said that the good relations of India with the Arab countries made it necessary not to exchange envoys with the Jewish State. The recognition of the State of Israel by the Government of India was announced in New Delhi on September 17, 1950. An official statement explained that, as in the case of Communist China, India's decision was the "recognition of an established fact"; that over 40 other countries, including two Muslim countries (Turkey and Iran) had previously recognized Israel, which had been admitted to U.N. membership; that the delay in India's recognition had been caused by the fact "that all aspects of the question had to be very carefully considered, including the sentiments of the Arab countries"; but that it was now felt that continued mutual non-recognition was not only "inconsistent with the overall relationship between the two countries", which had been working side by side in the U.N. but would also "limit the Government of India's role as a possible intermediary between Israel and other States". "A spokesman of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs confirmed that a memorandum had been received recently from the Egyptian Government urging postponement of the recognition of Israel until the latter's attitude towards the Arab refugee question had been clarified. He emphasized that India's decision did not affect her feelings of friendship towards the Arab countries; that she would continue to work for full justice and humane treatment of Arab refugees and exert her influence to that effect; and that the recognition of Israel did not mean that there was no difference between India's attitude and that of

Israel over questions like the status of Jerusalem and Israel's frontiers, which would be judged by India on their merits, with due regard to Arab claims".⁴ Hence, it could be construed that on the question of the recognition of Israel, India reacted to the internal and external pressure of circumstances and waited for an opportune moment to do so. Indeed, the Government of India had not the overall popular support at home to its Middle East policy and there was no consensus of opinion over the unimaginative approach that India took while dealing with a reality. As a distinguished Indian scholar wrote:

"While the present Government of India has accepted partition of India to appease Pan-Islamism, it has also consistently opposed the cause of freedom for the Jews, and, ironically enough, the principle of partition in Palestine. One of the darkest blots on the record of the recent Asian Conference in Delhi is the fact that although Yemen, Transjordan and even Australia and the Philippine Islands were invited to participate in it, Pandit Nehru's Government did not see its way clear to invite Israel, which is undoubtedly the most important and enlightened of all the Middle Eastern States. Israel, by virtue of armistice negotiations, has been recognized by Egypt and Transjordan. Even the British have been forced to recognize it because they had no other alternative. Altogether some thirty-five States have already extended recognition to Israel; and it is pretty certain that the Government of Israel will become a member of the United Nations during its next session. When will India recognize Israel? If Pandit Nehru has any other reason for not recognizing Israel than appeasing Pan-Islamists, when will he tell the Indian people the actual causes for his opposition to the freedom of the Jewish people? Pan-Islamists of India and outside of India have always worked against Indian freedom and unity. This cannot be said of the Jews who have throughout the world in many ways aided the cause of Indian freedom. It is high time for the people of India and the Indian Constituent Assembly to take action regarding the issue of recognition of Israel".⁵

As regards the views of the Father of the Nation on the issue, Mahatma Gandhi stood for the cause of the Jews with

deep sympathy for their age-long persecution, who had been the "untouchables of Christianity". He drew a close and parallel analogy between them and the Indian untouchables where religious sanction had been invoked in both cases for the justification of the inhuman treatment meted out to them. Therefore, there was this "more common universal reason" for his sympathy for the Jews apart from the intimate personal relationships that he had developed with them in South Africa. But his sympathy did not blind him to the "requirements of justice". The cry for the national home for the Jews did not make much appeal to him for the sanction for it was sought in the Bible. On the other hand, he called upon the Jews to emulate and make the country of their birth and livelihood their home as other people of the world had done. To Gandhi, the genuine and lasting remedy to this problem lay in the insistence on a just treatment of the Jews wherever they were born and bred as in Germany. Referring to the Arab-Jew question Gandhi equally vindicated the Arab cause when he wrote in the *Harijan* of November 26, 1938:

"Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English or France to the French. It is wrong and inhuman to impose the Jews on the Arabs. What is going on in Palestine today cannot be justified by any moral code of conduct. The mandates have no sanction but that of the last war. Surely it would be a crime against humanity to reduce the proud Arabs so that Palestine can be restored to the Jews partly or wholly as their national home. . . . And now a word to the Jews in Palestine. I have no doubt that they are going about in the wrong way. The Palestine of the Biblical conception is not a geographical tract. It is in their hearts. But if they must look to the Palestine of geography as their national home, it is wrong to enter it under the shadow of the British gun. A religious act cannot be performed with the aid of the bayonet or the bomb. They can settle in Palestine only by the goodwill of the Arabs".⁶

He believed that the Jews had been cruelly wronged by the world and was aware that "Ghetto" was the name given to Jewish locations in many parts of Europe. But for their heartless persecution, probably no question of return to Pale-

stine would ever have arisen. The world should have been their home, if only for the sake of their distinguished contribution to it. But, in his opinion, they had erred grievously in seeking to impose themselves on Palestine with the aid of America and Britain and later on with the aid of naked terrorism. Their citizenship of the world should have and would have made them honoured guests of any country. Their thrift, varied talent, and great industry should have made them welcome anywhere. It was a blot on the Christian world that they had been singled out, owing to a wrong reading of the *New Testament*, for prejudice against them. If an individual Jew did a wrong, the whole Jewish world was to blame for it. If an individual Jew like Albert Einstein made a great discovery or another composed unsurpassable music, the merit went to the authors and not to the community to which they belonged. It was no wonder that his sympathy went out to the Jews in their unenviably sad plight. But one would have thought, adversity would teach them lessons of peace. In his opinion, the Jews should have sought to convert the Arab heart. The same God ruled the Arab heart who ruled the Jewish heart. They could have offered Satyagraha in front of the Arabs and allowed themselves to be shot or thrown into the Dead Sea without raising a little finger against them. They would have found the world opinion in their favour in their religious aspiration. There were hundreds of ways of reasoning with the Arabs, if they would only have discarded the help of the British bayonet. As it was, they were co-sharers with the British in despoiling a people who had done no wrong to them. He was not defending the Arab excesses. He wished the Arabs, too, had chosen the way of non-violence in resisting what they rightly regarded as an unwarrantable encroachment upon their country. But according to the accepted canons of right and wrong, nothing could be said against the Arab resistance in the face of overwhelming odds. Writing, once more, from Panchgani on July 14, 1946, Gandhi asked of the Jews:

“Why should they depend upon American money or British arms for forcing themselves on an unwelcome land? Why should they resort to terrorism to make good their forcible landing in Palestine? If they were to adopt the matchless

weapon of non-violence whose use their best prophets have taught and which Jesus the Jew who gladly wore the crown of thorns bequeathed to a groaning world, their cause would be the world's, and I have no doubt that among the many things that the Jews have given to the world, this would be the best and the brightest. It is twice blessed. It will make them happy and rich in the true sense of the word and it will be a soothing balm to the aching world."⁷

Berlin

The inspiration that guided the Indian reactions to the Berlin problem could as well be seen in the light of the truth that Indian foreign policy in the period under review had largely been conditioned by the Indian national economic interests that called for a world without war. With regard to the crisis of the Berlin blockade, on the whole, India went ahead to make overtures to the big Powers involved in order to assuage the pangs of the Cold War and to avert the possibility of a third world war that had become more or less a certainty in view of the deterioration of the situation in Europe. *The Hindu* (Madras) of July 30, 1948, reflecting the non-official opinion commented that the Berlin question had brought the world nearer to war than at any time since 1939 and a solution of the problem was necessary to preserve peace. In fact the Indian attitude to the issues involving the division of the State territories of the world emanates from her own experience of the Partition as she is in the know of things that such cases are always fraught with danger. Thus, in consonance with the gravity of the deadlock, India contributed her mite in persuading the Four Powers to take to the path of reason and restraint as a war in Berlin would have actually shattered her dreams of emerging as a leading Power in Asia. The Indian National Congress reaffirming the resolution of the Nasik session (September 20-21, 1950) declared:

"The great need of the world today is the avoidance of war, which will inevitably bring irretrievable disaster to mankind. This Congress earnestly hopes that the great nations of the world, on whom rests a heavy responsibility, will pursue policies which ease the present tensions and lead to peaceful solutions of

present-day problems. This policy of interference with another country with a view to bringing about political or economic changes there, as well as the policy of controlling another country and depriving it of freedom to shape its own destiny, must lead to conflict".⁸

This was the crisis that, again, minutely tested and crystallized her policy of non-alignment. Nehru himself said in this context that there were many problems. Yet from the world point of view the biggest problem, judged from the criterion of war or peace, was still that of Berlin in Germany. He was not going into that and had always avoided meddling because one could not make oneself answerable to the big issues of the world. Naturally because it was an important problem, the Government of India had given thought to it, and had discussed it with other people and in its own way made some minor suggestions as to what should have been done. But all those, even the suggestions that it had made, were also not on what policies should have been pursued, but that any policy should have been pursued with a measure of gentleness and not abuse. That, Nehru submitted, was a slightly distinctive feature of India. The awesome impact that the problem made upon India with all the repercussions is evident when the Indian Prime Minister went to declare in another instance that Berlin posed a very big, rather tremendous, problem. On that depended the future of war or peace—might be that very year, or in an interval shorter than that. There was no good of his sitting down and, according to his thinking, logically condemning a particular personality or nation.⁹

Korea

The Korean crisis provided a big challenge to India in that it had the potentialities of a worldwide conflagration in it. A conflict of like gravity in the Cold War period with the involvement of the big Powers and of herself imminent could never have been bypassed by India but at her own peril. Thus her overall concern is explicitly reflected in her repeated call for the "localization of the conflict". With the Berlin question in the West, India was susceptible of the double disaster that faced the world to which again she was not in a position to

join hands in any capacity. On the whole, besides several factors including the avoidance of armed involvement and the geographical position, the efficient part that India was able to play in the U.N. treatment of the Korean question owed much to her membership of the Security Council during the period.

Uniting for Peace Resolution

In the United Nations, India opposed the Uniting for Peace Resolution (November 3, 1950), popularly known as the Acheson Plan, because she considered that it was not the time for stressing the military aspect of the world organization, important though that aspect might be. She felt that at that time the members ought to have rather concentrated upon improving the machinery of the United Nations for the tasks of peace. In this way, India hindered or cold-shouldered the attempts at the development of the operative capacity of the United Nations in order to fulfil her own ends. India voted against those provisions of the resolution which emphasized the martial role of the United Nations (Sections C and D). India's views were explained both by the Indian delegates in the General Assembly and by the Prime Minister in a Press conference in New Delhi. It was pointed out that the national military units referred to in the resolution would only be made available to the United Nations in accordance with the respective constitutional processes of member States and without prejudice to the exercise of the right of individual and collective self-defence. Indian armed forces were intended only for self-defence, and could not be spared for use outside the country, particularly when there was no indication who the enemy would be. "So long as the United Nations took enforcement measures or decided to recommend that the members take collective action against aggression with the concurrence of the big Powers, it was clear that such action would not be directed against any of the big powers. According to the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution, the Assembly, without the concurrence of the big Powers, could make the decision—that is, a large majority of the member States might vote against the wishes of one or more of the big Powers. It was feared that

any attempt to push through a decision on enforcement measures against the opposition of one or more big Powers would disrupt the United Nations; it would not strengthen the General Assembly or any other organ of the Organization."¹⁰ Nonetheless, the resolution was adopted by the General Assembly by 52 votes to 5 with the Soviet bloc opposed and Argentina and India abstaining. In India it was regretted that with the adoption of the Acheson Plan, the character of the United Nations was gradually changing. Pandit Nehru stated in Parliament on June 12, 1952, that instead of looking upon it as a great organization for peace, some of its members had gradually begun to think of it as an organization through which war could be waged. The original idea behind the formation of the United Nations was vastly different and though its Charter remained, somehow facts began to belie it more and more.

At its 302nd Plenary Meeting held on November 3, 1950, the General Assembly adopted the Uniting for Peace Resolution. (Resolution 377V). The resolution sought to emphasize the responsibility of the General Assembly for the maintenance of international peace and security in case of the failure of the Security Council to discharge its primary responsibility because of lack of unanimity among the permanent members. It provided a procedure for convening the General Assembly on an emergency basis in cases in which the Security Council was deadlocked because of the veto. The resolution invited each member of the United Nations to survey its resources in order to determine the nature and scope of the assistance it might render and recommended that the members maintain armed forces that could be promptly made available upon recommendation by the Security Council or the General Assembly. The resolution also provided for the establishment of a Collective Measures Committee to report about the methods to maintain and strengthen international peace and security. The compatibility of certain parts of the resolution with the provisions of the Charter was questioned by some delegations including that of India.¹¹ The main objection of India was, however, on the timing of the resolution. The United States and many other members of the General Assem-

bly did not agree with the Indian view. The United States representative pointed out that pacific settlement of disputes was an inseparable part of the collective security system under the Charter. He added that the greater the ability of the United Nations to foil attempts to solve conflicts by force, the more likely would it be that conflicts could be settled by negotiations. This clearly reflected the difference not only in this particular case but in the general approach of India and the Western nations to international problems then facing the United Nations and the world. The majority in the General Assembly thought that that was precisely the time to devise some machinery which might be utilized in case of a future possible emergency and the inability of the Security Council to act because of the veto. The attitude taken by India was, however, not only in line with her general policy, but also with the efforts which India had been making for a negotiated settlement of the Korean question. India appears to have thought that in the context of the already existing wide gulf between the two blocs and the doubts and suspicions, such a move or her support for it would minimize, if not defeat, the chances of such a settlement. The Uniting for Peace Resolution has been hailed as a big step and a milestone in the evolution of the United Nations. However, Mr Dag Hammarskjöld, the late Secretary-General of the United Nations, rightly remarked that the resolution did not constitutionally transfer to the General Assembly any of the enforcement powers reserved to the Security Council by the U.N. Charter. The enforcement action by the United Nations under Chapter VII of the Charter continues to be reserved to the Security Council.¹² The Uniting for Peace Resolution provides not for collective security action but for collective action in response to the recommendations of the General Assembly. The resolution can be utilized only in so far as the members prefer to respond to the non-obligatory recommendations of the General Assembly. Whether the resolution would prove to be a milestone in the evolution of the international organization is for the future to show. The resolution does, however, imply the possibility of leading the world organization to a major crisis if it is put into effect in a conflict which involves vital interests of the big Powers.

Chinese Intervention

According to the Indian point of view the fact that the Korean problem actually revolved around the status of Communist China came only next to that it was at the beginning a Russo-American conflict. India had always been of the opinion that the question of Korea could only be solved with China's cooperation. Whatever the outcome of the conflict was conceivable in the military sense, the displacement of peace could not be finally resolved without the acquiescence, if not the active concurrence, of China. India had laid stress on this argument right from the beginning and could not think of a peaceful rapprochement in the Far East unless the great country of China was taken into account. This unusual emphasis upon the indispensable and key role of an emergent Asian Power in Korea alone reveals the truth that had the peaceful conclusion of the Korean war been one of international significance to India, it was all the more important to her in her own national self-interest. She was found keen to develop friendly relations and goodwill with China and to be in the best and closest possible collaboration with her in matters of mutual concern. India was enthusiastic to restore China back to her ancient glory after a lapse of foreign subjugation even at the cost of the past support of the Nationalist China to the Indian struggle for independence. A Korean peace without the participation of China would be a lopsided and crude peace for that was prone to fail recognizing a major force in the region leaving behind a disgruntled China which, in its turn, meant uneasy times for India. It was all the same to her added advantage that Communist China be not branded a delinquent as that would only intensify the fighting bringing it nearer to her north-eastern border. While endorsing the U.N. actions in Korea, India could not afford to have a great power neighbour as China to be outlawed which was previously denied the membership of the United Nations. Given her struggle for liberation on the ideological plane, the immediate reactions of Communist China to the international affairs have emanated from the psychological make-up of her being kept out

of the society embodied in the United Nations Organization. Historically, it is also traceable to the violation of her human rights by the European Powers in the form of the retention of extra-territorial rights, when she was not treated on equal terms. India endeavoured to bring back the Soviet delegate to his seat in the Security Council for she understood that if there was any restraining influence upon China, it was that of the Soviet Union which in fact preferred to have China exhaust her energies through total involvement in the Korean war so that getting weaker, the latter would not prove a challenge to her position and programme in International Communism.

Again, from the economic standpoint, the new Republican Constitution of India came to be applied in 1950 with a fresh programme for the reorientation of the basic structure for Democratic Socialism and a sound economic planning for the transformation of the traditional economy and a national revival and they needed to be promoted to a stature of considerable calibre to start with. Moreover, the war in Korea came to India with all the adverse financial repercussions that are associated with any armed conflict. "Prices rose sharply after the outbreak of the Korean War, and although steps were taken to prevent money income from rising as a consequence of the abnormally high prices of exports, the economy was once again subjected to serious inflationary strain".¹³ This sincerely subscribes to the point of India being so keen upon the earliest possible settlement of the Korean dispute. When India had freed herself from foreign occupation in the late forties, it was in the early fifties that she was on her own and went out to find a chosen path guided by her destiny and genius. Hence this stage in her indigenous growth was of decisive importance to herth at would lead her to a settled life afterwards. Therefore, it was natural on her part to be super-sensitive towards any breach of peace during this period than at any other.

As noted beforehand, India supported the two resolutions of the Security Council, dated June 25 and 26, 1950, respectively, calling upon the North Koreans to withdraw their forces to the 38th parallel, and recommending that the members

of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might be necessary to repel the armed attack. India's association with the Korean question dated even earlier. She was one of the nine members of the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea which was appointed by the General Assembly to facilitate the establishment through elections of a National Government of Korea. "India, desiring to implement the Security Council resolution through some positive aid, sent to Korea a medical mission which has earned high praise for its work. India rejected the Soviet argument that the Security Council resolutions were illegal because Article 27 (3) of the U.N. Charter and especially the words 'the concurring votes of the permanent members' contemplate that all the five permanent members must be present and voting if a valid decision is to be taken. India's view was that mere abstention or absence of a member (in this case the Soviet Union which had boycotted the United Nations at the time these resolutions were passed) cannot amount to a negative vote".¹⁴ India's efforts both inside and outside the U.N. had been directed towards localizing and putting an end to the conflict and achieving a solution whereby the Koreans themselves would be able to decide their future. Prime Minister Nehru directly appealed to Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Premier, and Dean Acheson, the U.S. Secretary of State, for admission of the People's Government of China to the U.N. and for a conference between the USA, the USSR and China with a view to achieving a solution of the Korean problem. But this suggestion was not accepted by the USA though the USSR appreciated the initiative. India opposed the crossing of the 38th parallel by the U.N. forces. She feared that this might widen the conflict by involving China also in the Korean war—which was unfortunately borne out by subsequent events.

Cease-Fire

Then the United Nations cease-fire group of which the Indian representative, Sir B.N. Rau, was a member tried hard to achieve, by negotiations with the People's Government of China, a cease-fire in Korea. But it had to report

failure to the General Assembly on January 2, 1951. Thereafter, when the General Assembly passed, at the instance of the USA, a resolution branding China as an "aggressor", India opposed it, *inter alia*, on the following grounds: (1) It would completely bar the way to further negotiations. (2) While the General Assembly could, under Articles 10 and 11 of the U. N. Charter, make recommendations, it could not give a finding or make a determination as to an act of aggression—which was the function of the Security Council under Article 39. In spite of the fact that the United Nations had missed the psychological moment for negotiations in September 1950 when India had moved the proposal for constituting a sub-committee and in spite of the fact that the chances of success were now dim, India was working to evolve a formula which might put an end to the fighting in Korea. Thirteen Asian nations, including India, introduced in the Political Committee of the General Assembly a draft resolution requesting the President of the General Assembly to constitute a group of three persons, including himself, to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea could be arranged and to make recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as possible. Sir B. N. Rau, the Indian delegate, introduced another draft resolution sponsored by the same countries, excepting the Philippines, which proposed the establishment of a committee charged with the task of making recommendations for the peaceful settlement of the "existing issues" in the Far East. Mr Rau asked for a priority of discussion for the former resolution. He informally mentioned that the Committee envisaged in the latter resolution might comprise representatives of the People's Government of China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the USSR, Egypt, and India. Mr Rau stated that Mr Wu Hsiu-chuang, the representative of the People's Government of China, who was then in New York, had told him that his Government did not want a war either with the United Nations or with the United States and that a war had been forced on China by the military operations which were being carried on near the Chinese border. In fact Mr Rau had tried to sound out the Chinese

representative before moving the draft resolution. India appreciated the suspicions of China in this respect. In order to meet the possible Chinese complaint that it was not consulted by the United Nations before the resolutions were approved, Mr Rau pointed out that the draft resolutions moved by the Asian nations did not seek to impose an immediate cease-fire. The 13-Power draft resolution, Mr Rau declared, embodied an exploratory proposal only. President Truman told a meeting of the Congressional leaders that the United States officials were conferring with India on the Korean issue. It was reported in the daily Press that President Truman was counting heavily on India to play the role of a peace-maker between the Chinese People's Government and the Western Powers. Meanwhile, Mr Nehru had outlined a plan to meet the developing crisis in Korea and the Far East. He had suggested a Big Four meeting in New Delhi with the delegate of the People's Government of China attending on the basis of equality. His second proposal concerned a cease-fire in Korea and the establishment of a neutral zone supervised by a United Nations Commission in which India was prepared to be represented if the parties so desired.

It was unfortunate that the sponsors of the two resolutions decided to deal with them separately. These two resolutions could easily be combined into one. Mr Rau asked for priority for the 13-Power draft resolution for the simple reason that the second step as proposed in the 12-Power draft resolution could be realized only if the first, that is, the cease-fire could be realized. However, this splitting up unnecessarily gave a cause for suspicion and complaint to China. It was alleged that the cease-fire resolution was given priority in order to provide a breathing time to the United Nations forces which were facing a serious predicament at that time. It was further alleged that once that objective was achieved the second resolution would either be indefinitely shelved or the negotiations would be endlessly continued. Though the suspicion and complaint might be said to be anything but genuine, yet the sponsors could have easily avoided even the possibility of such a complaint. The suspicions and fears of China. The USSR and others appear to be without any foundation in face

of the fact that the Cease-Fire Group had made it clear to the Peking Government that it was the clear understanding of the sponsors that once a cease-fire arrangement had been achieved, the negotiations visualized in the second resolution would be started at once and that the Government of the People's Republic of China would be included in the Negotiating Committee referred to in the resolution. In fact, North Korea and China were in no mood to negotiate because their forces were in a happy position at that time.

It might be noted that the two draft resolutions attempted to cover not only the question then before the United Nations but also other issues. The draft resolutions used the omnibus phrase —“existing issues”. Criticism was levelled against this aspect of the draft resolutions. It was said that the draft resolutions were the result of a policy of appeasement and attempted to pay a price for obtaining a cease-fire by proposing a channel for the solution of “existing issues” between United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR and China. Mr Rau refuted these allegations. He pointed out that the word “issues” was taken from the last communique on the talks which President Truman and Mr Attlee recently had in Washington. As far as India was concerned the resolutions did not mean appeasement. It was a realistic appraisal of an explosive situation. The implications of the Korean question, India was convinced, were so deep and varied that it could not be successfully tackled in isolation. India had been conscious of this fact from the earliest stages of the Korean conflict. Any permanent solution of the Korean question was not possible, India thought, without solving other equally important issues in the Far East. India was trying to strike a middle course and to balance the demands of justice and logic with those of political wisdom. In so far as these attempts of India were aimed at reaching a negotiated settlement of the Korean question, it was supported by the United Kingdom. This support strengthened India's hands. The United States also appeared to be coming round to this view. The 13-Power joint draft resolution received general support. However, the Communist bloc opposed the move on the ground that the draft resolution attempted to provide a breathing spell to the

retreating forces of the United Nations Command. (Noted earlier.) Eventually the First Committee approved the 13-Power draft resolution in spite of the opposition of the Communist States who voted against it. The Cease-Fire Group was composed of Sir B.N. Rau, Mr Lester B. Pearson of Canada and Mr Nasrullah Entezam of Iran, the then President of the General Assembly. By this action, the General Assembly partially rectified its regretful neglect which lay in the abdication of authority as pointed out earlier. It now created a United Nations body which could, if successful, provide a guidance to the United Nations Command in Korea. It was a right step but as events were to show it was too late to rectify the consequences which had already ensued because of the failure of the Assembly to assert its authority earlier and also because of the unguided utterances of General Douglas MacArthur, the Military Commander in Korea. "By adopting this proposal the majority in the First Committee accepted the same position which India advocated in September 1950 and which was then rejected by the General Assembly. The whole context had changed now. Had the General Assembly thought it fit to accept the Indian suggestion before crossing the 38th parallel it might well have avoided the expansion of the war and would have presented optimum conditions for acceptance of a negotiated settlement in Korea".¹⁵ After the 13-Power proposal was adopted President Truman proclaimed a state of emergency in the United States. There was a feeling in India that President Truman's declaration of emergency and his vigorous reaffirmation of a non-appeasement policy indicated he had no faith in the cease-fire efforts and was preparing for the consequences of its failure. These moves might be said to have been warranted by caution and the reading of the situation, yet they could not but heighten the suspicion of China as to the motives behind the cease-fire move. Mr Rau continued his attempts to allay the fears which China might be expected to entertain. He met General Wu prior to his departure for China from New York. Mr Rau's meeting with General Wu was reported to be primarily for the purpose of allaying the Chinese suspicions that the cease-fire proposal were a trap to tie the hands of China.

The P.O.W. Issue

Finally worn out by prolonged warfare, both sides began truce talks at Kaesong and later in Pan Mun Jom. After one year of negotiations, the parties came to an agreement on all the points except the issue of compulsory repatriation of the prisoners of war. The Chinese and the North Koreans insisted that under general International Law and also under the Geneva Convention of 1949 the mother country had a right to demand the repatriation of all prisoners of war, including those who were unwilling to return. The United Nations Command, on the other hand, refused to repatriate prisoners of war against their will. To achieve a solution of this vexed problem, India put forward a proposal in the seventh session of the General Assembly according to which a repatriation commission would be created, which would be composed of two Communist and two non-Communist representatives, who would select an umpire to act as its chairman unless otherwise agreed. At the end of 90 days after the armistice agreement had been signed, the disposition of any prisoners of war whose repatriation might not have been effected or agreed upon by the commission, would be referred with recommendations to a political conference of both sides. If at the end of 60 days thereafter there were any prisoners of war whose return had not been effected or provided by the political conference, responsibility for their care and maintenance until the end of their detention should be transferred to the United Nations. Though the United States originally opposed the resolution, it was finally persuaded to accept it and on December 1, 1962, the resolution was passed in the General Assembly by the large majority of 53 votes to 5 with one abstention. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union and China rejected the Indian resolution. India subsequently amended her resolution proposing an immediate cease-fire in Korea, with a view to overcoming the Soviet objection to the original resolution, viz., that it did not contain any proposal for cease-fire. But strange to say, the USSR rejected even this amended resolution, which was, however, passed by a majority of 54 to 5, one of the largest majorities in the annals of the World Organization.

The Indian delegation formulated a set of principles, based on the provisions of the Geneva Convention, to facilitate the speedy return of the prisoners of war to their homelands and to bring about an immediate cease-fire. These principles were framed with a view to consultation and subsequent framing of a resolution in case these principles were considered to be generally acceptable. India ruled out voluntary repatriation because she thought that it would be "against the Geneva Convention and the well-established principles of international law" on the subject. These principles were communicated to the People's Government of China. The Chinese Government did not commit itself nor did she express any disapproval of these principles. India was given to understand that the Chinese Government appreciated India's attempts. Informal contacts with the various delegations at the United Nations revealed general support. Acting largely on the basis of her own judgment and the information she possessed India moved a draft resolution incorporating these principles. Mr V.K. Krishna Menon, the Indian delegate, declared that India approached the problem from the belief in the bona fide desire of both of the parties to reach an early armistice. He dissociated himself from the position taken by the United Nations Command negotiators and by the sponsors of the 21-Power draft resolution. Mr Menon said that the Chinese and the Koreans themselves had demanded that repatriation should take place in terms of international law. Therefore, so far as India was concerned, this was a common ground. India, Mr Menon further pointed out, was endeavouring to find a way which would meet legitimate objections and facilitate a reconciliation without infringing rights, international law, or deep-seated and well-held belief. Mr Nehru, too, underlined this approach when, referring to the various draft resolutions before the First Committee, he said that a thing might be correct in itself, and yet it might not lead to the result aimed at. What India wanted was to try and find some way of reaching the result. It was a poor consolation to say that one was right. Mere restatement of principles or finding a common juridical denominator was not enough. A solution which could be legally unimpeachable and could yet provide

possibilities of its acceptance by both the parties was what the impasse demanded. Thus, India took upon herself the highly delicate task of balancing the facts and the law, of comprehending the principles advanced by both the parties, and of building a bridge between what appeared to be two conflicting positions or points of view without, at the same time, doing any violence to the established principles of International Law. Mr Menon made it clear that the draft resolution pointed a way only and attempted to provide a basis for an agreement. It did not aspire to give a solution. He, therefore, reminded that if approved, it should be forwarded to the Chinese Government and the North Korean authorities merely as proposals submitted for their consideration rather than as an ultimatum.

By the first week in October 1950, the General Assembly had taken over the question, at least temporarily, and was faced with the necessity of immediate and fairly decisive action. Having stopped at the 38th parallel to await authorization to pursue the aggressor's retreating armies into North Korea, the United Nations forces were thus imperishing the impetus and military effectiveness of what could be—and substantially did become—the final offensive to destroy the North Korean military power. Within one week the Assembly passed an obliquely phrased authorization to take over temporary military control of North Korea. The vote on October 7, 1950, was 47 to 5 with 7 abstentions, and it can be deduced with safety that India abstained. The resolution, suitably long, is of particular interest here with reference to the first four of five sub-paragraphs in the first operative part, which together stipulated that the "General Assembly . . . (1) Recommends that

(a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea;

(b) All constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea;

(c) All sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, South and North, be invited to cooperate with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections and in the establishment of a unified government;

(d) United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified in (a) and (b) above;”¹⁶

As this eight-Power draft resolution made its way through Committee I, it was, of course, faced with a counterdraft by the Soviet Union, which called for the withdrawal of United States troops “and others” from Korea, and suggested a joint commission (of North and South Korea, equally weighted) for the negotiation of a settlement. Sir B.N. Rau, on behalf of India, found each of the two drafts objectionable, but not irreconcilable, and he, in turn, proposed a compromise resolution to appoint a sub-committee to review all suggestions “concerning the problem of the independence of Korea”, and recommend, within two days, “a draft resolution . . . commanding the largest measure of agreement”.¹⁷

Mr Rau’s compromise was unsuccessful, largely because in the eyes of the American and the other Western delegations there was no hope of reconciliation between the Soviet and Western drafts. But unfortunately for the West’s case in Asia, the Indian compromise proposal did win the affirmative vote of the Soviet Union, whereby the Soviet Union placed itself in the role of helping to perpetuate the assumption—or better, the illusion—that it concurred with Mr Rau’s somewhat strained conclusion that the two opposing drafts were reconcilable. It is at such delicate points that one turns to statesmanship for its more ingenious professional skills. The problem was not that of driving through the eight-Power draft, but rather of making clear the conclusion that there was no real alternative but to drive it on through. Whether its sponsors and, even more importantly, the United States delegation, performed this demanding task well or badly, or indeed whether they seriously undertook it at all, may not be very clear or easily resolved. What is a great deal clearer is that however desultory or valiant their efforts were, they nonetheless failed as far as India was concerned.

As for the resolution of February 1, 1951, four of the seven operative paragraphs were of particular importance, and read as follows: “The General Assembly

Finds that the Central People’s Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already

committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea;

Calls upon the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to cause its forces and nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the United Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea;

Requests a Committee composed of the members of the Collective Measures Committee, as a matter of urgency to consider additional measures to be employed to meet this aggression and to report thereon to the General Assembly, it being understood that the Committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good Offices Committee, referred to in the following paragraph, reports satisfactory progress in its efforts;

Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea by peaceful means, and requests the President of the Assembly to designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to this end".¹⁸

In his explanation of India's vote, Sir B.N. Rau grimly pointed out four objections to the resolution, of which the first was the Indian view that it would prolong hostilities in Korea indefinitely and may extend the area of conflict, even leading ultimately to global war. Matched against this was the contention that so many mistakes had been made against the Central People's Government of China during the last twelve months that the resolution did not seem to India to be quite fair in its condemnation. But it was another of Mr Rau's four points that probed most unerringly into the ultimate absurdity of the resolution; for, as the Indian delegate argued that to combine a proposal for negotiations through the good offices of the President with a previous condemnation of the Government with which the negotiations were to be conducted created the impression that the U.N. was not serious about either. By this combination, the resolution deprived the condemnation of any moral force and, at the same time, deprived the negotiations of their best chance of success.

Diplomatic Activities

India's acceptance of the June 27, 1950, resolution urging for police action against North Korea was based on "information supplied by a variety of sources" which (except the U.N. Commission Report) were, however, unspecified in the Government of India's communique of June 29, 1950. On July 7, Mr Nehru said in a Press conference that when North Korea launched an invasion on South Korea, it was clear, without even a great enquiry, that this was a well-planned and large-scale invasion. According to Lord Birdwood the Indian Cabinet's decision on the matter was made after the receipt of a report from Mr C. Kondapi, the Indian delegate to the United Nations Commission for Korea.¹⁹ Authenticity of Mr Kondapi's evidence could not have been doubted by the Indian Cabinet at the moment, and this might have been the most important factor determining their decision on the issue (though a close analysis of the documents on the origin of the Korean war proves that the U.N. Commission as a whole, as well as the Indian member in the Commission, individually gave their judgment on the matter without any shred of direct evidence). Even then Mr Truman's unilateral decision on June 27, 1950, to make an armed intervention in Korea forestalling the U.N. resolution on June 27, as well as the simultaneous declaration about the "neutralization" of Formosa and armed assistance to the French in Indo-China, provided sufficient grounds to make the American initiative for collective action in Korea look suspect in Indian eyes—as evident from the Indian Press reactions. Whether Mr Loy Henderson, the American Ambassador, played any significant role in influencing the decision of the Indian Cabinet through the two-hour interview with Mr Nehru on the eve of the Cabinet meeting on Korea, in the same way as he was supposed to have done during the Asian Conference on Indonesia in Delhi in 1949,²⁰ one can merely guess. The Indian Cabinet's decision on June 27 remains inexplicable in the light of Mr Nehru's statement on October 16, 1950, that it was patent to the Government of India that the USSR and even more particularly China were deeply concerned with the future of

a neighbouring territory like Korea and that no satisfactory solution in the Far East could be arrived at by ignoring these two Powers.

On the other hand, the influence of Sirdar K.M. Panikkar, the illustrious Indian Ambassador to China, in determining India's China policy is also evident from Nehru's analysis of New China's role in the Korean dispute which was the turning point in the evolution of her foreign policy. Mr Nehru said in Parliament on December 8, 1950: "Whatever happens in Korea is of the utmost significance to the Chinese people. We cannot ignore that fact unless one is prepared to completely ignore China and the Chinese people, which also one cannot do because they are more than a handful. So our approach has always been that this problem of Korea can only be solved in cooperation with the Chinese or, if you like, with their acquiescence".²¹ Though the Indian Government supported the U.N. resolution condemning North Korean invasion in June 1950, Mr Nehru made an attempt for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem and as prerequisite for this, stressed the admission of the Peking Government into the United Nations. As the North Koreans suffered defeats and were pushed back, India advised the United Nations not to cross the 38th parallel, as she had learnt through Sirdar Panikkar that if the 38th parallel was crossed, the Chinese Government would consider it as a grave danger to their own security and they would not tolerate it. When U.N. forces marched on to the Yalu river, India deprecated the action. Later, when the U.N. forces were driven back by the Chinese intervention in November 1950, India led the Arab-Asian bloc in the United Nations which worked for a cease-fire and the convening of a Political Conference, in which Peking would be included to discuss Formosa and other problems of the Far East. When this attempt seemed to have failed, partly as a result of Peking's cool responses, India and Burma were the only countries outside the Soviet bloc to vote in February 1951 against an American-sponsored resolution in the United Nations declaring Communist China an aggressor. India also refused to participate in the United Nations vote on May 18, 1951, which imposed an arms embargo against Communist

China and North Korea. According to the Indian Ambassador in Peking though the Chinese reply was a qualified acceptance with alternative proposals in respect of points which they did not accept, the Americans even before they had time to study it declared that it was a "contemptuous rejection" and immediately brought up proposals to brand China as "an aggressor".²²

Emergent China and Tibet

Nepal, emerging out of the feudal era only the other day, could not be taken in as a reliable buffer at least temporarily while Tibet was already annexed by China. Hence, it was of immediate concern to India that China should not be made able to advance southwards where the Karen rebels of Communist origin were also active inside Burma, the eastern gateway of India, and when there was serious Communist trouble within India herself. India's repeated appeal to seat the Red China in the United Nations was in truth to timely handle the renegade and to bring her permanently within the bounds of the Charter discipline so that she may not pose as a menace to her for India had discreetly foreseen the danger in the emergence of Communist China. In essence, the emergent foreign policy as pursued by India had been largely conditioned by the resurgence of China in comparison to others. Bringing the East and the West closer was one of the aims of Nehru's foreign policy. India's staunch support to the U.N. and its peace move was mainly due to her desire to break the barrier between East and West and build a bridge between them to create international harmony and cooperation. East-West tension often proved to be a luxury enjoyed at the cost of underdeveloped countries and Nehru wanted to lessen it. The persistent and almost headstrong stand that Nehru took on the question of admission of Communist China to the U.N., in the face of severe and frustrating criticism and opposition from the Western Powers, underlined his keen desire to use the U.N. platform to reconcile the conflicts between East and West. This would only contribute to her understanding and appreciated by both the sides and would assist her in rising in strength and stature not only in Asia and Africa but in the

world itself. To reiterate, if there was any Power in Asia with which Chinese expansionism would first of all possibly come to a clash, it was democratic India and none else. India literally gave away Tibet to China in order to silence her for the foreseeable future so as not to be interfered with by China when she was engaged in vital deliberations and experiments at home that would go a long way in deciding her ultimate goal and achievements. With the existing contrast in ideology, a Chinese influence would have had adverse effects upon her socio-economic framework and cherished values.

India was susceptible to the probability that should any disturbance to her task of survival would ever come from any quarter, the Chinese would be the leading one. Pandit Nehru, in the fate of Tibet, was well-informed in advance that this was going to be only a temporary expediency and a headlong collision with China was inevitable some time, somewhere in the days to come. Appeasement merely whets the appetite of the aggressor. Here, from security point of view, India was in a disadvantageous position with an outdated defence depleted by the transfer of the Gurkhas to Malaya by the British. India strove for being economically viable as only such a country would be in a place to assert her sovereignty and privileges especially vis-a-vis the rise of the Chinese Dragon. The anxiety on the part of India is evident when Nehru during a debate on foreign affairs in the Lok Sabha on September 30, 1954, acknowledged that China, no doubt, would go ahead fast. He denied that he was comparing or criticising but what he said was that this enormous country of China, which was a great Power and which was powerful at that time, was potentially still more powerful. India had made somewhat of a bargain with blackmail, that with Tibet annexed and behind the flimsy curtain of goodwill China would be pacified for a good number of years for it would take China some time to make her grip firm over Tibet while superimposing Marxism over Buddhism and exploit the natural resources before she resumed her journey onward. By that time, India would have gained substantial self-sufficiency and defence preparations in order to counter China's intimidation. With Tibet gone, India really came to endorse the Red colonialism that she

has not condemned in any part of the world as vociferously as she did in the case of Western colonialism. Finally, trade was a major factor of consideration for India in connexion with Tibet. India, in fact, wanted to see this underdeveloped country modernized and industrialized by dint of Chinese acumen and enterprise so that her ageold trade with Tibet and China as well might turn a new leaf and provide for wider scope and market as a durable impetus to her economic growth at large. Pandit Nehru said in Parliament on December 6, 1950, that the Government of India had also made it clear that India had no territorial or political ambitions in regard to Tibet, and that the relations of the Indian people were cultural and commercial. It had said that India would naturally like to preserve these relations and continue to trade with Tibet especially through Kalimpong because it did not come in the way of either China or Tibet.

"The third and last stage of the development in the foreign policy of India began with the coming into power in China of the Communists and India's recognition of the Peking Government".²² India could no longer be a distant onlooker at the cold war. It had come too close to her own borders and threatened to come closer, as, indeed, it did by the Chinese occupation of Tibet and the signing of the U.S.-Pakistan Defence Aid Agreement. India, unsuccessfully, tried to stop both these occurrences. Even more, the war in Korea and later in Indo-China made India conscious of a serious danger to peace in the area very close to her and all these events led to a hardening up of India's attitude in her "neutral" or "non-alignment"—or whatever name one might give it—policy. The Communist victory in China had, for the first time, provided a strong central base in Asia for international Communism and as India shared extensive borders with China, her anxiety to prevent China from helping Communist parties in South-East Asia and South Asia led to the gradual emergence of her policy of peaceful coexistence which began to take shape in 1953.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. K.P. Karunakaran, *India in World Affairs*, Vol. I, 1947-50, p. 195.
2. Ton That Thien, *India and South-East Asia 1947-60*, p. 97.
3. Eugene P. Chase, *The United Nations in Action*, p. 49.
4. Keesing's *Contemporary Archives* (September 23-30, 1950), Vol. VIII, 1950-52, p. 10974.
5. Dr. Taraknath Das, "When Will the Government of India Recognize Israel?" *The Modern Review*, Vol. 85, April 1949, p. 333.
6. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, *Non-Violence in Peace & War*, Vol. I, pp. 170 and 173.
7. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 117.
8. Indian National Congress, *Resolutions on Foreign Policy 1947-57*, p. 8.
9. Grant S. McClellan (Ed.), *India, The Reference Shelf*, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 99.
10. *India and the United Nations*, pp. 53-54.
11. G.A.O.R., Sixth Session, First Committee, p. 155, para 3.
12. Vide Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, June 16, 1956-June 15, 1957, U.N. Doc. A/3594/Add. 1, G.A.O.R., Twelfth Session, Supplement 1A, p. 3; & U.N. Doc. A/1844/Add. 1, *Ibid.*, p. 6.
13. *The First Five Year Plan*, Planning Commission, p. 178.
14. T.S. Rama Rao, "India and the United Nations", *The Indian Year Book of International Affairs*, 1952, p. 254.
15. Shiv Dayal, *India's Role in the Korean Question*, p. 121.
16. Quoted in Ross N. Berkes & Mohinder S. Bedi, *The Diplomacy of India*, p. 112.
17. G.A.O.R. *Official Records*, Fifth Session, Committee I, p. 33.
18. *Ibid.*, Chapter III.

19. Lord Birdwood, *A Continent Decides*, p. 203.
20. L.K. Rosinger, *India and the United States*, p. 98.
21. Quoted in Karunakar Gupta, *Indian Foreign Policy in Defence of National Interest*, p. 55.
22. K.M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas*, p. 123.
23. J.C. Kundra, *Indian Foreign Policy 1947-54*, p. 57.

6

INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES AND INDIA'S NATIONAL INTEREST

Indo-China

ON the one hand, the Government of India intensely desired to bring about a change in the political system of the world by supporting all kinds of anti-colonial and anti-imperialistic movements, while on the other when faced with a real situation India supported the maintenance of status quo in the name of peace. The role of indifference that India played in Indo-China seemed to degenerate into the vortex of double standard when India refused to recognize Ho Chi Minh's Government and to extend effective help to it, especially before 1950. This was in sharp contrast to her attitude towards the Soekarno Government of Indonesia which was in a similar position in 1946-49. She had displayed a spectacular interest in championing the cause of the Indonesian people by taking it to the United Nations. She had also taken a number of other steps in favour of the Indonesian Republican Government. But the same treatment was not meted out to the Vietnamese struggle. Despite the fact that this, too, was a genuine case of a fight against imperialism, the Indian official reaction was only lukewarm. Moral support alone was forthcoming with no direct intervention. Such diversity of policy bordering on inconsistency clearly indicates that India had to moderate her principles to suit the situation, like any other State, in defence of national interest. No doubt, the early phase of India's concern in Vietnam (1945-49) was characterized by expressions of moral support for the Vietnamese struggle for freedom and strong, verbal condemnation of French and Western policy. The All India Congress Committee in the course of its various sessions passed a number of resolutions calling upon the colonial

Powers to take their hands out of the Asian countries and condemned the British intervention in Saigon during September 1945. The All India Congress Committee, which was meeting in Bombay at that time, passed a resolution stating that it viewed with anxiety the attempts that were being made to maintain the political and economic subjection of Burma, Malaya, Indo-China, and Indonesia. In December, the same Committee, meeting in Calcutta, passed another resolution declaring that "any support from any quarter to imperialist designs in Indonesia, Indo-China, and elsewhere, is resented throughout Asia..."¹ In March 1946, at its meeting in Bombay, it passed yet another resolution stating that "it had become urgent and necessary to end foreign domination over the countries of Asia and Africa and for foreign armies to be withdrawn from all such countries, and notably from Indonesia, Manchuria, Indo-China, Iran, and Egypt".² In October 1946 Nehru sent greetings to Ho Chi Minh and in December of that year he made it clear to France that the hearts of the Indians were with the people of Indo-China. The attempt to crush the spirit of freedom in Indo-China had deeply moved the Indian people. Though it was difficult for the Indians to know the facts of the conflict, one thing was patent that foreign armed forces were trying to crush Vietnam. Acharya J.B. Kripalani joined voice as the Congress President in pointing out to France the possible breaking out of a war worse than the last one unless the Asian people were granted freedom. But as the struggle moved on, the militant Indian advocacy gradually subsided.

The actual discrepancy lay in that, though in keeping with the spirit and letter of the declarations of the ruling party, the Indian Government took steps to help Vietnam, the assistance was clearly marked by a limitation in scope or had a loophole somewhere. Thus when in 1946 Ho Chi Minh sent a representative to Delhi for requesting active assistance the mission was but a partial success. Again, though India acted to control the flight of French aircraft over the Indian air space as she did with Dutch aircraft in the Indonesian case, the ban was not total and effective as in the latter case. Even at the Inter-Asian Relations Conference in March 1947 Ho Chi Minh's

Government was implicitly denied the right to speak for the whole of Vietnam with the allowance of the representation of other States like Cambodia and Laos and the plea of his representative for material aid and collective action went unheeded. In facing up to practical issues, the delicate question arose at the Conference whether or not active assistance should be given by the more powerful Asian States to their smaller neighbours struggling to be free. The issue was placed squarely before the Conference by the delegates from Vietnam who appealed for something more than the moral support which all were willing to give. This question was reiterated by both the Malayan and Indonesian delegates. The issue was of such significance that Pandit Nehru himself intervened with great earnestness, urging delegates to remember the dangers inseparable from rendering active assistance to national movements. The situation in Indo-China was very confused, and it was the path of wisdom to try to narrow the area of conflict, not to enlarge it. It was altogether unrealistic to expect India to intervene, for that was the way to bring about a world war. At the same time, however, delegates should know that the freedom movements in Vietnam and elsewhere would always have the whole-hearted moral support of India. "While Pandit Nehru's views were not accepted with unanimity they were decisive and the report contented itself with laying special emphasis on the necessity of every Asian Power withholding direct or indirect assistance to colonial Powers trying to keep any Asian country in subjection. It also recommended that non-indigenous minorities resident in any Asian country should whole-heartedly support and assist the freedom movement in the country of adoption".³ It is evident that India also declined Ho Chi-Minh's request in October 1947 for de jure recognition, as noted earlier, and for intervention on behalf of Vietnam in the United Nations. Mr Nehru, replying for India, said that while the Indian people were in sympathy with Vietnam's struggle for freedom, he did not see how the Indian Government could be expected to declare war on France. That, according to him, was not the way to proceed, and by such precipitate action they were likely to lose in the long run. Any wise government would try to limit the area of conflict. It would, however,

bring sufficient pressure to bear, but that could not obviously be done by a government in public meetings.

Though India advanced her Government's official policy and even legal arguments in support of her actions, her attitude was affected by other considerations which she was reluctant to emphasize in public, but which were widely discussed in India after 1950. Among these considerations, there were the emergence of China as a powerful and aggressive State, the Communist nature of Ho Chi Minh's regime and its close association with Communist China and the Soviet Union. This is explained by the fact that the strong condemnations of French colonialism which were so frequently made in 1945-46 were also heard less often afterwards. It can, in the meantime, be seen that though there was intense support for Ho Chi Minh in Indian public opinion, India preferred to maintain her stand in view of the Indian Communism itself deriving inspiration and strength out of the development. In Communist China a new rival to India emerged on the scene that began to assert its leadership of the anti-colonial movements in Asia. India's policy of containment stemmed from the fact that the Communist victory in China established a constitutional system that was basically incompatible to her own mode of living and foreign to her tradition and thinking. It was followed by India's anxiety to prevent China from helping Communist partners in South and South-East Asia. Hence the emergence of Red China has to a considerable extent dictated the Indian foreign policy-making that was oriented towards that end. Her leaders had not forgotten the statement of Lenin that the road from Moscow to Paris lay through Peking, Shanghai, and Calcutta. To begin with, a victory of Communism in Vietnam would be not only a victory for the Vietnamese Communists, but also a victory for Communist China and in the long run, an expansion of Chinese influence not only in Vietnam but throughout the Indo-Chinese peninsula. A victory of the Communist forces would affect India's position adversely, while a victory of the Nationalist forces would have the opposite effect. To a country like India, which was intensely anti-colonialist, and which favoured Nationalism rather than Communism, the Vietnamese imbroglio appeared highly complex.

Nationalism, Communism and Colonialism there were so intertwined that to support Nationalism without strengthening Colonialism or Communism demanded a refined sense of analysis and judgment on the part of India. Yet, in no small measure, India was successful in helping the forces of Nationalism in Vietnam without feeding the other two. Indeed, India's policy in regard to this country provides an example of how in spite of outward apparent aloofness, she has actually contributed to the fostering of national democratic elements in South-East Asia at the expense of Marxist crusades.

In regard to Indo-China, India pursued a policy of absolute non-interference. If there was any interference, it could at best be a theoretical one. While on the one hand, India was desirous that French colonialism should follow in the footsteps of the British for reasons better known, on the other she did not provide any support to the forces of Ho Chi Minh though earnestly requested wherein the roots of Communism were gaining ground in the guise of Nationalism. India did not like the idea of Indo-China providing a doorway to Communist China towards the South posing a threat to herself in the long run. Calling for a cease-fire in Indo-China Nehru had to say in a statement in the Lok Sabha on April 24, 1954: "We do not, for our part, seek any special role in Asia: nor do we champion any narrow and sectional Asian regionalism. We only seek to keep ourselves and others, particularly our neighbours, to a peace area and to a policy of non-alignment in world tensions and wars. We believe this is essential for our own sake and for enabling us to make our contribution to world peace. The present developments, however, have cast a deep shadow on our hopes; they impinge on our basic policies and seek to contain us in alignments. Peace to us is not just a fervent hope; it is an emergent necessity".⁴ So far as the internal pressures were concerned, India did not think it worthwhile to estrange the French authorities in view of the existence of French colonial possessions and interests in India that France was to hand over in a peaceful manner soon afterwards and in the same vein India did not judge it prudent to lose the goodwill of a third European Power immediately after that of the Dutch and the British in several

respects. As Nehru commented in his Pondicherry speech on January 16, 1955, that it was the civilized way of dealing with problems. The uncivilized way was that of war, even though the so-called advanced countries might fight. Thus, while Pondicherry might be a very small part of India, it had now become a symbol of friendly solution by negotiated settlement between nations. Mr Nehru's strong antipathy to French control over Indo-China as well as Morocco and Tunisia, might have been influenced by India's irritation at the reversal of French policy of withdrawal from the several French pockets in India, in the face of the complete British withdrawal from the mainland, as also relative weakness of the French, whom Mr Nehru refused to recognize among the world's four Big Powers. Anyway, he had declined to grant recognition to the Ho Chi-Minh regime on the ground that it was not in physical control of the whole territory like the Communist Government in China. But Indo-China was also supposed to be the key country of all South-East Asia with her fabulous riches in strategic materials and a Communist regime there might jeopardize the security of South-East Asia, by endangering the position of Malaya, Siam, and Burma. However, the expressed reason of India's refusal to recognize the Ho Chi Minh Government, that Mr Nehru was unwilling to risk judgment at this stage as to which regime had the support of the people, was not valid in the context of the Government of India's support to the Thakin Nu Government in Burma, when its control was limited to a few cities in the whole country in March 1949.

Malaya

In essence, India's advocacy of anti-colonialism has been relative to the degree to which her own national self interests demanded it under different circumstances that included a deliberate toleration of conservative forces and the acceptance of the status quo, if not explicit cooperation, sometimes even giving it an alien colour. Whereas in some outstanding cases, India's vociferous stand against imperialism has been the most forceful and unparalleled, in others the same voice has subsided down to a feeble whisper or there is a definite change in

tone. A conspicuous departure from her policy of vigorous anti-colonialism in South-East Asia was noticeable when the Indian Government adopted in regard to the movement in Malaya an attitude which sharply contrasted with its attitude in regard to the movement in Indo-China and Indonesia. Whereas the French and the Dutch were denounced in the strongest terms, there was no condemnation of the British. Moreover, the Indian Government did not press for an immediate independence of Malaya. "If in 1947, Mr Nehru was irritated by the delays of the Colonial Office and if he was annoyed by the fact that there was nobody with whom the Indian Government could deal but this Office, he saw no need to rush matters in regard to the emancipation of Malaya".⁵

India was well aware of the fact that the movement in Malaya was a Communist revolt led by the Chinese and was not the violent expressions of a Malay-frustrated Nationalist movement. India could only discard such terrorism that involved the Indian community as well and was inspired by the Communist Youth Congress of Calcutta held in February 1948 and the Telengana agitation. "India criticized the Malayan freedom movement in the strongest terms as sheer terrorism and in his speech in Singapore in June 1950 Nehru called Communism the enemy of nationalism. He also said that immediate British withdrawal from Malaya may lead to internal chaos and insecurity. This, however, did not mean the compromising of India's anti-colonial stand. In Malaya, the Communists alone were using terrorist methods and the evil of terrorism was patent to Nehru who had witnessed its manifestation in Telengana. Again Nehru hoped in the same speech that Malaya would be soon free. In Indo-China, Nehru did not accuse the Ho Chi Minh regime as terrorist but welcomed it as a national movement for liberation, though it was Communist-inspired, probably because Ho Chi Minh had a greater following in Indo-China and the revolt was more widespread".⁶ Furthermore, India wished to provide the British with a long rope in order to build up a new Malayan Nationalism in the absence of a bona fide Malay Nationalist movement owing to the pluralistic character of the Malay society, composed of three major and different races—Malayans, Chinese and

Indians. As such, prospects of communalism were rife in the colony which India had herself experienced while the other countries of racial origin could at the same time be interested in the affairs of Malaya leading to conflict of interests. Hence, the organisation of an indigenous force and a leadership capable of taking over the reins of power from Britain, and of institutions well-equipped to meet the pluralist problems of Malaya were bound to precede any measure of her freedom lest the freedom gained itself be allowed to disrupt soon afterwards. Red China's expanding zone of influence had to be checked and the ambition of Chinese-dominated Malay Communist Party needed to be countered by the installation of a National Republic. All these put together could be feasible only through a measured process calling for a considerable period of time as corroborated by the Indian stand for a gradual advance towards Malayan independence. Meanwhile, the country had to be governed, economic stability and prosperity maintained and the law and order preserved. India could not expect the British to take leave of the land at such a critical juncture when vital issues awaited solution and a total and peaceful image of the country was yet to emerge. Last but not the least, from the geo-political point of view, the control of Malaya-Singapore region together with its economic potentialities by a Power hostile to India would throw out a serious threat to India's security as it is always involved in South-East Asia for it was from this base that the Japanese had landed their forces towards the borders of India in World War II. For this strategic reason, it is natural to expect that India could not relish the idea of seeing it fall into unfriendly hands. In other words, a National Government, well-disposed towards India, ought to have been formed, however delayed that might come. Still another point was the strategic position of Malaya and Singapore in the defence of the Indian Ocean. As India was the champion of Asia against Western colonialism, she was also potentially a maritime power, according to Sardar K.M. Panikkar's concept, and therefore her leaders might wish to cast her lot in with the Commonwealth and support the British colonialism in Malaya. With a depleted Indian Navy after the Partition, the Indian Ocean that was once considered to be a

"British Lake" still needed the protection from its former controlling power in the East when the world naval supremacy of Great Britain had not dwindled to the point it had done in other fields of English life after World War II. And all these necessities of the body-politic together account for the Indian understanding for British policy and cooperation with the British authorities. Hence also the support for Malay independence tempered by the desire to see this act accomplished in an orderly manner while, at the same instance, sympathizing and furthering the cause of the Malay Government.

Mr Nehru, no doubt, was in favour of Malayan independence, and he knew also that, sooner or later, this would come. But at the same time, he was also in favour of Malaya remaining in the Commonwealth and thus retaining her close connexion with Great Britain. Restraining her tone, India was satisfied with a Dominion status for the Malaysians as still being within the Sterling Area. India's dollar reserves in the Bank of England would have been uncomfortably depleted in the event of an early Malayan freedom and as a result of Malaya's coming out of the Commonwealth. Therefore, India wanted the existing scheme of things to continue when Mr Nehru said in a Singapore speech, as referred above, in June 1950 that immediate British withdrawal might lead to internal chaos and insecurity. Besides this, in consequence of the anti-social activities of the Communists, the production of rubber and tin in Malaya was hard hit that formed the main dollar earning products of the Sterling Area of which again India was a member. The prosperity and stability of Malaya were indispensable to India in that the extension of protection to the Indian immigrants followed by the defence of their interests had to be effected (but only within the limits of what the Indian Government considered to be legitimate) which required the maintenance of racial harmony as well. India made a representation to the United Kingdom Government in July 1948 through her High Commissioner in London that along with the measures to check terrorist and other unlawful activities in Malaya, some measures to improve the conditions of Indian labourers should be introduced, so as to curb effectively their tendency to participate in subversive activities, which were then on the

increase among the Chinese-controlled labour unions in Malaya. This emanated from the fact that the elimination of want, disease and illiteracy, as one of the root causes of war, formed a basic factor in India's foreign policy for the miserable parts and people of the world proved a fertile ground for Communism to foster. As is well known, Mr Nehru had not merely condemned the Malayan liberation movement as vilest terrorism in words, but also had lent help to the British by allowing the transit of Gurkha mercenaries from Nepal to crush that movement. Though this policy had been criticized by the Opposition in Parliament as subservience to British Imperialism, there was more than one reason for Mr Nehru to help the British in Malaya out of self-interest. As Mr Nehru pointed out in Parliament, stoppage of transit to Gurkha recruits to Malaya would mean collapse of the Nepalese economy. But Mr Nehru did not extend his argument to say that a collapse of the Nepalese economy might well set off a series of chain reactions culminating into a Communist uprising in Nepal endangering India's security. Another point of Mr Nehru's interest in the maintenance of British control over Malaya, as observed elsewhere, might be that he had a finger in the Malayan dollar pie, through the Sterling Area dollar pool. To add to this, the economic relations between India and Malaya were found to be more than intimate. The Indians had large shares in the economic development of the country and as strategically located, Malaya was an earner of hard currency for the Sterling Area on the strength of which India had a big stake in the post-war period. Moreover, Malaya was a great centre of entrepot trade through which the various products of the countries of the Eastern hemisphere and other continents including the Indian peninsula passed in and out. Hence the trade factor that Malaya represented was all the more important as India was anxious to develop her economy at a rapid pace, and was becoming more interested in her neighbouring countries as markets for her products.

It may here be asserted that though throughout these two cases Indian anti-colonialism receded to the background, India in fact did not support the imperialistic forces. What she was caught up with was only the time factor that has found a unique

place in the history of modern Indian diplomacy as in that of any other successful one. In this context, her legacies of British policy and diplomacy could not also be ruled out. So it cannot be said that she advertently stood for the perpetuation of colonialism in utter disregard of her avowed policy of active opposition to it. For the foreign policy of a country is a relative and elastic phenomenon. It has remained dynamic and subject to swift changes in the internal and external spheres. If a government is vehemently supporting a cause at a time, the very next day one may find it denouncing its own previous stand with equal vehemence whenever the national self-interests demand it that way. It cannot afford to stick to a chosen position all the time. That would only amount to sheer foolhardy and lack of foresight. But whatever varied policies a country may be inclined to adopt in the course of her international life, all her actions would emanate from, revolve around and end up in the edifice of national self-interest. There is little of permanent value in the functioning of a full-fledged State diplomacy excepting its basic features while different circumstances presuppose the employment of different instruments. One could not have preferred to overlook the stark realities for the sake of reckoning its possession of an idealism. A true idealism is but the realism of the morrow. "Now, foreign policy is normally something which develops gradually. Apart from certain theoretical propositions we may lay down, it is a thing which, if it is real, has some relation to actuality and not merely to pure theory. Therefore, we cannot precisely lay down our general outlook or general approach, but gradually it develops".⁷ After all, India was eager to see these countries gain their independence, but what was involved was that in the immediate national interests of India it was not desirable that they should be set free forthwith. What India resented was the interplay of three forces of Colonialism, Nationalism, and Communism the last of which sometimes came to the fore in the guise of the second. Thus, had the struggle involved only the first two forces in the absence of Communism India would have certainly intervened with matching vigour that she applied in other international issues, both within and without the United Nations. India, in all seriousness, asked

cable settlement in favour of one of them was something long overdue.

India's attachment to the sentiment of Asian solidarity remained platonic. Her support to this idea was rooted in national self-interest on all occasions as in any other. If the attempts of the Super-Powers to enter the Asian scene were opposed, it was because India wanted to maintain in Asia the natural post-colonial balance of power. Any intrusion which would disturb this balance in favour of the other Asian country receiving the patronage of a super-power was resented. She sought to promote a neutral, peaceful, free Asia in which, if foreign patronage was eliminated, India would automatically acquire an important place by virtue of her geographical position and economic potential. Her preference for Nationalism to Communism also springs from the fact that the latter would dispute her dynamic role in Asia with the former reinforcing her own nationalism. "Asianism is a kind of Monroe Doctrine to keep Asia free from the evils of power conflict. It will enable Asia to develop herself freely. And since India's destiny is tied with Asia, peace in Asia is bound to promote peace in India".⁹ The Government of India had stronger objection to regional pacts in Asia than elsewhere because these pacts would tend to upset the natural balance of power in Asia against India. As Nehru made it explicit on one occasion, India was compelled by circumstances to give expression to the natural urge of history and geography in regard to her antipathy towards isolationism in Asia. Obviously, it was not an ideal but a compulsion. It would be wrong, therefore, to attribute only idealism to India's support for Asian solidarity. India's effort to promote freedom movements in Asia was hence more moral than material. Even in the case of Indonesia where India was ostensibly said to have provided material assistance, the actual contribution in the real sense of the term was meagre. India, there too, did not despatch any substantial materials inside the territory itself for that would come nearer to intervention. She was contented with a few instances of external and indirect help. The mere exercise in the disallowance of the flights of an airway and the romantic feats like that of the Indonesian leaders being flown into

India by Mr Biju Patnaik of Orissa could not have amounted to sustained and active support on the spot as compared to other historical anecdotes. This was, by all means, not in consonance with her conspicuous representation in the United Nations and elsewhere in regard to the Dutch atrocities. For the steps taken by her did not decidedly hamper the field operations of the Netherlands Government and the fighting capabilities of the Indonesian Republicans themselves were not enhanced. It was still open to the KLM airlines to touch down at any other airport in the East, and the restriction imposed upon it over the Indian air space did not prove to be of vital strategic significance as it was intended to be. In fact, the greater part of her material support to other countries was of rather a humanitarian character. The Indian Navy, too, had not inherited the prowess of "Brittania rules the waves" and was unprepared to intercept the Western cruisers in the Indian Ocean. As such, a good number of outlets were yet accessible to the Dutch people either on their own account or through vicarious responsibilities. So even in those cases where India was said to have enlisted material support, it was superfluous. Thus again wherever the question of mutual assistance and cooperation among the Asian nations in times of national crisis came up, India exclusively made her influence felt on the side of moderation and shirked from the translation of the pledges offered. For the satisfaction of her objectives, she worked up the Asian sentiments to be favourable while at the same time avoiding any explicit commitment or entanglement in and around the region.

India's vocal pleading was seldom backed by tangible and decisive action and this only subscribes to the view that the prevailing world opinion as reflected through the United Nations and in her favour as a young nation was alone essential for her and deemed adequate to meet the aspirations of the Indian people. That India be expected to supply military personnel was still a far cry. "One of the first acts of Nehru's Interim Government under Lord Mountbatten in 1946 was to recall the Indian armed forces from the South-East Asian countries where they had been despatched by the British authorities to suppress the national liberation move-

ments in the interests of the ex-Colonial Powers".¹⁰ Notwithstanding her political wisdom of not feeding the flames of war, the shyness for going headlong with open arms to the rescue of another sister colony was an index to her own frailties in the several aspects of domestic life. It is evident that India could not have provided the necessary assistance even if she physically wanted to but at her own cost. The estranged relations with Pakistan and the confrontation over Kashmir engaged from the very inception whatever troops she could muster and so she had to console the outside world by disclosing that the Indian armed forces were specifically prepared for guarding the home frontiers only. On the other hand, the benevolence of moral support was readily available at all times and everywhere irrespective of ideology because she had little to lose from that in her territorial integrity and security. On the contrary it went to pacify the rousing public opinion in India that was very often in wide disagreement with the official version in several of the cases of international concern. It no less acted as a restraint upon the Powers involved from running amuck and beyond the limits through the pressure of world opinion. Eventually, moral support was in the spirit of her policy and in the process would go to evaluate, its basic tenets. Had she no territorial ambitions of her own, like *Lebensraum*, she had at least one in order to consolidate what she already possessed as a subcontinent and to be a leading force in Asia though very often acting in a self-denying manner. For this very initiative, she talked loud of the virtues of Asianism but never encouraged the idea to take the shape of a regional organization as accepted by the U.N. Charter. Her unilateral conviction was invariably vivid in all of the diplomatic gatherings she called or attended including the Baguio Conference convened by the Philippines Government from May 26 to 31, 1950. India had accepted to come to the Baguio Conference in order to thwart any plan of military or political lining up of South-East Asian countries against Communism, and especially against Communist China. She could not agree to the idea of forming "an anti-Communist pact in the Far East". According to Mr Nathaniel Peffer ("Regional Security in South-East Asia", *International Organization*,

May 1954) in rejecting the proposed Pacific Pact, India stated that such alliances would retard the chances of reducing world tension, that an anti-Communist bloc by itself was no answer to Asia's problems, that Asian countries were to frame economic and political policies to face the challenge and that the emphasis would have to be on economic rather than the military solution of the problems. She had earlier rejected an Australian attempt to form a Pacific Pact. While Australia was ready to go it alone with the United States, the ultimate outcome was the formation of the Colombo Plan and the ANZUS respectively, Mr Werner Levi writes, with British insistence on Indian participation and India's insistence on the non-military aspect of cooperation. An Asian pact would have, by its very nature, stood in the way of her hope for acquiring the hegemony of this part of the world, and the release of material support foreshadowed the advent of alliances, political and military, as its normal culmination. To wit, the popularization of a private cause has been one of the fruitful devices of international diplomacy. In liaison with this pattern, it is exhorted that Indian anti-imperialism coupled with anti-racialism as the fundamentals of the foreign policy could not have been the all-time features of the same although the national sentiments of the repulsive image of the status quo seekers are to withstand the test of time for the fact of their being cast on the anvil of bleak suffering and humiliation and ingrained into the subconscious of the Indian psychology—assuaged by the teachings of their great mentor, Mahatma Gandhi.

The subject of the economic development of Asia was also thoroughly discussed in the Inter-Asian Relations Conference that was held in New Delhi from March 23 to April 2, 1947. Since the smaller countries could not hope to carry through industrialization from their own resources, they favoured strongly a South-East Asian or even a continental bloc. Both the delegates from Ceylon and from other countries, including India, expressed great misgivings about dollar imperialism, and stated that they did not wish to shake off a political master only to be subjected to an economic master. Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia and Malaya, however, expressed equal mistrust of Indian and Chinese penetration and this subject once raised

was a recurrent feature of the Conference. No sooner was Western exploitation denounced than fears emerged of a more stringent Indian and Chinese economic stranglehold once it had gone. When opinion within the group appeared to be crystallizing in favour of the South-East Asian or even an Asian bloc, a leading Indian delegate intervened. Industrialization, he said, was the only means of raising the standard of living. For that, India and other countries must have a planned economy but it was madness to think in terms of an economic bloc of Asia. Such a concept was neither desirable nor practicable; it would lead to conflict with the West, it would mean "putting a rope around our own necks". There was no reality in this sharp division between continents and, waving his hand in the direction of the Soviet and Palestinian delegates, he asked, "to which continent do these gentlemen belong? Are they Asians or Europeans?" But he agreed that the Asian countries should have nothing further to do economically either with the imperialism "that was retreating" or with the imperialism "that was advancing behind dollar loans". From this last point, the Chinese implicitly dissented. Provided that the loans were negotiated on satisfactory terms and did not give a foreign country any economic stranglehold, they maintained there was no valid objection to it.

The same point of view emerged from the discussions on the racial question. There was a pronounced sentimental feeling for Asian unity but once the general principles, on which it was easy to reach agreement, were disposed of, there emerged more and more clearly great mistrust of Indian and Chinese expansion in South-East Asia. It was in the final discussion on the racial question that a formal resolution was proposed by an Azerbaijan delegate to the effect that no Asian country should permit discrimination on grounds of race. This resolution which evoked much sympathy was debarred on procedural grounds. It is worth recording also that the group of Racial Problems felt that each country had a right and must necessarily retain the right of determining its own immigration policy. This view, which was accepted in the light of the formidable problems confronting the smaller South-East Asian countries, carried implications for the "White Australia"

policy which did not fail to elicit comment in the Press. In a sense the views recorded by the group undoubtedly provided a not ineffective answer to Asians who challenged this policy on grounds of equity. On the other hand, it was clear that the Conference itself had not in mind exclusion on a strictly racial basis.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. N.V. Raj Kumar, *Background of India's Foreign Policy*, p. 90.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
3. Nicholas Mansergh, *The Asian Conference on International Affairs*, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, July 1947, p. 300.
4. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 398.
5. Ton That Thien, *India and South-East Asia, 1947-60*, p. 242.
6. Satyavrata Ramdas Patel, *Foreign Policy of India—An Enquiry and Criticism*, p. 84.
7. Jawaharlal Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
8. K.P. Karunakaran (Ed.), *Outside The Contest*, p. 88.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
10. Karunakar Gupta, *Indian Foreign Policy In Defence of National Interest*, p. 75.

7

HUMAN RIGHTS

THE United Nations resolutions on Human Rights and Genocide got tremendous backing of India but India's fundamental policy in 1947 was to divide the subcontinent into two independent States on the alleged ground of different nationalities based on religion. With regard to the Non-Self-Governing Territories, the General Assembly had adopted a Standard Form on Information to be transmitted under Article 73 on November 3, 1947. In that Form, information on human rights was left in the optional category. In 1949 only two Administering Members—the United States of America and Denmark—gave information on the optional part. The Assembly adopted a resolution on this question at its fourth session that received unflinching support from India. It invited the Administering Members to give information on human rights, amongst the matters in the optional category. The Assembly further recommended that in the case of the revision of Standard Form, general information sought in the optional part should become compulsory. Thus the General Assembly first emphasized the importance of human rights in regard to non-self-governing territories in 1949. This principle was further developed in 1950. At the fifth session of the Assembly, the delegations of Haiti, Mexico, the Philippines, and Syria jointly sponsored a draft resolution. This draft resolution invited the Administering Members "to include . . . a summary of the extent to which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is implemented in the Non-Self-Governing Territories under their administration" and authorized the Special Committee "to make such recommendations as it may deem desirable relating to the application in Non-Self-Governing Territories of the principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights".¹ This draft resolution would make the Universal Declaration of Human Rights more important for the depend-

ent peoples residing in these territories. And it would confer upon the Special Committee a specific right to study the question of human rights in these territories. This draft resolution was adopted with slight amendments despite the criticisms from the Administering Members. It referred, in the preamble, to the Assembly decision to delete the colonial clause from the Draft Covenants on Human Rights. It invited the Administering Members to give information on the implementation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and empowered the Special Committee to make recommendations thereon to the Assembly. This resolution 446(V) of December 12, 1950, was directed to make human rights in the non-self-governing territories a subject of international scrutiny and supervision.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was made, by implication, for the inhabitants of these territories a law created by a treaty. The General Assembly thus aimed at implementation of this Universal Declaration in these territories even before the completion of the implementation programme for human rights. The General Assembly took a further step in 1951. That year was fixed for revision of the Standard Form of Information to be transmitted under Article 73e. The original Form left the information on human rights in the optional category. The next move was to include this information in the compulsory part on the basis of the Assembly resolution 327 (IV). The revised provision sought information as to the way in which the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were protected by law in these territories. The non-administering Powers including India gave general support to this revised Form. They claimed that the protection of human rights was a condition of social development in these territories. The information on this would complete the picture of new social patterns in these areas. They further claimed that the attainment of the ideals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in these territories was a concern for all. The Universal Declaration, as an interpretation of the Charter, was applicable even before the Covenant was signed. They claimed that the Administering Members were bound to inform on human rights under Article 73e. Otherwise, these Members would expose themselves to public

suspicion and criticism. The General Assembly also made several recommendations for the promotion of human rights in the Trust Territories and received acclamation from India. This initiative of the Assembly strengthened the cause of human rights for trust peoples. The Assembly recommended the abolition of corporal punishment, the absolute prohibition of such uncivilized practices as child marriage, the abolition of discriminating laws and practices contrary to the principles of the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreements. In particular the Assembly declared formally that this discrimination on racial grounds as regards educational facilities available to the different communities in the trust territories was not in accordance with the principles of the Charter, the Trusteeship Agreements and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In fact, India has remained one of the most interested Members of the United Nations in the various activities of the latter in connexion with the furtherance of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms culminating in the historic Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on December 10, 1948. If India has adhered to the principles of the Charter, it is in this context that her faith and collaboration with the world body as a welfare institution have been manifested the most while India was found determined to re-orient her own policies towards this sphere. She sincerely affirmed the inner value of the statement that international conflicts have their origin in the violation of human rights. One can fairly assume that India, no less than the United States, is committed to the general proposition once expressed by Secretary of State Marshall to the General Assembly, that "systematic and deliberate denials of basic human rights lay at the root of most of the world's troubles, and threatened the work of the United Nations".² In her limited capacity India has played a memorable role in the various sessions of the organs of the U.N.O. and lent her services in the commissions and committees with regard to these matters and thus has contributed her mite in the direction of the extension of these privileges to more and more individuals of the world. India's behaviour in the United Nations had been particularly marked by a tendency to invoke the organization as an instrument for

the advancement of certain causes, most of which she had insistently brought forward in terms of highly moral considerations. In this regard, India had represented a strong and vigilant dedication to the objectives of "freedom" and "human rights", a dedication that had been expressed largely in the obsessive-compulsive nature of India's response to colonialism and racial discrimination. In such matters as these, India addressed herself to the conscience of mankind, and to men of goodwill able to see the right and willing to stand forth on her behalf. During the seventh session of the General Assembly in October 1952, the Commission on Human Rights (in connexion with the Covenants on Human Rights) recommended that the Assembly adopt a resolution on self-determination, proposed by India. It opened with the statement that "slavery exists where an alien people hold power over the destiny of a people", and recommended that administering Powers grant the right of self-determination "on a demand for self-government (by a dependent people) the popular wish being ascertained in particular through a plebiscite held under the auspices of the United Nations".³ The objection raised by several delegates that such a plebiscite might not always be the best method of procedure and leeway should, therefore, be permitted for other measures did not convince the majority. The resolution was sent on to the General Assembly by the Economic and Social Council, after a heated argument repeating the opinions already expressed in the Commission.

In the long, perplexing effort to bring forth a United Nations convention on human rights—in itself a remarkable tribute to the vitality of the myth of a totalitarian and an anti-totalitarian community of interest—the really contentious issues have not been numerous; perhaps there have been half a dozen. If that is a reasonable estimate, it can be stated that India has played an active chief-partisan role in two-thirds of them: (1) the single vs the double convention dispute; (2) the self-determination article quarrel; (3) the Colonial clause disagreement; and (4) the federal clause issue. "With the exception of the fourth, in which India has shown considerable skill in patiently, if unsuccessfully, advising the United States on American constitutional law, there has been a close

relationship between India's vigorous pursuit of a position and advancement of the cardinal principles of Indian foreign policy. The dispute on the single vs the double convention related to the issue of whether there should be one all-inclusive convention declaratory of all rights, or whether there should be two: the one on political rights, and the other on economic, social, and cultural rights. India's advocacy of the latter approach has been, in fact, the consequence of firm convictions both on the primacy of political rights and on their superior justiciability".⁴ The Indian memorandum to the Human Rights Commission, dated February 21, 1951, argued its opposition to the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights in the then-current proposition for a convention on the grounds that "financially weak countries where these rights are not justiciable will not be in a position to implement them". (E/CN 4/515/Add. 14, March 19, 1951.) Yet it might be added that in the Committee debates during the Sixth Session, there was no serious effort to answer a Latin American delegate when he asked whether it was really easier to implement the article on racial discrimination. It remained for Father D'Souza to represent the fuller views of the Indian delegation, and who in the course of the following remarks seemed to express an axiomatic rationale for the Indian focus on the primacy of political egalitarianism. The Father asserted that in putting the political and civil rights first, India implied not only that those civil and political rights were of their nature capable of receiving an exact expression which would facilitate enforcement by law. Not only did India imply that it was not possible to give to the more difficult and less tangible elements of the social and economic rights a similar expression to facilitate enforcement. He would go further. . .and say that according to the Indian way of looking at life, liberty, and society, it was by the exercise of those civil, political, and individual fundamental rights that the improvement of social, cultural, and economic standards could take place.⁵

India's actual participation in Human Rights legislation dates back to the very first San Francisco Conference in 1945 (Third Plenary Session, April 28) when her chief delegate, Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, probably for the first time, made a

forceful introduction of this aspect of the U.N. structure when he, laying due emphasis upon its all-time importance, said: "Those rights are incapable of segregation or of isolation. There is neither border nor breed nor colour nor creed on which those rights can be separated as between beings and beings. And speaking as an Asiatic, may I say that this is an aspect of the question which can never be forgotten, and if we are laying the foundations for peace we can only lay them truly and justly, to last for some time—for a couple of generations at least. Those fundamental human rights of all beings all over the world should be recognized, and men and women treated as equals in every sphere, so far as opportunities are concerned".⁶ A long time victim of colour distinction and suppression of fundamental rights herself, as the vagaries content in a European colonialism, the policy of struggle against racial discrimination was a natural corollary of her national experience that found expression in freedom and went to form a vital factor of her independent policy. India's apathy for racialism (as is too publicized to be wanting in elaboration) first ventilated itself in her championship of the Treatment of the Persons of Indian Origin in the Union of South Africa, in the United Nations from 1946 onwards that has remained a prominent issue with her for years together and about which more than necessary have been written and discussed. The Indo-South African dispute along with Pakistan was also the first Commonwealth conflict on human rights, which came before the General Assembly in June 1946, and offered the Assembly its first opportunity to interpret the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter. Having ended racialism and discrimination at home by recourse to constitutional remedies and otherwise, India went to emancipate her people in South Africa who were still deprived of the achievements of the mother country. This was the country again that had been the major source of inspiration for India in formulating her policy in that the Father of the Nation had initially suffered humiliation there and initiated the struggle. India preferred to enter the arena of the Family of Nations as well as the United Nations with the policy of anti-colonialism and even then the novel companion of this policy she took up was fight against racial discrimina-

tion. This event goes to amplify the rapid and profound stress which India laid upon her actions in order to ensure Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to those still denied, through the good offices of the United Nations. This factor also accounts for the adequate guarantees that India made in her new Constitution of 1950 for fundamental rights and freedoms irrespective of race, colour, caste, creed, sex or religion of the Indian people and the proper respect for the dignity of the common man followed by the abolition of special privileges in concrete consonance with the spirit and letter of the U.N. Charter. But how far all these liberal enactments have been conducive to the welfare of her own population is another question.

Besides India's crucial role in the U.N. legislation, the Indian delegate to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Mrs Hansa Mehta, made a statement at the last meeting of that session on June 22, 1948, urging that the individuals should be able to take their complaints to the United Nations Organization. She said that the United Nations had received a large number of representations from individuals and organizations regarding the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. There was a demand, therefore, for an organization to deal with these petitions not necessarily judicially but in a spirit of conciliation. It was this consideration which had moved the working group at Geneva (of which Mrs Mehta was the Chairman) to put forward the preceding December a scheme to deal with them judicially by tribunal and extra-judicially through a standing committee. The tribunal was not viewed with favour and the standing committee was considered a not unsatisfactory solution, she added. Mrs Mehta realized the difficulties in the way of dealing with representations from individuals. They would not always be reliable, and might be malicious or even frivolous. But it would not be difficult to weed out such petitions. The committee would not be a judicial committee but a conciliation committee. In spite of these apparent difficulties, the right to petition the United Nations should not be denied to the individuals.⁷ Several such efforts on the part of India to materialize the advancement of individual liberty bear witness to her dedicatedness. Though

found progressive and laudable in the case of the Mehta proposal, the Indian public opinion expressed doubt about its innate workability as a leading Indian daily wrote:

“Seeing what a mess the United Nations has made of the urgent problems posed before it, one wonders why the Indian delegate to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Mrs Hansa Mehta, wants provision to be made for hearing by an appropriate committee of individual complaints against violation of human rights. She thinks that the proceedings need not necessarily be of a judicial nature but in a spirit of conciliation, and feels that the scheme to this end put forward in December last at Geneva by the Working Group of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights should be put into effect. The Good Offices Committee of the Security Council has been seeking agreement for five long months in Indonesia. And the omens are scarcely more propitious for a successful conciliation committee of the nature envisaged by Mrs Mehta though there will be a lot of sympathy with her general claim that “the right to petition the United Nations should not be denied to individuals”.⁸

Again, Mr A.D. Mani of India said at the meeting of the Social Committee on October 24, 1952, that peace or war depended on the extent of freedom of information in the world. If peace was to be properly secured, it must be on the basis of freedom of information readily available to all, he said. It could be stated without exaggeration that freedom of information was as important as the control of the atomic weapon or the reduction of armed forces of the nations. If the nations were to base peace on secure foundations, it was essential that they ensured that information was available on all subjects to the millions of people in the world, that men spoke, talked and wrote freely so that their minds might be made known. Mr Mani said that his delegation considered a convention on freedom of information he suggested that the Committee should have a full discussion on freedom of information. He also suggested that the draft convention on freedom of information, drawn up by a United Nations Committee in 1951, be opened for signature along with the convention on international transmission of news and the right to correction. The Indian delegate said

the Social Committee might recommend the draft code of ethics drawn up by the Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information to professional organizations for their consideration and expressed the hope that an international professional conference might be held as speedily as possible to draw up an international code of ethics.⁹

Practice At Home

Thus, from the above discussion, there are no reservations as to the place of India in the annals of the United Nations legislation on Human Rights as well as in the relevant international affairs, at large. But when it came to her own internal affairs, the picture presented by India in this sphere was somewhat different and not coming nearer to a reasonable pursuit. She was found failing to apply in her own case what she had so far been asking others to fulfil. Being herself a multi-racial and multi-religious nation, supported by the caste system, she realized that it was not feasible to satisfy the aspirations of a large number of social and ethnic interests in equal measure and at the same time. A heterogeneous complex, the Indian nation with fewer economic guarantees did not prove a fertile ground for the implementation of the U.N. Human Rights ideals in the face of an insoluble variety of the typical problems. The adoption of measures in this connexion by the United Nations itself could not have been made but in overall anticipation of the optimum manifestation of its economic aspect and active support for the material emancipation of underdeveloped areas of the world. The proper application and fruition of the ingredients of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms presupposed the existence of a sound economy coupled with communal harmony that India lacked. That India sought to bring about the realization of the spirit of human rights to her people was evident from the following statement of the Planning Commission with regard to the objective of the First Five Year Plan. "The central objective of planning in India at the present stage is to initiate a process of development which will raise living standards and open out to the peoples new opportunities for a richer and more

varied life".¹⁰ But the Plan was yet to be formulated as an instrument to bring home to those governed the meaningfulness of their aspirations. For the immediate period, even the bare necessities of a humble life were denied to a major section of the Indian society while a volley of disruptive internal forces were let loose in the transitional aftermath. As such, though calling for unity and integrity, India on the other hand, could not help but accept the Two-Nation Theory of Mohammed Ali Jinnah that led to the deplorable Partition in August 1947. The policy that India moulded was to bring about an artificial division of the country on the basis of separate religious nationalities when the Hindus and the Muslims were conceived as constituting two different nations. This stood in clear contrast to the cherished human values the contribution of India to which had not been negligible. To verify, if a nation implied "a historically evolved stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture", the Muslims of India could not be termed as one nation as they did not represent a community in every respect. Hence the plea to base nationality upon religion has been untenable and out of the question. As Mr R. Palme Dutt observed : "It is obvious that this attempt to base nationality on religion (together with the degree of common culture associated with religion) runs contrary to every accepted historical and international experience of the character of a nation".¹¹ This starting point was of serious political import and would lead to the logical conclusion that the Muslims constituted a single nation wherever they might be in and outside the subcontinent. Therefore, even if the possibility of intermingling the Hindus and Muslims into a compact unit in every region of India was there intact, the attitude of India towards the solution of the final phase of transfer of power was but an implicit affirmation of the practice of racial discrimination regarding which India had only the other day created such a hue and cry in the international sphere. Probably Field Marshal Jan Smuts could have been correct in his assessment when he called upon the Indian delegate amidst a General Assembly debate in 1946 to end up racial discrimination in her own home prior to coming to the rescue of the South

African Indians. India, with her faith in internationalism and encouragement for one World Federation, was in reality interested in the disintegration of her traditional forces and geographical entity in order to compensate the vested interests of a selected hierarchy when the fragmentation of the Globe cannot be accepted as a step towards the common goal.

India, contrary to her established doctrines and virtues, consciously encouraged and aided unprogressive ideas at home and was very often a mute observer of the violation of those tenets upon which the framework of Human Rights is based. The Partition, in its wake, once more brought incalculable hardships to the millions of Indians when, once for a while, the respect for the dignity of the common man was a fiction and when people were deprived of their basic rights, property and other privileges as the minority communities suffered in the respective Dominions. It could also be asserted that India, as any other country, believed in the extension of human rights to her people in so far as it could withstand the onslaughts of the new force, i.e., Communism, the latter most of the time filling the void created by the absence of these rights. In this way, the ideals of the U.N.O. indifferently served as the instruments of national policy as well. While many of the U.N. members were sceptical about the total application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Draft Covenants afterwards, lest they might, in the long run, challenge their very sovereign status, some others were contemplating how best to make the Charter provisions solve their own immediate problems. Though the needs of the Indian people were one of the highest, the translation of the U.N. recommendations was not feasible on purely humanitarian grounds. Furthermore, the advancement of human rights depended upon the pattern of government and its degree of consistency with the national self-interests of a particular country. In so far it was a dynamic process, it was relative, too. Its application was equally determined by the extent to which it did not stand in the way of the exercise of national sovereignty. Much again was decided by the controversy it gave rise to between International Law and Municipal Law with a tendency towards the liquidation of the State structure itself.

As noted elsewhere, India also supported the creation of the State of Israel in spite of the fact that millions of Arab Muslim refugees had to suffer because of the Partition. In course of her initial stand in the United Nations on the question of Palestine India had stood against the partition of the country and the erection of an independent Israel State. But she changed her attitude when the interplay of power-politics made Israel a reality at the termination of the war and accepted it as a new force in the Middle East in the face of an unwilling majority of the Arabs. India took for granted the plight of the Arabs in the act of submitting to the carving of a new State out of the Arab homeland. So India, here too, could not pay due regard to the fundamental rights and national dignity of the victims when the same were being tampered with, as these did not suit her private purposes in the particular circumstances. She was not in a position to assert and appreciate the fact that Israel had come to exist at the overwhelming cost of the Arab nations. With her undaunted pro-Arab policy, the recognition of Israel on the part of India was tantamount to her affirmation of the potentialities of power-politics. "If inconsistency is involved, one should be content to rest such a finding on the evidence that while, on the one hand, no Power quite excels India in its determination to have the United Nations take up and do something about moral issues in the colonial world, on the other hand, no Power quite approaches India in its reluctance to pursue the same issues when they are part of the Great Power rivalry".¹² This departure resulted in the deviation from those promises with which India had obliged herself under the U.N. Charter as the satisfactory implementation of the Human Rights programme could not be treated in isolation. In fact, the insistence attributable to India as to the individual being a subject of International Law springs from the truth that having an overpopulated, underdeveloped economy, human life in India is indubitably one of these with the lowest value in the world where people, unemployed and uncared for, died of ill-nourishment and frustration. This tragedy is also carried by the record of Indians overseas being one of the largest number in the various countries for a long time in history.

Indians Overseas

Though India, in fact, did not want to steal the limelight in the beginning of her career at the United Nations, she did so at least for the sake of presenting to the world her dynamic policy in the field of major discrimination practised regarding race and colonialism. Thus India, in doing so, was at the same time upholding those provisions of the U.N. Charter that are quite expressive about Universal Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Charter categorically lays down under Article 1(3) as one of the purposes of the United Nations, to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Pandit Nehru said in the U.N. General Assembly in Paris on November 3, 1948, that he did not think it needed to dwell upon any particular aspect of the question of racial equality but he reminded that Assembly of the world-wide aspects of the question. Obviously there were large regions of the world which had suffered from racial inequality. If racial inequality was practised, if it was a menace to world peace and violated the Principles of the United Nations Charter, to tolerate it was obviously to sow the seeds of conflict. Again, the facts are adequately supported by the body of resolutions passed by the Indian National Congress to that effect. The Indian National Congress passed the first resolution on the Indians overseas with reference to South Africa in 1894. Since then passing of resolutions for the removal of the grievances of Indians overseas commonly marked Indian National Congress sessions.

At a later date, the Indian National Congress at its Jaipur session in December, 1948, announced that it "has noted with deep regret that the Government of the Union of South Africa continues to treat its Indian citizens in disregard of acknowledged human rights and of the principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations. That Government has ignored the wishes of the General Assembly of the United Nations and even challenged the fundamental principles on which the

United Nations Organization is founded. This repudiation of a vital principle, if persisted in, can only lead to bitter and far-reaching racial conflicts and may even result in the break-up of the United Nations Organization. . . .The Congress expresses its full sympathy with all those who have suffered by the policy of racial discrimination of the Government of the Union of South Africa".¹³ Afterwards, the Foreign Relations Department of the Indian National Congress conveyed on September 21, 1950, to Mr Trygve Lie, the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization, the necessity for action on the resolutions passed at hundreds of meetings all over India, protesting against the policy of racial discrimination in South Africa and the deep resentment caused among the people of India by the uncivilized behaviour of the Malan Government towards the coloured people there. It might be remembered in this connexion that the Congress had circularized all its constituents to hold public meetings to express India's sympathy with the oppressed people of South Africa. As a practical measure of support to the Satyagraha movement then going on in that country, the Indian National Congress had also issued an appeal for the collection of public funds to assist the Satyagrahis in the districts.

On questions concerning racial equality, India wanted the United Nations to exercise its influence and power in favour of freedom and progress as suggested by the following statement of Mr Nehru:

"It is a matter which concerns us all. It is not merely a question of Indians or South Africans, but it is a matter of vital significance to the world, because that too symbolizes something in the world. If that is to continue in the world, then there is bound to be conflict and conflict on a big scale, because it is a continuous challenge to the self-respect of a vast number of people in the world and they will not put up with it. The matter is thus before the United Nations and I hope the United Nations will help in its solution. But quite apart from the United Nations, there cannot be the shadow of a doubt that if such a policy is continued, it will breed conflict. And that conflict will not be confined to particular areas in South Africa or elsewhere; it will affect peoples in vast continents".¹⁴

Indian spokesmen have repeatedly stated that discrimination based on race, practised by some people of the world, was a grave danger to peace. In the opinion of the Indian Government, the United Nations could not disregard this issue in view of the Principles and Purposes clearly stated in the U.N. Charter, which reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, and express the determination "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom". The treatment of people of Indian origin in South Africa is a specific case of the violation of fundamental human rights. India's position on the handling of this issue by the United Nations has been based on political and moral considerations. It was widely believed in India that only the pressures of international opinion and action by international organizations could bring a change in regard to racial discrimination in countries where dominating social and political forces were interested in maintaining it. On the question of the authority of the United Nations to take action in this field, India's views were much the same as those expressed on the issues concerning dependent areas. India was of the opinion that the United Nations Charter should be interpreted in a liberal manner, so that the world organization could be an agency of action for widening areas of freedom and progress. As such, the opinion of the Indian leaders and the deep feeling of the Indian people were something natural in the establishment of a common front with the United Nations Organization.

On the other hand, India, during this period, was also concerned for the persons of Indian origin living abroad already facing a difficult problem of refugees due to the Partition and gave vent to her anxious feelings in a number of ways. She was really worried that a first influx might come in due to the impact of nationalism in those countries thus augmenting her cares and responsibilities as a Welfare State. As such she could not encourage the return of the overseas Indians to their homeland after so many years though in fact she championed their cause within and without the forums of the United Nations in no uncertain terms and made the efforts towards the enhancement of their socio-economic betterment a prime factor of her foreign policy. To begin with, the very

act on her part to call upon the Governments concerned to take up the consideration of their Indian settlers implied that she was not prepared to assume their guardianship at home and would wish the overseas Indians a happier time in the country of adoption. While the Indians were exempted from the violation of their own human rights in those countries, there would be no question of the exodus back to the land of their forefathers. When India was not in a position to ensure socio-economic justice to a large section of her own population along with the refugees from Pakistan, a fresh addition to it from abroad would have only redistributed whatever there were of opportunities and privileges making them insignificant in volume and utility. After all, India's basic policy regarding the Indians overseas had remained one of cautious aloofness and she called upon them to identify themselves with their settlement in all respects. If they could have any aspirations and devotion towards their country of origin, that could only be moral and emotional. Speaking of the Indians overseas Mr Nehru said:

“ . . . Indians abroad . . . should always give primary consideration to the interests of the people of those countries; they should never allow themselves to be placed in a position of exploiting the people of those countries; and they should be friendly to the people of those countries, cooperate with them and help them, while maintaining their own dignity and self-respect”.¹⁵

The above statement indicates that India was genuinely anxious about the Indians residing abroad, not because they were poverty-stricken and in need of material protection, but because of the high economic status in which they had been able to place themselves. She was aware of the possibilities of the conflict of interests and wanted to ascertain that the enterprise of the Indian immigrants might not assume aggressive proportions and tend unduly to exploit the resources of the country bordering on economic colonialism which she had herself experienced as to be the forerunner of political subjugation. Besides the fact that India has been historically a land of adventure and romance, the Indians a few centuries back left the shores of the motherland for places like the other

British Colonies and Dominions as merchants, traders, workers and indentured labourers. The exclusive landmark of the emigration lay in that though not being even citizens of a free country and working under all possible disadvantages, they made their living good wherever they went. They toiled hard for themselves and for the country of their adoption at the same time. In this manner, they prospered and benefited the particular country, too, in the process. Even the humblest of the emigrants had made himself or herself well-off and secured those fundamentals of economic freedom which his own native State had failed to provide him with. This was certainly a proud moment for India but not so for the country concerned. All went well till the time those countries were the sister dependencies within the British Empire. But at the attainment of independence and a hold over the apparent economic self-sufficiency, those countries expressed deep resentment of the foreign, especially the Indian, encroachment upon their economic life, which was genuine in most of the cases as the Indians were far ahead of the local inhabitants in terms of social attainment. A living nationalism could never forego the cause of economic independence and so the Indians were taken to be at the root of the stagnation of the indigenous growth despite their significant contribution to the national whole. Hence, the problem of the Indians overseas had actually been one of economic and biological character and if they suffered from racial discrimination and other humiliations abroad, it was first because of their gradual domination over the economy and population of those countries and because of their colour and other prejudices, if any, afterwards. The problem of the interference with their human rights similarly springs from the fact that the enjoyment of those rights led to the curtailment of the rights of the local people. Therefore, the Indians were found almost everywhere to be the undesirable elements and faced imminent eviction. The affected Governments were alarmed by India's "expansionism" although the same had its origin not in the political but economic urges put forward by an under-developed colony. Though the Indian colonies were found in several parts of the world, especially in South-East Asia, even earlier than the voyages of Columbus and Vasco Da Gama,

India had no record of having imposed her will upon a particular country as a colonial Power. This was of direct interest since her cultural and religious penetration were so profound that her relationship with those countries was on the verge of being interpreted as that of a Greater India. While her own internal conditions and that of the country in question, besides other exogenous factors, were responsible for this restraint, the Indian colonization, as such, stood as a class by itself. The Indians as a consequence became the victims of severe legislation that took away whatever there was left of their alien rights to property and others. One may also deal here briefly with the movements in the lesser countries of Asia. Burma, from the time of its conquest by the British to 1937, was administered as a part of India, and the movement for national revival was greatly influenced by the developments in India. There were, however, two significant differences. The economic exploitation of Burma by Indian capitalists and business men and the large emigration of Indians into Burma gave to Burmese nationalism a two-fold character, anti imperialist and anti-Indian. The Indian nationalist movement encouraged the fight against imperialism, while the British, in their turn, encouraged Burmese racial exclusiveness.

Under the circumstances, the socio-economic atmosphere in India was not favourable either, for the re-entry of the overseas refugees even though they were eager to do so and made a move to start back. Thus, here too, India could not be said to have guaranteed the basic rights to a neglected people, declared Stateless in some cases, who once formed a part of her own community, whenever they were undergoing a critical time in discrimination and expulsion in several countries of the world. On the other hand, she had to adopt a series of measures for the regularization and check of the internal refugees themselves who were in no better a condition. A number of delegations of the overseas Indians came to India beginning with pre-independence days and had the support and sympathy of the Congress Organization. The Congress even made unofficial enquiries into their conditions by sending out emissaries to places like the Fiji Islands. But what it could do at the best was to make vocal representations and when freedom arrived,

the Indian Government was unable to live up to its promises owing to the distress in which it found itself. Moreover, it was in the national interest of India that those Indians continue to prolong their stay in the countries of adoption. In fact, India had herself a big economic stake in that and as such sought to protect the Indian interests abroad in every respect though condemning the vested interests at the same time India gained substantially in her national revenue through the remittances made by the Indians from different parts of the world. She also no less benefited in trade and commerce through these channels. Some Indians were big merchants especially the Parsis and the Gujaratis. The trading class had also played a notable role in constructing a financial base for the Indian National Congress as in the Union of South Africa and was an asset depended upon in India. The truth that India made the fight against racial discrimination a basic pillar of her foreign policy and carried it forward with unparalleled force in the United Nations alone shows that what she really hinted at was an allowance for the active participation of the Indians in the affairs of the government of the respective States—that would have greatly added to her advantage in the economic field. Finally, it could also be observed that in the case of the Indians returning home from abroad, the impact on the national economy would have been undoubtedly adverse as there was already a tendency towards the concentration of economic power, against which the Republican Constitution intended to struggle in the ensuing years. Furthermore, the overseas Indians, in their own capacity, acted as unofficial envoys of India reflecting her image in the world and bringing home their impressions of those countries. They were supposed to interpret and advance the Indian cause in the truest sense of the term. The message of Mahatma Gandhi for the countrymen overseas, living in a distracted world, was that the spirit of India at its best should be exhibited by each one in his own person. The shortcomings of the Indians must be buried in India.¹⁶

Actually, as a distinguished English observer has noted, the Indian Empire at that time was a “continental order”, a political structure based on India and extending its authority from

Aden to Hongkong. Its spread, says Mr Guy Wint (British in Asia), was the result of Indo-British partnership, of Britain and India, of the emigrants of the British middle-class and of Indian man-power which they had organized. India could not have established the Empire without Great Britain, nor could Great Britain without India. All the principal actors who conceived the expansionist policies were Englishmen; but the Empire which they built was based on Indian, not British, needs. Except for the sake of Indian security Great Britain have had little interest in the Persian Gulf, Tibet or Sinkiang, in all of whose affairs it began to intervene. Indian emigrants, not British, swarmed into the new provinces and, while British capital built the railways, mines, plantations and new industries, Indian moneylenders acquired the land. The fact that in their activities in Asia the British were in part doing India's business and acting as servants of the Emperor of India rather than of the King of England explains much about the past and present of the Empire which is otherwise obscure. The Indian Empire is to be thought of, Mr Wint continues, as consisting of a kernel which was the rich lands directly administered and of a protective rind. This rind was made up partly of minor and more or less primitive States such as Bhutan and Nepal and part of mountain and desert territories, inhabited by people tribally organized. Over both these groups the Indian Government exercised a control whose form varied but whose common purpose was to prevent or restrict their relations with other countries or at least to ensure that they could not be used by them for hostile purposes. Still further afield, and as a sort of open ground, in front of the outworks, the Indian Government formed a ring of neutral States, Persia, Arabia, Tibet and Afghanistan, and even for a time a part of Sinkiang. On one side the limit of India's interest was in general the Arabian Desert between Baghdad and Damascus, which forms the true division between the countries which look towards Europe and those which look towards Asia and which was once the boundary of the Roman Empire. On the other side the interest extended to Indonesia and Indo-China, though for various reasons it was less keen and alert than on the Western side. A corps of specialists in the Indian

Army and the Foreign Office of the Indian Government, inconspicuously and at times with the sense of carrying on a conspiracy or an esoteric rite, secured the continuity of policy. Round it grew up a romance, a vision of the seas swept by the British navy, 3,000 miles of mountain frontiers of Northern India, the lands beyond, supposed in the imagination of the classically educated officials to be so much like the barbarian territory beyond the limes of the Roman Empire, the mysterious Central Asia in which the forces might one day collect and coalesce for a descent on the tropic lands of the South, the small frontier forces whose wars with tribesmen (if heard of at all) seemed such amusing anachronisms to the outside world, but which protected millions of peaceful peasants, the secret agents who, like the associates of Kipling's *Kim*, flitted through the mountain lands disguised as traders or Lamas, loaded with silver rupees and measuring rods. "Thus this period witnessed the growth of an 'overseas India', a large-scale emigration of Indian people into the tropical areas of the Empire, where they carried with them not only their agricultural and labour skills but a modified Indian social system, India's religions, temples and festivals. In South Africa, in the British Colonies of East Africa and in the distant lands of British Guyana, Trinidad and Jamaica, flourishing Indian colonies came into existence which were not without significance for the internal life of India. Though the status of India did not improve, as she remained a very minor partner in this grandiose development, the status of the Indian Empire improved and became that of a major Power in Asia".¹⁷

As on several other occasions, here too, the element of maritime trade dictated the attitude of India to a considerable extent. The bulk of the overseas Indians consisted of the traders who went there in the better half of the last century in order to discover customers for their goods of Oriental fame. The Indian Ocean opened out a wide passage and unlimited opportunities to the outside world, and the interests of India led to the establishment of the naval supremacy of the Indian sealords like Admiral Kanhoji Angre over the foreign sea powers. While the Indians had a say in the control of at

least the Arabian Sea, the Indian maritime trade was allowed to proliferate under a peaceful atmosphere and the Indian vessels called on many a port in the world. Therefore, in the process, India was in a position to earn a handsome amount of foreign exchange that she needed for her own economic development in view of the depleted financial resources that she started with. Moreover, the overseas settlements of the Indians provided for a surer ground for the sale of fresh Indian products and goods, as noted before. Hence it was in the immediate interest of India to maintain a foothold in those countries by all means economic, if not political. Again, India's developing economy, especially in the field of manufacturing goods, required a free and regulated outlet that she found in the countries of the underdeveloped regions of Africa and South-East Asia and the presence of the Indian mercantile class therein imparted an impetus to the programme. In addition to it, practically the whole of the Indian mass was averse to British imperial expansion. This certainly presented an embarrassing Anglo-Indian picture. But, at the same time, it was thought to be wise to take full advantage of the fact. So the Indians followed in the footsteps of the British and extended their own interests into those countries acquired by British arms into the Empire. Finally, as referred beforehand, India, already burdened with the refugee problem due to Partition, was reluctant to accept the entire lot of the overseas population (she was by then one of the most densely populated countries of the world) when actually she was intent on encouraging the exodus of her surplus manpower to distant, lesser populated lands like Brazil and Canada for permanent settlement as she was vexed with her endless demographical crisis.

The most pressing consideration, as it were, turned out to be a fear of Balkanization. India, as a developing country that had become independent only lately, comprised territories which were till recently bundled together by the imperial power for administrative convenience. If human rights claimed by each religious, ethnic, linguistic or tribal group within the country were given recognition—and these rights included the right to self-determination—the territory

of India, with diversified groups, would have soon been subdivided into a number of States again, when she was actually heading for the integration of the territories despite the fact that Britain had left an option to Princely States to join either of the Dominions or to maintain the status quo, closely approximating to the right of self-determination. This specific right had already been exercised in the case of the creation of the Islamic State of Pakistan out of the Indian peninsula on the plea of the Muslim religious minority forming a nation and much to the detriment of the Indian long-term interests both at home and abroad. (Referred earlier.) Moreover, India was quite aware of the implications of the application of this measure vis-a-vis the indigenous problems as that of the Nagas, that fell within Article 2(7), domestic jurisdiction clause, of the U.N. Charter of her being a Member State. Thus any grant of individual rights that stood in the way of the common national end was not acceptable to India as a modern State. On the other hand, she believed in that once a country had attained its independence, no further question arose concerning the right to self-determination and the right of peoples to self-determination arose only in the case of subject peoples seeking independence from a colonial Power. While the right of the people within a State to change their government was recognized, the right of any particular group within the State to self-determination was rejected. If such a view of the right of peoples to self-determination was upheld and permitted, it could only lead to the destruction of the political unity of the developing countries in which there were minorities. This overwhelming desire of India to reorient the territorial and political status quo inherited by her from the imperial power towards the geographical unification at times led her to profess that she should not be expected to grant the same measure of freedom to the individual as the developed countries did.

Again, the extent to which human rights could be promoted was to a large degree dependent upon the standard of living and the level of economic development. There could be, as aforesaid, no meaningful exercise of several human rights in a country where economic resources were scarce and the bulk

of population lived on the margin of subsistence. In such cases, the primary duty of the State was to promote the economic growth of the country and to raise the standard of living of the population. To that end, it was necessary for a developing country like India to embark upon programmes of economic planning. The implementation of plans might, in some instances, result in the restriction of the enjoyment of certain human rights in national clothing. The concept of welfare State was of particular importance to an infant nation and ex-colony. It was the aim of the "welfare State" to look after the moral as well as material interests of those coming within its jurisdiction and the State accordingly needed the necessary powers to implement its plans in such matters, even though in the process of doing so, the right of the individuals or groups might be temporarily affected. This could be inferred from the fact that one of the political conditions essential to successful planning as laid down in the First Five Year Plan (of India) was to vest "effective power, based on the active cooperation (acquiescence to the partial limitation of individual rights whenever necessary, DRC) of citizens, in the hands of the State; and, earnest and determined exercise of that power in furtherance of these ends".¹⁶ Similarly, the fragile structure of India as a nation obliged the State to impose restrictions on the freedom of information and other correlated rights and in any case, the freedom envisaged could not have had the same currency as it had in highly democratized European countries. The degree of variations in the implementation of human rights literature in different countries was directly relative to the extent of socio-economic and political attainments of the hewers of coal and the drawers of water. Under the Indian Constitution of 1950, it was expressly declared that the Fundamental Rights were to be qualified and could be enjoyed by the citizens only with certain reservations as subject to "law and public morality" and were liable to suspension during a state of Emergency. Hence, however much a State might wish to ensure the "freedoms", it could not allow their exercise to lead to the disintegration of the component elements. In the ultimate analysis, State rights had a priority claim over that of the individual so that it might be able to function squarely towards the realization of the welfare institution.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Raghubir Chakrabarti, *Human Rights and the United Nations*, p. 124.
2. *Official Records*, Third Session of the General Assembly (Part I), p. 37.
3. Commission on Human Rights: *Report of the Eighth Session*, April 14 to June 14, 1952 (Economic and Social Council, *Official Records: Fourteenth Session, 1952*, Supplement No. 4), p. 64.
4. Ross N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi, *The Diplomacy of India*, pp. 147-48.
5. *Official Records*, Sixth Session of the General Assembly 1951-52, p. 507.
6. UNCIO, Vol. I, Doc. 22. p. 245.
7. *The Hindu*, June 24, 1948.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*, October 26, 1952.
10. *The First Five Year Plan*, Planning Commission, p. 7.
11. R. Palme Dutt, *India Today and Tomorrow*, p. 241.
12. Ross N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
13. Congress Session, Jaipur, December 18-19, 1948. Indian National Congress, *Resolutions on Foreign Policy, 1947-57*, pp. 1-2.
14. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 48.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
16. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, *Non-Violence in Peace and War*, Vol. II, p. 28.
17. K.M. Panikkar, *Asia and Western Dominance*, p. 128.
18. *The First Five Year Plan*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

8

CONCLUSION

THE emerging India's foreign policy had to depend largely upon conditions determining her defence, economic reconstruction and active manifestations of her ideological standpoint regarding anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. Further, in pursuing the policy of peace India was only acting in accordance with the guideline set out in her Constitution. If the peaceful settlement of international disputes were to have been taken to its logical conclusion there would have been no war, supported and participated by India, in Indonesia and in Kashmir respectively. Thus India's role in those cases where she encouraged violence was in consonance with the Charter principles of individual self-defence (Art. 51) and anti-imperialism. However, it has to be accepted that such interpretation of the U.N. Charter for the sake of national interest was India's only. The United Nations was not only exploited by India for bringing before the world opinion the burning question of anti-imperialism. India was consolidating her defence by vigorously pointing at the sanctity of community-living in accordance with international law while openly advocating a policy of anti-power bloc non-alignment. India had the full confidence to expect help from Britain as the superior member of the Commonwealth and also from other members of the United Nations at the same time. It can be seen from our discussion the India was fully aware of the weakness of the collective-security machinery of the United Nations Organization. It is obvious that the policy-makers of India knew their goal too well as to discriminate in their peace approaches with relation to Indonesia, Malaya and Indo-China. In actively supporting the U.N. action in Korea India only sent non-combatants in the form of army medical corps. This was a clever move on the part of India to remain on the side of the law and at

the same time to avoid in getting involved in actual armed conflict. The foreign policy formulation by newly-independent India was tested for the first time in the Korean conflict. India probably never thought of seeing the United Nations as a party to any armed dispute. The behaviour of Indian representatives in the United Nations was hesitant, cautious to the point of being vascillating in the face of adopting positive resolutions on successfully carrying out the responsibilities by the U.N. troops at Korea. As a matter of fact, it was a serious experience of a newly-independent country to be actively involved in the legality of a war not of its own making. However, India faced boldly the world criticism in connexion with her stand taken in Kashmir. It was a brave experiment to behave as a mature nation. India went to the United Nations with full confidence of the legality of her action in Kashmir and was not too happy to learn that even in the United Nations there were more politics than ethics. The best part of India's policy formulation during this period was in her confidence in the U.N. even after her partial disillusionment with the Kashmir question. The politics of confrontation would probably have given India more freedom of action. But in the process India would have to lose her position as a champion of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism.

From the foregoing analysis, we could assess that it was, again, the compulsion of her demands for economic reconstruction that explained India's leanings on the United Nations during the period. She found it healthier for her initial growth than the hospitality of the power blocs. This was undoubtedly something besides her basic faith in and appreciation of the philosophy evolved in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. With the political aspirations of the Indians satisfied, it were the economic discrepancies that presented the crux of the problem to the independent India. The volume of external supply to meet the indigenous deficiencies governed her consideration of the issues, internal and external, and led to the formation of her image of the post-war world. That the struggle for independence under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi itself had its origins in the hope of attaining economic freedom, India did not seek the end of colonial rule

for its own sake as any other underdeveloped country of the resurgent era. Thus the political independence gained was but a means to an end, that is, the renaissance of an all-round recovery, so as to be able to counter effectively any external aggression or internal subversion. India's bid for economic reconstruction was followed up by her efforts to help the neighbouring countries, for their economic reconstruction was also of interest to her. This could at best be construed from her release of financial aid to Burma in 1949 out of her slender resources and along with some other Governments of the Commonwealth. This was in order to enable the nationalist government in Rangoon to form a bulwark against the Karen rebels. Similar motivation was evident in her putting pressure on the Metropolitan Powers with regard to the inclusion of Indonesia in the ECAFE membership. In recent memory, the land-locked economy of the Kingdom of Nepal assumed increased importance to India and the grant of aid has taken place here, too. Again, to India, a comprehensive rationalization of the national economy was only feasible in a free and self-guided atmosphere. As Mr V.T. Krishnamachari, a former Vice-Chairman of the National Planning Commission, observes: "In the freedom movement, the leaders always linked up political advance with social and economic advance and stressed the need for changes in the social and economic structure for the elimination of poverty. Independence was valued largely for the opportunity it would give to the nation to bring about these changes".¹

But socio-economic reconstruction had several aspects of its own. Moreover, the proposed reconstruction would be incomplete without industrialization that stood for progress in the modern sense of the term. Hence economic build-up involved a larger part of technical equipment and know-how that, again, India was initially not in a position to provide. As such, a train of developmental imports was bound to follow for which, once more, India was not able to pay sufficiently in foreign exchange. This called for the acceptance of the foreign inter-governmental loans and grants that were not always free from qualifications. Therefore, the inexorable logic of events and the economic discrepancies followed up by political

obligations were in fact the stepping stones that gradually brought India closer to the United Nations Organization, and the effort on her part to make the best out of the mobilization of U. N. resources. Her needs for economic cooperation and building up strength in pursuance of the U. N. Charter principles could be felt from the following extract from the impressions of the Conference of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East held at Ootacamund in June 1948. This was stated by Mr M. Ananthasayanam Iyenger, Member, Constituent Assembly, and Adviser to the Indian Delegation:

“The offer by the Minister for Industry and Supply to the Government of India of unconditional help to our sister nations in the East was both spontaneous and sincere. It marks a new chapter of harmony and cooperation in our relations with South-East Asia. The countries which are still under the domination of metropolitan countries and had been reticent to declare their views openly lest they should estrange Britain and America must have felt encouraged by India's attitude. One of the noteworthy features of the Conference is that the United Kingdom delegation expressed their country's willingness to send to India capital equipment consistent with their own requirements. The assurance of the U.K. delegation at a time when the sterling balance talks are going on in London augurs well for the future. It is regrettable that the same spirit of accommodation and help was found wanting in the speeches of Dr Henry Grady, leader of the American delegation, though much was expected from that quarter. The reference to Hyderabad in connexion with the Indonesian debate was unfortunate and received a well-merited rejoinder from Dr (Shyama Prasad) Mookherjee (leader of the Indian delegation). Despite the apparent coldness and caution and want of warmth exhibited during the debates so far by the American delegation, it is hoped that during the Committee stages, its leader would come out with a bold offer of help”.²

As regards the developmental assistance from the U.N., besides financial, it also included a United Nations Technical Assistance Programme. India recognized the advantages of technical assistance through an international organization,

although sentiment in favour of an international rather than bilateral approach was less strong in the case of technical assistance than in the field of external finance. In the first place, an international programme enabled a country which did not wish to accept assistance from another country owing to political or other reasons, to present its request unhesitatingly to the United Nations. A further advantage of an international programme was that it "places at the disposal of the countries requiring technical assistance, not the necessarily limited facilities available in any particular country, but a pool of technical knowledge and services to which all countries in the world, including the underdeveloped countries themselves, have contributed their best."³ Another consideration in favour of an international programme was that underdeveloped countries while receiving technical assistance could take part in determining the conditions under which such assistance was rendered. It is also discernible that had India been a self-sufficient, developed country, she would seldom have emphasized this aspect of her relationship with the world organization. Her inclination towards the potentialities of the U.N. Charter stipulations through this specific second channel was clearly out of domestic compulsions. So it did not germinate in her free will and implicit acquiescence. It is acknowledged that India, at the outset, expounded and displayed her union with the political aspect of the U.N.O. After all, the direct circumstances that had caused the convention of the San Francisco Conference were not economic in character. Had she laid stress upon the future role of the Economic and Social Council, it was because she was aware that in a bipolarized world, she would have to depend much upon the resources of the U.N. Specialized Agencies. This was subsequently confirmed by the hint of the policy of non-alignment in the September broadcast of Mr Nehru coinciding with the historic Fulton Speech of Sir Winston Churchill (March 5), in the year 1946, that adumbrated the ideological division of the world into two. "In the sphere of foreign affairs India will follow an independent policy, keeping away from the power-politics of groups aligned one against the other . . ."⁴

So it had not been the intention of India at any time to convert the United Nations solely into an economic institution

or at least to make it a satellite revolving around one of its organs, i.e., the ECOSOC. Had India's leanings towards the U.N.O. been inspired by immediate material needs, her rapprochement with the Principles of the U.N. Charter lay for off in the common historical urges. Thus the apparent insistence on aid was not long-term in nature and would be resorted to so long as India was an underdeveloped nation not preferring to receive assistance from the bloc countries. This was also in consonance with the part of the Preamble of the U.N. Charter, "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples", and the Purpose, "To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" [Art I (3)]. But it does not imply that India had lost sight of the general international interests in her enlightened self-interest. The extension of the policy of non-alignment itself has been dependent upon the continuation of the Cold War and Big Power rivalry. So India could not be said to have championed the welfare functions of the U.N.O. at the neglect of its political basis and background.

In essence, India's response in favour of the U.N.O. for her national reconstruction comprised two phases. The project necessitated (a) an uninterrupted flow of external resources, and (b) the maintenance of international peace and security. But though in the course of her planning India turned towards the U.N. for assistance she concentrated upon the restoration of peace through the enforcement measures under Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter in the solution of international disputes. On the other hand, while evaluating the economic role of the world body, she was conscious of its financial and supply limitations and the capacity to effect the required economic betterment of the underdeveloped world.

"In recent years Indian official delegates have expressed several misgivings in regard to the work under the (United Nations Technical Assistance) program. Fears have been

expressed that the program may suffer from lack of funds. It has been noted that the resources available in any particular year are not known sufficiently in advance to permit effective planning. This can be rectified by orderly development of the programs, early contribution by member nations, and also by strengthening the reserve fund. Indian delegates have also pointed out that the funds which have been available to India under the program have been small in comparison with India's needs and many very important requirements are still left unsatisfied. At the twentieth session of the Technical Assistance Committee, the Indian delegation indicated that there were some doubts as to the efficacy of the program as applied to India and that an opinion was current in the country that the benefits derived were not commensurate with the cost.⁵

So also she did not expect the U.N. to provide her with the entire volume of external assistance for economic development as the solitary source. A general picture of her utilization of the possibilities put forward by the United Nations could be gathered from the following extract of dialogue between Professor Michael Brecher and Mr V.K. Krishna Menon. When asked by Professor Brecher regarding the attitude of the Indian delegation to the United Nations, Mr Menon replied that the Indians were a very much smaller quantity in world affairs. There was no policy as such that the Indians wanted to promote for themselves. As reminded by the Professor of every State having a policy, Mr Menon admitted that it was so, but asked what it was that the Indians wanted out of the U.N. for themselves. Professor Brecher suggested that they wanted pressure for economic development and the end of colonialism, to which Mr Menon replied that so far as economic development was concerned, what was worthwhile was mostly bilateral.⁶

With the first objective of the receipt of loans and grants more or less assured to her through various quarters, India sought to reiterate the world consensus upon the improvement of the structural fabrics of the United Nations at the postponement of the emphasis upon its military aspect and devoted more of her time at the U.N. for the constructive tasks of peace. Her unequivocal stand against the Acheson Plan showed how far she was prepared to go for the preservation of the

integrity of the Law of the United Nations. For she knew that only peace achieved in the settlement of disputes through the machinery of the Security Council would be a lasting and comprehensive one—a precondition for the successful implementation of the domestic programme. If the U.N. was not an economic complex, it was not either a war-machine. Hence the emphasis that India laid upon the different aspects of the world organization at different times had been respectively dictated by her varied national interests. Since the question of accepting active role in solving international disputes by the United Nations demands the qualifying status of a country's economic development India forcefully exhibited her interest over the vitality and survival of the United Nations in the second half of the twentieth century and the reasonable widening of U.N.'s activity area.

However, India, like any other sovereign State, was more concerned with her own problems. The existence of the United Nations, in spite of pious pronouncements, was a means to an end; the "end" remains the vital point of interpretation. The long-standing debate on nationalism vs internationalism still bears upon the thinking of all nations. If the U.N. is to be taken as a machinery to propel the spirits of nations towards the goal of world government, India did her best to bring about a functional federation within the superstructure of the U.N. Charter. International cooperation could be achieved, as mentioned in the U.N. Charter, by solving problems of economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character. The "solutions", however, need to be considered in the light of not only national efficiency but also on the major issue of national interest. As regards the psychological set-up, India in the late forties was quite conscious and zealous of her sovereign status that constituted the cornerstone of her achievement as a nation—as a mother-eagle is conscious of her new-born babies. As such, though she accepted the U.N. Charter it was understandable of her that she did so as a sovereign power that would not encourage undue impingement upon her rights from any quarter. After all those years of dependency, she was not willing to feel the presence of any "masterly" element overhead even though that would come out of her own reci-

procal agreements. Thus, it could be said that in her immediate years of freedom, what the conception of the U.N. India had gathered was that of a "guide, philosopher, and friend" but not that of a supervisor or an organism superimposed over her own State-system. So while the question to observe the Universal Declaration in practice came up, India realized that her sovereign rights were to be further compromised which she could not afford even from the defence point of view. Consequently, there appeared a line of demarcation between her advocacy and endeavour. In its application she saw the act of "external intervention", howsoever well-disposed that might be. This, once more, impelled India to retrace her steps and redefine her appreciation of the U.N. Charter stipulations. She was inclined to invoke Art. 2(7) of the Charter and delimit her domestic jurisdiction in the face of the U.N. jurisdiction. In like manner, she had to make use of the Charter provisions in order to protect her national sovereignty and interests in relation to the United Nations itself. This was in sharp contrast to her attitude in other cases of the violation of human rights when India disapproved of the resort to this Article as in South Africa or with the Netherlands Government in Indonesia. Hence the law of the United Nations was meaningful to her and she went to adore them as in Korea only so far as they did not come into conflict with her self-enacted laws.

The inauguration of the United Nations as a new world organization replacing the League of Nations fulfilled not only the political but also other aspirations that go to constitute the full individual life. Though the circumstances under which it was brought about were primarily political, the prevailing world social and economic circumstances as well as historical forces came only next in cooperating to make it possible. The struggle of Humanity towards freedom in all its aspects had a far more reasonable fruition in the philosophy of the United Nations Organization and so naturally it was the organization that, though lacking in universality, was able to look at the individual in his total personality and took into consideration the different aspects of human life. Though itself not devoid of power-politics, the U.N.O. broke new grounds in establishing that the modern individual was not a mere instrument of the

State-life, but a pivot around which revolved the progress of human civilization. The aftermath of the War had put forth several questions of general concern that called for not only the new order being placed on solid political grounds, but also on surer socio-economic and cultural foundations. The recognition of the principle of Human Rights was implicit in the declaration, "We, the Peoples of the United Nations". Again, the post-war resettlement programme thrown up by the evolution of the U.N. era called at the same time for the redefinition or replacement of certain perverted values and beliefs that were found incompatible with the functioning of the world organization, by progressive ones. It is safer to trace that the movement for human rights as a world force was given its proper shape and colour after thousands of precious human lives perished in the Nazi concentration camps. The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, too, helped to bring the individual to the foreground. In the latter, the dissenting opinion of Justice Radha Binode Pal of India was a conspicuous one. Hence, with the rise of the anti-colonial powers, especially in the East, the U.N. became a platform for not only the propagation of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism but also a source of forces for social changes in the form of human rights, individual freedom, rights of ethnic groups, etc., that found expression in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of December 10, 1948, and also in the Genocide Convention.

India, in consonance with her avowed policy of self-determination of all nations sought to utilize the Declaration of Human Rights as a major weapon in her war against colonialism. Her stand in the various sessions of the General Assembly and the Committees and Commissions bears clear testimony to it. She invoked the provisions of the Declaration wherever it was found suitable and laid stress upon its wholesale observance by the Great Powers. She supported a number of resolutions on the elimination of colonialism and racialism as passed by the General Assembly on the basis of the Declaration and submitted several proposals. In regard to the Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories, she fought vigorously against the adamancy of the Administering Powers not willing to

furnish information to the Trusteeship Council regarding the political progress of the Territory and declared that Sovereignty in the long run was vested in the population whereas the ultimate goal of the people was the right to self-government. This was in keeping with the contents of the Universal Declaration. That the U.D.H.R., for the first time, lent voice and dynamism to the stipulations of the U.N. Purposes and Principles, India found it more advantageous to further her own cause of anti-colonialism by advocating the promotion of an all-round advancement of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories and their progressive development towards self-government or independence. Hence the U.D.H.R. affirmed and provided an added impetus to the stand that India was already determined to further on her own initiative as a factor of national policy.

India as well stuck to her ideological stand of remaining outside any regional arrangements for defensive purposes as enunciated in Chapter VIII, Articles 52-54 of the U.N. Charter. This was in sincere compliance with her policy of non-alignment with power blocs and when she was not interested in the creation of any third bloc. As such, she did not encourage the formation of an Afro-Asian organization though a number of attempts were made towards this end and even when the U.N. Charter expressly provided for it. Thus, though appreciating it in general, the Indian ideology could not agree to the application of certain U.N. Charter provisions including Articles 52-54, and failed to endorse the development of this aspect of the world organization. This was so because regional arrangements would not be to her favour as a young nation and while she did not think that to resort to this part of the U.N. Charter was opportune in times of the Cold War. This is not to exhort that public opinion in India was solely behind the Governmental attitude in this particular instance. A section of the Indian intelligentsia with Sirdar K.M. Panikkar leading (The Future of South-East Asia, New York, 1943) discussed these problems at length from a more realistic and nationalistic angle and analysed the possibility of such an Asian organization. The mild impact of this regional approach upon official thinking could not have been ruled

out, though later on it remained a purely academic affair. The All India Congress Committee made the following observation in 1946: "Inevitably whatever the future of the world organization is, India and the countries of South-East Asia must hang together and work together. This is necessary from the point of view of defence and strategy, for trade and commerce, and in cultural association."⁷ But, at the same time, she became an active participant in the U.N. actions and played a decisive role in some of the cases for she knew that a full-scale development of her personality was not feasible apart from her active association with the world body. Her ambition to display as much dynamism as possible within the United Nations was because she wanted to prove that in spite of economic disadvantages and the "worthlessness of multilateral arrangement for economic development; as remarked by Mr K. Menon (referred earlier) non-alignment with any power bloc was not detrimental to progress. On the contrary, the policy of non-alignment made it possible to create an atmosphere in which the peaceful reconstruction of the national economy through the application of democratic planning could be successfully undertaken. In other words, national progress was not invariably linked up with taking sides with a particular group of developed countries. The possibilities for economic development could not be identified with the goodwill of the highly industrialized nations of the world. The recovery of an underdeveloped economy was assured even when it lacked the whole-hearted material support of a power bloc, as an outsider. India sought to vindicate her position that non-alignment was not immoral or absurd as some people in the West presumed it to be. Though initially suffering (which even the developed countries did) for want of a proper background and mutual understanding, it was clear that the policy of non-alignment was a living one and contributed to the economic interests of a nation, as it did in other spheres, in equal measure. Thus the myth of the indispensability of the blocs in a bipolarized world was exploded. A nation, determined in its inherent will and confident of the righteousness of its cause, could survive and go ahead even in the face of an overwhelming majority of aligned forces. Though there might

have been a slower rate of progress and achievements, given the limited capacities of a world organization, a member of the U.N.O. would ultimately arrive at its destination where the big Powers did not anticipate it to be. In her hasty decision to play the major role of a peace-maker, India during the period under discussion accepted more responsibility than she could possibly bear. It was a case of policy-making without the support at the base. It was vastly out of proportion of her intrinsic strength which is imperative for a successful foreign policy. India instead decided to lean heavily on the supposed strength of the U.N.

The implementation of the U.N. conventions and declarations by India was not only meant for the purpose of internal development but also for practical advantages in winning the approval of the majority of the members of the U.N.O. So while not overlooking the general international concern in her enlightened self-interest, India found that application of the U.N. stipulations in her domestic sphere (in consonance with her sovereign status) would be to her own advantage in the first place and in the extension of her foreign policy objectives. It was so because her actions would be hailed by one and all alike especially in the underdeveloped world as a true champion of justice and liberty, which, in its turn, was of much importance to India in her international life and consolidating her position within the larger framework of the United Nations Organization.

The third and last development in the policy-determination of India during the period proved to be an active manifestation of her ideological standpoint regarding anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. As Dr Appadorai once remarked her antipathy to these world forces originated not in the books but in national experience. It was a policy inherent in the circumstances, past thinking and the whole mental outlook of India, in the conditioning of the Indian mind during the struggle for freedom, and in the circumstances of the contemporary world. Not only political but also social and traditional elements imparted it the needed background. A policy so deeply rooted in the national past was indeed unique in its own sense and as an ex-colony attaining independence she took up the

diplomacy India could not go physically alone. Her role in the formation of the Afro-Asian group and her response to the Commonwealth Caulcusing Group in the General Assembly were significant. Whenever possible, and despite vigorous denials of an Afro-Asian bloc, Indian initiative in the United Nations took the form of proposed joint resolutions, backed by the combined moral and political strength of most of the Afro-Asian world represented in the organization. Later on, her anti-colonialism and anti-racialism, too, came to be strictly confined to the borders of official policy and interpretation as indicated by her silence in the case of the neo-colonialism, Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe and violation of human rights, and even the Caribbean domination of the USA. Thus she did not allow the historical emotions to get the better of her. Had India propounded the policies on her own initiative and platform, it would have had a lesser effect, if any, on the world scene, and her objective of having a place under the sun and a leading position among the Afro-Asian countries would not have gained momentum. One of the governing factors—the middle-of-the-road policy—would be intelligible in the light of the analysis of the historical background and the contemporary world situation. India also did not want to take sides, because in that stage of her economic and military development, she was not in a position materially to influence events. Thus whatever desirable changes she could look forward to effect in the pattern of international cross-currents in her favour were feasible only through the medium of the United Nations. Dwelling upon this her Prime Minister said in the Constituent Assembly (Leg.) on March 8, 1948:

“Our general policy has been to avoid entering into anybody’s quarrels. If I may say so, I have come more and more to the conclusion that the less we interfere in international conflicts the better, unless, of course, our own interest is involved, for the simple reason that it is not in consonance with our dignity just to interfere without producing any effect. We should either be strong enough to produce some effect or we should not interfere at all”.⁸

India, as a new-born nation, was not known well to many countries of the world and was lesser understood. What the

image had the Europeans drawn of her was substantially on the plane of the distorted writings of the British historians to whom, again, India was only a land of snakes and jugglers. On the other hand, what the people behind the Iron Curtain could still see of India was only through the telescope of old Anglo Russian rivalry as in Afghanistan. To them, India was not yet independent in the Marxist sense of the term but was only turned into an appendage to the imperialist paraphernalia. They concluded that the real struggle for Indian independence had commenced in the year 1947. A world atmosphere in which her real image lay concealed, India could not expect to leave a genial impression and effect the reparation of the damage done to her ancient glory. The application of all forms of diplomatic procedure including an overnight establishment of diplomatic relations in the major capitals of the world would not have brought about the necessary restoration and an adequate explanation of the policy of non-alignment. Even if it could work, that would have taken a long time and energy with probable complications.

Therefore, in the United Nations India found an apparatus through the medium of which she could actively manifest her ideological standpoint regarding anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. She had long wanted to provide a distinct shape and colour to her ideological programme in order to build up a clear-cut basis to start with. To an infant nation like India the creation of a favourable place was of primary importance. As the U.N.O. embodied the international, if not the universal, consensus regarding matters of general interest, an effort to play a conspicuous role in the proceedings of the United Nations was very much in the thought of India. This is also subscribed by her insistence on gaining the membership of the Security Council. The U.N. was a better platform from where India could interpret her own foreign policy for the benefit of a large gathering of member-States. This anticipation was later corroborated by events when India contributed to the final settlement in the Korean crisis. The cushion that the policy of non-alignment provided in the armour of the United Nations during the Cold War could not be overlooked and in some instances, the policy went even further

to safeguard the interests of the big Powers as well in that there was no head-on collision. The policy of non-alignment would not have been fruitful to such a degree and gained currency among a good and increasing section of the people of the world had it ever been nursed and exercised beyond the United Nations auspices and not in cooperation with the U.N. Charter. It would have been difficult for non-alignment to survive had it not been professed through the Lake Success channels. India laid emphasis upon the place of uncommitted nations in the organs of the U.N.O. for that would enable them to play a useful role in times of stalemate in the power-bloc deliberations. Her attitude has been subsequently endorsed by the growing influence and dimension of the non-aligned group in the U.N. General Assembly.

India's debut in the United Nations with the active manifestation of her ideological standpoint had the support and cooperation of the world body for her actions came within the bounds of the U.N. Charter and respected the discipline thereunder. In the process she sought to provide it with a fresh experience in the settlement of international disputes as well as an opportunity to interpret the salient provisions of the U.N. Charter. Thus they represented the demand of the time and a reflection of the philosophy of the U.N. Charter itself. As the majority in the United Nations affirmed her actions and appreciated the overtures, the bulk of the legal and moral force behind the U.N. Charter provisions were put to her assistance that was advantageous to India to supplement her own strength. Thus the U.N.O. has remained a source of inspiration, guidance and ultimately support for India despite some causes for despair here or there. Throughout the course of her association, India has been meticulous as not to do anything that goes against the interests of the United Nations for that would revert back upon herself again. India brought the Indonesian and South African cases before the world forum so that apart from the amicable settlement of the disputes in general interest, the world would also have had at the same time an opportunity to catch a vivid glimpse and intrinsic character of the basic pillars of Indian foreign policy. In essence, this represented only an aspect of the policy as a whole and had to be

was not quite a logical one and was not much fair to Asia and Africa, India accepted it all the same as she thought it represented, *inter alia*, the objectives, the conditions of the world then prevailing, and the play of forces, with the hope that it would change for the better. India's relationship with the U.N.O. especially during this period clearly indicates that she did not lag behind the others in championing the cause of the world body as far as practicable. In fact, her harmonious collaboration with the United Nations was one of the most outstanding among that of the signatories to the San Francisco Charter. From the very foundation of the organization, India had been an enthusiastic member, and her Prime Minister more than once publicly reiterated India's adherence to it. Not only to the principal organs of the United Nations, but to the meetings of various Specialized Agencies like the I.L.O., the F.A.O., UNESCO, and ECAFE, she invariably sent strong delegations and took an active part in their proceedings, both in the plenary sessions and at committee stages. The Executive Secretary of ECAFE in a broadcast made a public reference to the important contribution made by India to the work of the third session of ECAFE, held at Ootacamund in June 1948. And she continued to offer this adherence, notwithstanding strong provocation to the contrary from the handling of the Kashmir question by the Security Council. Her action in unison with the U.N. came in a series. Whether in Indonesia, Korea, or Palestine, she provided the U.N. with a support that was at once durable and unequivocal. In the process, she made possible a scope wherein the U.N. Charter would be able to gain in dynamism and dimension. India, along with Australia, brought the Indonesian question before the Security Council as it threatened international peace and security. India played a positive role supplementary only to that of the Security Council that was not very often expected of a new-born nation. Though the settlement took place under the auspices of the United Nations, the contribution of India towards it was substantial. In all these, the objective of India was "to strengthen the hands" of the Security Council for the tasks of peace in accordance with the U.N. Charter stipulations. As a fresh entrant into the community of nations her interest and zeal in the development of an international

Dutch Government to give up. In the South African dispute, she had to act rather a bit differently and cautiously for she was a party to the dispute with a co-member of the Commonwealth; with Pakistan and Burma as well. But even here, though the solution was not nearer at hand owing to the presence of third party interests, she did not tend to flout the U.N. presence and the Law of the United Nations though the Indian settlers were actually suffering. South Africa did so advertently. But here one question arises: how would India have behaved in these cases had there been no United Nations? Would power-politics fill up the vacuum? It would not, for it was already there in the U.N.O. Under similar situations, in the Indonesian case, India could not have interfered at all or should she do so, her negotiations had to be bilateral and subdued in tone and volume. She would have to compromise and to pay more heed to the bargains of the bloc interests. That would not have, again, helped much in the manifestation of her ideological standpoint. Whatever discussions would have taken place within the Commonwealth, in case the South African case were referred to it, would only be consultative in nature. In fact, her membership of the Commonwealth was interpreted as the first stage of her leaning towards the West, especially on the USA upon which Britain in turn rested to consolidate her position in the new world. In either way, there would be no matching organ to voice her feelings in the same way as the U.N. did. So either India would prefer to keep much to herself or go out in search of another United Nations Organization. During a speech in the Lok Sabha on November 22, 1960, Mr Nehru paid a tribute to the world organization:

"It is clear that the United Nations cannot be a merely debating body. It has undertaken a very heavy task, and has solved some of the difficult problems. Because of the United Nations, war has been avoided on several occasions in the last few years. If the United Nations were not there, the world would be in a parlous state, and we would have had to search for it and build up some such organization. I have often criticized the United Nations for some step or the other with which I did not agree, but, broadly speaking, I should like to pay my tribute to the United Nations for the work which it has done, and to its able Secretary-General".¹⁰

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. V.T. Krishnamachari, *Fundamentals of Planning in India*, p. 8.
2. *The Hindu*, June 6, 1948.
3. P.S. Narasimhan, "Technical Assistance", *India Quarterly*, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (April-June 1962), pp. 154-55.
4. *The Indian Annual Register 1946*, Vol. II, published by the Annual Register Office, Calcutta, 1947, p. 252.
5. *India and the United Nations*, Study Group, p. 202.
6. Michael Brecher, *India and World Politics*, p. 113.
7. *The Indian Annual Register*, *op. cit.*, p. 104.
8. Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, p. 33.
9. S.V. Puntambekar, *The Foreign Policy of the Indian Union*, p. 66.
10. Jawaharlal Nehru, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

DOCUMENTS

- Constituent Assembly Debates*, Government of India, Vols. I & II, *Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs 1931-52* (Two Vols.), London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953.
- Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization*. San Francisco, 1945. Published in cooperation with the Library of Congress. New York, United Nations Information Organization, 1945.
- Documents on International Affairs*, 1949-50. Selected and Edited by Margaret Carlyle. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. London, Oxford University Press, 1953.
- Economic Survey of Asia and Far East*, Bangkok, UNO (ECAFE), 1954.
- Essential Documents and Notes on the Kashmir Dispute*. Delhi, International Books, 2nd Revised and Enlarged Edition, 1965.
- Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-59*. New Delhi, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 2nd Edition, December 1959.
- Indian Council of World Affairs, *Report of the First Asian Relations Conference*. New Delhi, 1948.
- Indian Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. *The Conference on Indonesia*, New Delhi, 1949.
- , *Memorandum by the Indonesian Delegation to the Indonesian Conference*, January 1949.
- Indian National Congress. *Resolutions on Foreign Policy, 1947-57*. New Delhi, All India Congress Committee, 1958.
- International Financial Statistics* published by the International Monetary Fund (U.N.O.).
- Official Records of British Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard). London, HMSO.
- Official Records of the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council*. New York.

- Parliamentary Debates: Parliament of India Official Report Part I: Questions and Answers, 1st-5th Session, 1950-52.* Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1950-52.
- Report of the U.N. Commission on Korea, December 1949-September 1950:* U.N. Document A/1950. Lake Success.
- Report of the Visiting I.M.F. Mission on India's Economy.* New Delhi, February 8, 1953.
- Selected Documents on Asian Affairs, Vol. I: India.* New Delhi, Indian Council of World Affairs.
- The Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice.* Published by the United Nations Office of Public Information, New York.
- The Constitution of India (Text).* The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India.
- The First Five Year Plan.* Planning Commission, Government of India, 1951.
- United Nations Economic and Social Council, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East Survey of Reconstruction Problems and Needs. Document E/CN.11/39, November 3, 1947.
- , Reference Pamphlet No. 2, 1949.
- , Third General Conference—Report. New Delhi, Ministry of Education, Government of India, 1949.
- United Nations Preparatory Commission and U.N. General Assembly: 1st Session. Report on the work of the Indian delegation, Parts I and II, 1945-46, Delhi, Manager of Publications, 1946.

GENERAL

- Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1949-53.* New York, University Press, 1950.
- Bailey, Sydney D., *The General Assembly of the United Nations: A Study of Procedure and Practice.* Published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, Revised Edition, 1964.
- Bains, J.S., *India's International Disputes: A Legal Study.* Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1962.

- Banerjee, A.C., *The Constituent Assembly of India*. Calcutta, A. Mukherjee & Co., 1947.
- Banerjee, Pramathanath, *A Study of Indian Economics*. University of Calcutta, Sixth Ed., 1951.
- Basu, Durga Das, *Introduction to the Constitution of India*. Calcutta, S.C. Sarkar & Sons (Private) Ltd, First Edition, January 1960.
- Berkes, Ross N., and Bedi, Mohinder S., *The Diplomacy of India: Indian Foreign Policy in the United Nations*, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1958.
- Bhattacharya, K.N., *Indian Plans: A Generalist Approach*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1963.
- Bimla Prasad, *The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy: The Indian National Congress and World Affairs, 1885-1947*. Calcutta, Bookland Private Limited, April 1960.
- Birdwood, Christopher Bromhead. *Two Nations and Kashmir*. London, Robert Hale, 1956.
- Bisheshwar Prasad, *Our Foreign Policy Legacy: A Study of British India Foreign Policy*. New Delhi, People's Publishing House, 1965.
- Bowles, Chester, *Ambassador's Report*. New York, Harper, 1954.
- Brecher, Michael, *Nehru: A Political Biography*. London, Oxford University Press, 1959.
- , *India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World*. London, Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Chakrabarti, Atulananda, *Nehru: His Democracy and India*. Calcutta, Thacker's Press & Directories Ltd., 1961.
- Chakrabarti, Raghubir, *Human Rights and the United Nations*. Calcutta, Progressive Publishers, 1958.
- Chase, Eugene P., *The United Nations in Action*. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1950.
- Cousins, Norman, *Talks With Nehru*. New York, John Day, 1951.
- Dallin, Alexander, *The Soviet Union at the United Nations*. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.
- Das, Taraknath, *India in World Politics*. New York, 1932.
- Dastur, Aloo J., *India and the Commonwealth*. Ahmedabad, Harold Laski Institute of Political Science, 1960.
- Dayal, Shiv, *India's Role in the Korean Question: A Study in the*

- Settlement of International Disputes under the United Nations.* Delhi, S. Chand & Co., 1959.
- Dutt, R. Palme, *India : Today and Tomorrow.* Delhi, People's Publishing House Ltd., Revised and Abridged Edition of *India Today*, 1955.
- Eichelberger, Clark M., *U.N. : The First Ten Years.* New York, Harper, 1955.
- Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand, *Non-Violence in Peace & War*, Vols. I & II. Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing House, Reprints 1960 and 1962.
- , *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* (Volumes of the period), The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India.
- Ganguli, B.N., *India's Economic Relations with the Pacific Areas and the Far East.* New Delhi, Indian Council of World Affairs, 1952.
- Gangu, Madhusudan, *India's Foreign Policy.* Bombay, The New Book Company.
- Goodrich, Leland Mathew and Hambro Edvard Isak, *The Charter of the United Nations, Commentary and Documents*, London, Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 2nd and Revised Edition, 1949.
- Govinda Raj, B.V., *India and Disputes in the United Nations, 1946-54.* Bombay, Vora, 1959.
- Guha, Sunil, *Welfare Economics in India.* Calcutta, Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1960.
- Gupta, Karunakar, *Indian Foreign Policy in Defence of National Interest (An Analytical Study of Indian Foreign Policy).* Calcutta, The World Press Private Ltd., 1956.
- Gupta, Sisir, *India and Regional Integration in Asia.* Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1964.
- Hovet, Thomas (Jr.), *Bloc Politics in the United Nations*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960.
- Hupei, Robert Strausz & Hazard, Harty W. (Ed.), *The Idea of Colonialism . . .*
- India and The United Nations.* Report of a Study Group set up by the Indian Council of World Affairs (National Studies on International Organization). New York, Manhattan Publishing Co., 1957.
- Iqbal Singh, *India's Foreign Policy.* Bombay, Hind Kitabs, 1946.

- Joshi, G.N., *The Constitution of India*. Calcutta, Macmillan & Co. Limited, Fifth Edition, 1966.
- Kahol, Om Prakash, *India's Foreign Policy : A Critique*. Bombay, Libertarian Social Institute, 1958.
- Karunakaran, K.P., *India in World Affairs, August 1947—January 1950 : A Review of India's Foreign Relations from Independence Day to Republic Day*. Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1952.
- , *India in World Affairs, February 1950-December 1953: A Review of India's Foreign Relations*. Calcutta, Oxford University Press, 1958.
- , (Ed.), *Outside The Contest: A Study of Non-alignment and the Foreign Policies of Some Non-aligned Countries*. New Delhi, People's Publishing House, 1963.
- Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol. VI, 1946-48 and Vol. VIII, 1950-52.
- Kelsen, Hans, *The Law of the United Nations*. London, London Institute of World Affairs, 1950.
- Khan, Mohd. Shabbir, *India's Economic Development and International Economic Relations*. Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1961.
- Kochukoshy, C.K., *India & United Nations* (Forum Letters on International Affairs). Delhi, The International Cultural Forum, 1953.
- Kondapi, C., *Indians Overseas 1838-1949*. Delhi, Indian Council of World Affairs, 1951.
- Kothari, Shantilal, *India's Emerging Foreign Policies*. Bombay, Vora and Co. Publications, 1951.
- Krishnamachari, V.T., *Fundamentals of Planning in India*. Calcutta, Orient Longmans, 1962.
- Kundra, Jagdish Chandra, *Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-54: A Study of Relations with the Western Bloc*. Groningen (Netherlands), J.B. Wolters, 1955.
- Lanka Sundaram, *India in World Politics: A Historical Analysis and Appraisal*. Delhi, Sultan Chand & Company, 1944.
- Levi, Werner, *Free India in Asia*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1957.
- Lie, Trygve, *In The Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations*. New York, Macmillan, 1954.
- Lohia, Rammanohar, *The Third Camp in World Affairs*. Bombay, Socialist Party, 2nd Ed., 1951.

- , *Indian Foreign Policy*. Allahabad, The All India Congress Committee, 1938.
- London Institute of World Affairs, *Year Books of World Affairs*. London, Stevens.
- MacLaurin, John, *The United Nations and Power Politics*.
- Madan Gopal, *India as a World Power: Aspects of Foreign Policy*. Delhi, Rajkamal Publications, 1948.
- Masani, M.R., *Neutrality in India*. Bombay, Democratic Research Service, 1951.
- Mende, Tibor, *Conversations with Mr. Nehru*. London, Sacker & Warburg, 1956.
- Menon, K.P.S., *Many Worlds: An Autobiography*. Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1965.
- , *The Flying Troika*. Bombay, Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Menon, V.P., *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States*.
- Misra, B.R., *Economic Aspects of the Indian Constitution*. Calcutta, Orient Longmans, Second Revised Edition, September 1958.
- Moraes, Frank, *India Today*. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1960.
- Munshi, K.M., *The End of An Era: Hyderabad Memories*. Bombay, Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, 1957.
- Murti, B.S.N., *Nehru's Foreign Policy*. New Delhi, The Beacon Information and Publications, 1953.
- Murty, K. Satchidananda, *Indian Foreign Policy*. Calcutta, Scientific Book Agency, 1964.
- Needler, Martin C., *Understanding Foreign Policy*. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1966.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, *Before and After Independence: A Collection of Speeches 1922-50*. New Delhi, Indian Printing Works, 1951.
- , *Independence and After: A Collection of Speeches 1946-49*. New York, John Day, 1950.
- , *India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961*. The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961.
- , *Press Conferences 1950 to 1953*. New Delhi, Information Services of India.
- , *Speeches, 1949-53*. New Delhi, Publications Division, Government of India, 1954.

- , *Soviet Russia: Some Random Sketches and Impressions*. Bombay, Chetana, 1949. First Published 1929.
- Panikkar, K.M., *Asia and the Western Dominance*. London, Allen & Unwin, 1953.
- , *In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat*. London, Allen & Unwin, 1955.
- Parameswaran, C., *Nehru's Foreign Policy X-Rayed*. New Delhi, The Republican Series, No. 3, 1954.
- Patel, Satyavrata Ramdas, *Foreign Policy of India: An Inquiry and Criticism*. Bombay, N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd., 1960.
- Pavlov, V.I., *India: Economic Freedom versus Imperialism*. New Delhi, People's Publishing House, 1963.
- Puntambekar, S.V., *The Foreign Policy of the Indian Union*. Baroda, Padmaja Publications, 1948.
- Raghavan, N., *India and Malaya*. Bombay, Orient Longmans, 1954.
- Rajkumar, N.V., *The Background of India's Foreign Policy*. New Delhi, All India Congress Committee, 1952.
- Rao, B. Shiva, *India's Foreign Relations 1947-51*. New Delhi, 1952.
- Rao, V.K.R.V., and Dharm Narain, *Foreign Aid and India's Economic Development*. Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1963.
- Rosinger, L.K., *India and the United States*. New York, Macmillan, 1950.
- Saletore, Bhasker Anand, *India's Diplomatic Relations with the West*. Bombay, Popular Book Depot, 1958.
- Sharma, Sri Ram, *India's Foreign Policy—The British Interpretations, 1947-57*. Gwalior, Gyan Mandir, 1961.
- Sitaramayya, B. Pattabhi, *The History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1935)*, 2 Vols. The Working Committee of the Congress, 50th Anniversary, 1935.
- Tansky, Leo., *U.S. and U.S.S.R. Aid to Developing Countries: A Comparative Study of India, Turkey and the U.A.R.* New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Second Printing, 1968.
- Taylor, Alastair McDonald, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations*. London, Stevens & Sons, 1960.
- Mitra, H.N., and Mitra, N.N. (Eds.), *The Indian Annual Register: An Annual Digest of Public Affairs of India, 1919-1947*. Calcutta, The Annual Register Office.

- Alexandrowicz Charles Henry (Ed.), The Indian Year Book of International Affairs, 1952.* Published under the auspices of the Indian Study Group of International Affairs, University of Madras. Madras, 1952.
- Grant, S. McClellan (Ed.), The Reference Shelf, Vol. 32, No. 1 INDIA.*
- The Year Books of the United Nations, New York.*
- The Year Books on Human Rights (U.N.).*
- Thien, Ton That, India and South-East Asia, 1947-60: A Study of India's Policy Towards the South-East Asian Countries in the Period 1947-60.* Geneve, Librairie Droz, 1963.
- Venkatarangiya, M., India in World Affairs 1950-51.* Indian Council of World Affairs, 1952.
- Worsley, Peter, The Third World.* London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964.
- Wortley, Ben Atkinson (Ed.), The United Nations: The First Ten Years.* Manchester, University Press, 1957.

PERIODICALS

- American Political Science Review*
- Asiatic Review*
- Calcutta Review*
- Capital*
- Commerce (Bombay)*
- Contemporary Review*
- Eastern Economist (New Delhi)*
- Foreign Affairs (U.S.A.)*
- Fortnightly*
- India Quarterly (I.C.W.A.).*
- Indian Journal of Political Science (Bombay).*
- International Affairs (London).*
- International Conciliation*
- International Organization (U.S.A.)*
- Modern Review (Calcutta)*
- Nation*
- New Republic*
- New Statesman & Nation*
- Nineteenth Century*

Pacific Review

Round Table

Spectator

The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science

The Hindu (Madras)

The Hindustan Times (New Delhi)

The Times (London)

The New York Times

The Statesman (Calcutta)

U.S. News & World Report

World Politics

World Review

Quest (Bombay)

INDEX

- Absorption of forces, 10-1
- Acheson, Dean, 138
- Acheson plan, 134, 205
- Aden, 193
- Afghanistan, 193, 214
- Africa, 17, 97, 107, 156, 166, 195, 218
- Afro-Asian Bloc, 213
- Agriculture, and planning, 38-40;
 - and foreign assistance, 40
- Ahimsa and Satyagraha, tenets of, 4
- Aiyar, S. Subrahmanian, on importance of commerce and industry, 95
- Ali Yavar Jung, *Nawab*, on technical assistance, 81
- All India Congress Committee
 - resolution condemning colonial powers intervention in Asian countries, 155-56;
 - on regional arrangements, 210
- American wheat loan, 77
- Angre, Kanhoji, 194
- Anti-colonialism, 13-5
- ANZUS, 104, 170
- Appadorai, on India's anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism policy, 211
- Appadorai, A., 217
- Arab Muslim refugees, 185
- Arab Nationalism, 125
- Arab Refugee, 127
- Arab State, 123
- Arabia, 193
- Arabian Desert, 193
- Arabian Ocean, 112
- Arabian Sea, 195
- Arabs, 124-26, 130;
 - Mahatma Gandhi, 129
- Arce, Jose, on Kashmir problem, 60
- Argentina, 134
- Aristotle, 11
- Ashoka, 4
- Asia, 97, 107, 156, 166, 218;
 - Big Powers' foreign aid to, 56;
 - nationalism in, 121
- Asian Nationalism, 166
- Asianism, 167, 169
- Attlee, 141
- Attlee, Clement, *Lord*, 115
- Australia, 18, 34, 113, 122, 128, 170, 218;
 - aid to India, 41
 - opposition to division of Korea, 65
- Ayyangar, Gopalaswami, on Kashmir problem, 60
- Baghdad, 193
- Baghdad Pact, 107
- Baguio Conference, and India, 169
- Baker, Philip Noel

- on Kashmir problem, 59-60
- on ceasefire in Korea, 64
- Balkanization, 195
- Bank of England, 108, 163
- Belgium, 18, 20, 59-60
- Ben-Gurion, David
 - on friendly relations with India, 126-27
- Berlin Problem, India's attitude towards, 131-32
- Bhutan, 193
- Big Powers, objectives of, in the cold war, 100-01
- Bokaro thermal power plant, 86
- Bokaro-Konar power project, 86
- Bose, Subhas Chandra, 95
- Bowles, Chester, on India's role in Korean crisis, 58
- Brazil, 88, 195
- Brecher, Michael, 205
 - on India's policy of non-alignment, 31-2
- British capital investment, in India, 108-09.
- British capitalism, 110
- British colonial system, 16
- British Guyana, 194
- British Imperialism, hold on India, 109
- British Monopoly, 109
- British War Office, 111
- Buddhism, 4, 151
- Burma, 12, 49, 121-22, 156, 160, 170, 220
 - persons of Indian origin in, 191
 - India's aid to, 201
- Canada, 18, 34, 59, 60, 115, 123, 195
 - aid to India, 41
 - opposition to division of Korea, 65
- Cease-fire, in Korea, 138-42
- Census of India's foreign liabilities and assets, 1960, 110
- Central Asia, 194
- Central Tractor Organization, 40
- Ceylon, 121, 170
- Chiang Kai-shek, 113
- Chicago Tribune, on India's attitude in Korean crisis, 58
- Chile, 88
- China, 25, 59, 60, 121
 - cooperation in solving Korean crisis, 136
 - India's appeal for admission to the U.N., 138
 - and Korean cease-fire resolution, 139-42
 - and India's resolution on Korean Prisoners of War issue, 143
 - and Korean crisis, 146-47, 149
- Chinese, 161
- Churchill, Winston, 203
 - on partition of India, 47
- Cold War, India's attitude towards, 102-03, 105-07.
- Collective Measures Committee, 134
- Colombia, 59-60
- Colombo Plan, 35, 170
 - assistance to India, table, 76

- Colombo Plan Consultative Committee, 1952, *Karachi*, 35
- Colonialism, 165-66
- Columbus, 190
- Commission on Human Rights, 177
- Committee of Good Offices, 122-23
- Commonwealth, 54, 163, 199, 220
—features of, 114-15
—role during Korean war, 115
- Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, 1951, 112;
—and Korean War, 115
- Communism, 101, 121, 152, 165-67, 169, 184
- Communist China, 127, 169
- Communist Youth Congress, and Malaya, 161
- Conference on Indonesia, *Delhi*, 14, 20, 121, 148
- Conquistadors, 124
- Cooley Fund, 71
- Covenants on Human Rights, 177
- Cranganore, 124
- Cuba, 18
- Czechoslovakia, 62, 123
- Damascus, 193
- Damodar Valley Corporation, 86
- Dead Sea, 130
- Declaration of Human Rights, and India, 208-09.
- Denmark, 19
—and human rights, 174
- Deshmukh, C.D., on foreign capital in India, 110
- Disarmament, and India, 98
- Djakarta, 123
- Draft covenants on human rights, 175, 184
- D'Souza, *Father*, on India's views on human rights, 178
- Dumbarton Oaks, 200
- Dunlop, 109
- Dutt, R. Palme, on nationality based on religion, 183
- Earl Mountbatten of Burma, as Governor-General of India, 112
- East Africa, British colonies of, 194
- Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), 11, 54, 218
—India's efforts for Indonesia's entry into, 201
- Economic Policy, of India, 29-31
- Ecuador, 18
- Eden, 115
- Eden, Anthony, 64
- Egypt, 18, 156
—and Israel, 128
- Eight-Power draft resolution, on Korean crisis, 146
- Eighteen-Nation Conference on Indonesia, 21, 123
- Einstein, Albert, 130
- El Khouri, on Kashmir problem, 60
- Entezam, Nasrullah, 142
- Eritrea, 12
- Ethiopia, 12

- Fabian Policy, 166
- Federal Government for Palestine, 125
- Federal Reserve Bank of India, and private foreign investments in India, 110
- Fiji Islands, 191
- Five Year Plan, *First*, 32, 197
 - foreign commitments, 32-7
 - technical assistance, 38
 - agriculture, 38-40
 - foreign assistance, 40-2
 - causes of dependence on foreign assistance, 43
 - foreign policy of India, 44-6
 - foreign capital for, 70-2
- Food and Agriculture Organization, 54, 128
- Ford Foundation, aid to India, 75-6
- Foreign aid, to India,
 - policy regarding U.N. assistance, 79-83
 - comparison between bilateral and international, 82-3
 - comparison between U.N. assistance and Big Powers aid, 89-91
- Foreign assistance, to India, for first Five Year Plan, 32-5
 - economic development, 35-6, 43
- Foreign investment, in India,
 - public sector, 70-1
 - private sector, 71
 - U.S. conditions of, 71
- during first Five Year Plan, by U.S. 72
- by Canada, 72
- by Australia, 72
- by New Zealand, 72
- by I.B.R.D., 72
- share of U.K., 110
- Foreign Policy, and foreign assistance, 42, 55
 - and national economy, 50
- Foreign Policy, of India, under Directive Principles of State Policy 8-9
 - foreign commitments, 32
 - foreign assistance, 42-7, 49, 57, 69
 - problems of, after partition, 47-8
 - U.S. foreign aid, 56
 - Big Powers' aid, 56-7
 - factors influencing, 93-4
 - economic considerations in, 94, 96
 - factors determining, 116-18
 - national interest factor in, 155
 - elimination of want, disease and illiteracy as a basic factor in, 164
 - national self-interest objective in, 165-67
 - persons of Indian origin as a factor in, 188-90
 - fight against racial discrimination as a factor of, 192
- Foreign Trade, of India,

- trends in, 57
- Formosa, 148
- Four Freedoms, 51
- France, 18, 60
- Freedom of information, 181-82
- French Revolution, 5
- Fulton speech, 203
- Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy in Indian Constitution, 1950, and U.N. charter, 3.
- Gandhi, Mahatma, 43, 170
 - pacifism of, 4
 - on the cause of the Jews, 128-31
 - Arabs, 129
 - Indians overseas, 192
- Gandhism, 217
- Geneva Convention, 143-44
- Genocide Convention, 208
- Grady, Henry, 202
- Great Britain, 18, *see also* United Kingdom
- Greece, 19
- Green Revolution, 40
- Gromyko, on Kashmir problem, 60
- Guatemala, 18, 123
- Gujaratis, 192
- Gurkha mercenaries, in Malaya, 164
- Gurkha troops, 112
- Gurkhas, 151
- The Hague agreement, 19
- Haiti, 174
- Hammaraskjoeld, Dag, on Unit-ing for Peace resolution, 135
- Henderson, Roy, 148
- The Hindu, on Berlin problem, 131
- Ho Chi Minh, 156, 159
- Ho Chi Minh's Government, 155, 158
- Hongkong, 193
- Hudson, G.F., on Indian policy on Kashmir and Korean issues, 26
- Human Rights
 - India's attitude towards, 174-75
 - in United Nations, 176-82, 185
 - in Trust Territories, 176
 - in India, 195-97
- Human rights and Funda-mental Freedoms, 176
 - in India, 182-84
- Hyderabad, 50, 202
- Imperial chemicals, 109
- India, attitude towards United Nations Organization, 1-2
 - constitution of, compared with U.N. Charter, 4-9
 - Directive Principles of State Policy under consti-tution of, 6, 8
 - economic collaboration with U.N. 7-8
 - relations with U.N., 9-10
 - contribution to U.N. in respect of absorption of forces, 10-11
 - U.N. Trusteeship system, 12-3
 - anti-colonialism in U.N., 13-5

- Non-Self-Governing Territories, 15-6
- South-West Africa, 16-9
- the Indonesian problem, 19-22
- the Kashmir issue, 22-3
- the Korean issue, 23-6
- economic policy of, 29-31
- Colombo Plan, 35
- aid from U.S.S.R., 45,
- relations with Pakistan, 48
- foreign policy of, 49-50
- foreign aid to, 53, 55, 81-2
- U.N. agencies foreign aid to, 53-4
- U.S. wheat loan to, 56
- U.S. foreign aid to, 58-9
- Anglo-American resolution on Kashmir problem, 61
- opposition to partition of Korea, 65
- economic difficulties of, 67-70
- foreign trade in 1948-49, 68
- per capita income in 1948-49, 68
- investment of foreign capital in, 70-2
- U.S. aid to, 73-6
- aid by Ford Foundation, 75-6
- policy of foreign aid, 80
- policy regarding U.N. assistance, 79-83
- proposal for creating fund for financing economic development, 80-1
- International Monetary Fund assistance to, 83-5
- loan by I.B.R.D., 85-7
- assistance under United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, 87
- borrowings from the I.M.F. and I.B.R.D. during 1947-1952, table, 88
- Norwegian aid through the U.N.O., 88
- policy regarding U.N. assistance, 89-91
- factors influencing foreign policy of, 93-4
- economic planning, 94-5
- economic considerations in foreign policy of, 94, 96
- industrialization as a key to economic growth in, 95
- disarmament, 98
- situation after independence in, 99-100
- Super Powers' ideological conflict, 102
- capitalism and Communism, 102
- attitude towards cold war, 102-03, 105-07
- attitude towards Western Powers, 103
- opposition to regional military alliances, 103-04
- views on Communism, 104

- foreign policy compared with U.S. foreign policy, 104
- foreign policy components, 104-05
- relations with Commonwealth, 107-08, 113-16
- economic relations with Britain, 108
- British capital investment in, 108-09
- private foreign investment in, Britains' share, 110
- defence problem of, dependence on U.K., 111-12
- relations with U.K., 112-13
- attitude towards Korean war, 113
- factors determining foreign policy of, 116-18
- attitude towards Indonesian struggle, 120-23
- policy of support for Asian freedom movements, 120-21
- policy of anti-imperialism, 120-21
- favours nationalism in Asia, 121
- South East Asia policy of, 121-22
- attitude towards Palestine problem, 123-31
- attitude towards Jews, 124
- factors influencing attitude towards Palestine problem, 125
- attitude towards Berlin problem, 131-32
- attitude towards Korean crisis, 132-33
- attitude towards Uniting for Peace resolution, 133-35
- relations with China, 136-37
- draft resolution for cease-fire in Korea, 139
- resolution for immediate cease fire in Korea, 143
- Korean P.O.W. issue, 143-44
- attitude towards China's role in Korea, 149-50
- support to China's membership to U.N., 150
- relations with China in respect of Tibet, 150-52
- policy of peaceful coexistence, 152
- national interest factor in foreign policy of, 155
- relations with Vietnam, 155-56
- attitude towards Indo-China, 155-60
- compared with attitude towards Indonesia, 155
- factors influencing policy towards Vietnam, 158-59
- relations with France, 159-60
- policy towards South East Asia, 160-61

- attitude towards Malaya, 160-64
- British colonialism in Malaya, 162-63
- economic relations with Malaya, 164
- approaches in foreign policy in South East Asia, 164-70
- foreign policy of, national self-interest objective in, 165-67
- opposition to regional pacts in Asia, 167
- recall of armed forces from South East Asia, 168
- Pacific Pact, 170
- human rights and fundamental freedoms in, 182-84
- attitude towards Palestine, 185
- Israel, 185
- persons of Indian origin as a factor in foreign policy of, 188-90
- racial discrimination as a factor in foreign policy of, 192
- human rights in, 195-97
- factors governing policy towards U.N., 199-220
- aid to Nepal, 201
- economic reconstruction consideration in relations with U.N., 200-06
- Indonesia's entry in ECAFE, 201
- aid to Burma, 201
- U.N. foreign assistance to, 201-03
- U.N. developmental assistance, 202-03
- non-self-governing territories, 208-09
- declaration of Human Rights, 208-09
- regional arrangements, 209-10
- non-alignment policy of, 209-10, 214-15
- anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism policy, 211-13
- foreign policy of, 216
- veto, 216-17
- India, National Planning Committee, 95
- India, Planning Commission, purposes of, 32-3
- declaration on economic assistance, 70
- on foreign capital, 81
- on human rights spirit, 182-83
- Indian army, British control over, 111
- Indian Cabinet, decision on Korea, 148
- Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee, 1931, 109.
- Indian citizens, in South Africa, and Indian National Congress, 186-87.
- Indian Civil Service, 112
- Indian Communist Party, 100

- Indian Economy, British control over, 108-09
- Indian Emergency Food Aid Act, 1951, aid to India under, 73
- Indian Empire, 192-95
 - Guy went on the reasons of spread of, 193
- Indian Iron and Steel Company, 86
- Indian labourers, in Malaya, 163
- Indian National Congress, 65, 92-5, 192
 - on the Indians overseas, 186-87
 - on racial discrimination in South Africa, 187
- Indian National Congress, 1950, *Nasik*, on Berlin problem, 131-32
- Indian National Congress, All India Congress Committee, 1952, *Calcutta*, resolution on cold war, 106
- Indian Navy, 162, 168
- Indian Ocean, 112, 120, 162, 168
- Indians overseas, and Indian National Congress, 186
 - question in the U.N., 186, 188
 - problems of, 190-91
 - problems regarding re-entry in India, 191-92
 - contribution in national revenue, 192
 - Mahatma Gandhi, 192
 - causes of growth, 193-95
 - as traders, 194-95
- Indo-American Technical Cooperation Fund, aid to India under, 74
 - constitution of, 75
- Indo-China, 31, 46, 148, 152, 156, 193, 199
- Indo-South African dispute, in U.N. General Assembly, on human rights, 179
- Indo-U.S. Technical Cooperation Agreement, 1952, aid to India under, 74
 - provisions of, 74-5
- Indo-U.S. Technical Cooperation Programmes, 40
- Indonesia, 19-22, 170, 181, 193, 199, 207, 218
- Indonesian case, 220
- Indonesian Republicans, 168
- Indonesian Struggle, India's attitude, 120-23
- Industrial Policy Resolution, 1948, 70
- Inter Asian Relations Conference, and Ho Chi Minh's government, 156-57
 - recommendations of, 157
 - economic development of Asia, 170-71
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 54, 71
 - aid to India during the first Five Year Plan, 41
 - loan to India, 85-7
- International Court of Justice, 18-19
- International Economic Order, 8

- International Labour Organization, 218
- International Monetary Fund, 54
 - aid to India, 83-5
- International Trusteeship System, 13, 16
- Iran, 123, 127, 156
- Israel, 123, 126-27, 185
 - India recognizes legal existence of, 127
 - reasons of India's recognition of, 127-28
- Israelis, 126
- Italian colonies, 17
- Iyenger, M. Ananthasayanam, on economic cooperation with South East Asia, 202
- Jamaica, 194
- Jammu and Kashmir, 59
 - question, 60
- Japan, and external resources, 34
- Jebb, Gladwyn, 60
 - arbitration proposal on Kashmir problem, 60-1
- Jerusalem, 123-24
 - status of, 128
- Jewish immigration, 124
- Jewish State, 123
- Jews, 124-25, 130
 - India's attitude on, 124
 - in Malabar, 124
 - Mahatma Gandhi, 128-31
 - compared with untouchables of India, 129
- Jinnah, Mohammed Ali, Two-nation theory of, 183
- Judea, 124
- Junagadh, 60
- Kaesong, 143
- Kalimpong, 152
- Kamath, H.V., 126
- Karen rebel, 150, 201
- Kashmir, 22-3, 26, 43, 47, 100, 105, 111, 169, 199
 - India's attitude, 200
- Kashmir Problem, Big Powers' role in, 59
 - Britain's role in, 59-60
 - U.S. role in, 59
 - India's objection to arbitration proposal, 60-1
 - arbitration resolution, 61
 - Anglo-American resolution, 61
- Kashmir Question, 125, 218-19
- Keskar, B.V., on recognition of Israel, 126
- Keynes, J.M., 8
- Kondapi, C., 148
- Korea, 23-6, 31, 46, 65, 152, 207, 214, 217-18
 - Unified Command of U.N. in, 25
 - Chester Bowles on India's role in, 58
 - India's opposition to partition of, 65
 - Canada and Australia oppose partition of, 65
 - cease-fire in, 138-42
- Korean crisis, India's resolution on the establishment of Repatriation Commission on Korea, 62
 - India's role in, 61-6, 199-200

- India's attitude towards, 132-33
- China's cooperation in solving, 136
- India's role in U.N. Security Council, 137-38
- India's role in U.N. General Assembly, 139-40
- cease-fire resolution, 141
- Korean war, and India, 113
 - role of Commonwealth in, 115
 - impact on Indian economy, 137
- Kripalani, J.B., on France's intervention in Indo-China, 156
- Krishna Menon, V.K., on the Korean P.O.W. issue, 144-45
 - on India's attitude towards U.N., 205
- Krishnamachari, V.T., on the economic reconstruction, 201
- Kuomintang, 121
- Lajpat Rai, Lala, 95
- Lake Success, 219
- Lamas, 194
- Latin America, 97
- League Covenant, 11
- League of Nations, 2, 207
- Lebensraum, 169
- Lever Brothers, 109
- Levi, Werner, 170
- Liberia, 19
- Libya, U.N. administration of, 12
- Iie, Trygve, 187
- Lopez, on Kashmir problem, 60
- MacArthur, Douglas, on the Korean cease-fire resolution, 142
- Macaulay, Lord, on class hierarchy, 99
- Maharaj Singh, 16
- Malabar, 124
- Malay Communist Party, 162
- Malaya, 112, 151, 156, 160, 170, 199
 - India's attitude towards, 160-64
 - India's support to British colonialism in, 162-63
 - economic relations with India, 164
- Malayan nationalism, 161
- Malayans, 161
- Managing agency, British system of control over industry, 108-09
- Mani, A.D., on freedom of information, 181-82
- Marshall, and human rights, 176
- Marxism, 151
- Marxist Leviathan, 166
- Max Mueller, 4
- Mehta, Hansa, on human rights, 180-81
- Menon, K., 210
- Menon, K.P.S., on Korean crisis, 61-2
 - on partition of Korea, 65
- Mexico, 174
- Middle East, 125, 185

- Military alliances, India's opposition to, 103-04
- Mill, John Stuart, 8
- Minority report, 125
- Monroe Doctrine, 167
- Mookherjee, Shyama Prasad, on U.S. assistance, 202
- Mountbatten, *Lord*, 168
- Mountbatten settlement, 110
- Mudaliar, A. Ramaswami, on I.B.R.D.'s work, 87-8
- Mudaliar, Ramaswami, 11
 - on human rights, 178-79
- Muslim States, 125
 - of West Asia and Pakistan oppose partition of Palestine, 125
- Muslims, 125
- Mutual Security Organization of the U.S.A., aid to India under, 74
- Nagas, 196
- Nair chieftains, 124
- Nationalism, 165-67
- NATO, 104
- Needler, Martin C., on U.S. foreign aid, 58
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, and the U.N. Charter, 1
 - on objectives of the Constitution, 5-6
 - on U.N.'s economic aspect, 11
 - on India's anti-colonial policy, 15
 - on Indonesian problem, 21
 - on Kashmir, 22
 - on Korean issue, 24
 - on India's policy of peace, 28-9
 - on industrialization, 29
 - foreign policy of, 29
 - on foreign assistance to India, 36-7
 - on technical assistance, 38
 - on foreign policy of India, 45, 48
 - on India's relations with Pakistan, 48
 - on foreign assistance, 54-5
 - on India's support to partition of Korea, 66
 - on India's economic policy, 69-70
 - on foreign aid, 79
 - Chairman of National Planning Committee, 95
 - on economic policy, influencing foreign policy, 95-6
 - on U.N.'s role as a welfare agency, 96-8
 - on situation in India after independence, 100
 - on ideological conflict, 102
 - and cold war, 105-06
 - on problems of Europe, 106
 - on dependence on U.K. for India's defence, 111
 - on India's membership of the Commonwealth, 115-16
 - on India's attitude in the cold war, 116

- on adoption of Uniting for Peace resolution, 134
- on China's admission to U.N., 133
- plan to solve Korean crisis, 140
- on Korean P.O.W. issue, 144
- on Korean war, 148-49
- on China's role in Korea, 149
- policy of, on bringing East and West close, 150
- on China, 151
- on Tibet, 152
- on France's intervention in Indo-China, 156
- on support to freedom movement in Vietnam, 157
- on India's role in Asia, 159
- attitude towards France, 160
- declines recognition to Ho Chi Minh regime, 160
- on Malaya, 161
- and Ho Chi Minh's government, 161
- on Malayan independence, 163
- and British control over Malaya, 163-64
- on Malayan liberation movement, 164
- on India's Asian Policy, 167
- on racialism, 186
- on racial discrimination in South Africa, 187
- on Indians overseas, 189
- on India's non-alignment policy, 203
- on India's attitude towards W.N., 213
- on world government, 217
- on India's relations with the U.N., 217
- on United Nations Organization, 220
- Nepal, 112, 150, 164, 193
 - India's aid to, 201
- Netherlands, 18, 20, 122-23, 168, 207
- Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission on Korea, 115
- New Delhi, 219
- New Testament, 130
- New Zealand, 113
 - aid to India, 41
- Non-Self Governing Territories, 15-6, 174
 - and India, 208-09
- Non-alignment, 10
 - Indian policy of, 29-31, 49-50
- North Korea, 23, 65, 145
 - and China, 141
- Northern India, 194
- Norway, 18-9
 - aid to, 41
 - aid to India through the U.N.O., 88
- Nuremberg trial, 208
- Orissa, 168
- P.L. 480, 71
- Pacific Pact, and India, 170
- Pakistan, 12, 50, 107, 113, 121,

- Truman, 141-42
 —India as a peace-maker between China and Western Powers, 140
 —Korean war, 148
- Truman, Harry S., 115
- Trust Territories, and human rights, 176
- Trusteeship system, 12-3, 15
- Turkey, 19, 127
- U.S.E.C. Agency, aid to India under, 73
- U.S.S.R., 17, 105, 141
 —aid to India, 32, 41, 45, 55
 —India's resolution on Korean P.O.W. issue, 143
 —on withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, 146
- Uganda, 17
- Union of South Africa, 18, 192
 —treatment of Indian citizens and India's reaction, 179, 186-88
- United Kingdom, 16, 20, 50, 112, 115, 141
 —aid to India, 41, 76-7
- United Nations, purposes of, 3-4, 186, 207-08
 —economic collaboration with India, 7-8
 —India, 9-10, 199-220
 —India's opposition to martial role of, 133
 —foreign assistance to India, 201-03
 —developmental assistance to India, 202-03
- United Nations Charter, 10, 219
 —India, 1
 —contents of, 2-4
 —fundamental rights, 3
 —Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, 3
 —compared with constitution of India, 4-9
- United Nations Command in Korea, 142
- United Nations Commission for Indonesia, 123
- United Nations Commission for Korea, 148
- United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 180
- United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Working Group, 181
- United Nations Conference on International Organization, 11
- United Nations Economic and Development Administration, 80
- United Nations Economic and Social Council, 11, 54, 177, 203-04
- United Nations Economic and Social Council, Sub Commission on Economic Development, 80
- United Nations Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 4, 33, 54, 217-18
- United Nations General Assembly

- Korean crisis in, India's role in, 139-40
- and resolution of Korea, 145-47
- United Nations General Assembly, Political Committee, and Palestine problem, 126
- Trusteeship Committee, 16
- United Nations Peace Fund, 98
- United Nations Security Council, and Indonesian problem, 19
- Kashmir problem, 22, 26, 59
- Korean issue, 23
- Indonesian struggle, India's role in, 122-23
- Korean crisis, India's role in, 137-38
- United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 123
- United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, 202
- assistance to India under, 87
- United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, 62, 65, 138
- India as a member of, 64
- United Nations Trusteeship Committee, 18
- United Nations Trusteeship Council, 16-7, 209
- United Nations Trusteeship Territories, India's stand on, 14
- United Nations Unified Command of, in Korea, 25
- United States, 16, 19, 34, 105, 107, 115, 141, 170, 219-20
- Bill of rights of, 5
- involvement in Korea, 24
- foreign capital, 34
- aid to India, 41
- foreign aid policy of, 53
- Korean cease-fire resolution, 142
- human rights, 174
- United States-Pakistan Defence Aid Agreement, 152
- United States, Congress, Foreign Relations Committee, 55
- United States Aid, and India's foreign policy, 56
- to India, 73-6
- United States Mutual Security Act, 1951, 53
- United States Special Development Fund, aid to India under, 73-4
- United States Wheat Loan, to India, 56
- United States Economic Assistance Programmes, objectives of, 78-9
- Uniting for Peace Resolution, 98
- India's opposition to U.N.'s martial role, 133
- India's attitude towards, 133-35
- provisions of, 134-35

- Dag Hammarskjöld on, 135
- U.S., 135
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 174-76, 184, 209
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 176, 208
 - compared with fundamental rights in Indian Constitution, 5
- Uruguay, 123
- Van Langenhove, 59
- Vasco Da Gama, 190
- Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, and U.N. Charter, 3
- Veto, and India, 216-17
- Vietnam, 156
 - relations with India, 155-
- 56
 - recognition of, India declines, 157
 - India's attitude towards, 158-59
- Viner, on U.S. aid programme, 77-8
- Vishinsky, Andrei, 63
- West Africa, 17
- White Australia, 171
- Wint, Guy, on the reasons of spread of Indian Empire, 193
- World Health Organization, 54
- Wu, 142
- Wu Hsiu-chuang, 139
- Yalu river, 149
- Yemen, 128
- Yugoslavia, 123